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ABSTRACT
INTENTIONAL IDENTITY AND REPORTING THE BELIEFS OF OTHERS
FEBRUARY 1996
GEOFFREY C. GODDU, B.A., HAMILTON COLLEGE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Edmund Gettier III
This work analyzes Peter Geach's problem of intentional identity, viz. adequately
formalizing the sentence "Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare and Nob wonders
whether she killed Cob's sow" and other sentences like it First, Geach's problem is
presented, and then Geach's original formalization proposals, and his own reasons for
rejecting them, are presented and discussed. Next, the solutions proposed by various
philosophers and linguists are presented and analyzed in detail. All are shown to be either
inadequate or incomplete. As a result, the standard objections to one particular solution,
the pronoun of laziness solution, are re-examined and shown to have problematic
consequences. Finally, a modified pronoun of laziness solution that avoids the standard
objections is presented and defended.
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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM OF INTENTIONAL IDENTITY
In his 1967 paper, "Intentional Identity," P.T. Geach provided the following
problem. Consider a reporting of witch paranoia via the following sentence:
(1) Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether she
(the same witch) killed Cob's sow. 1
The problem is simply to determine the logical structure of (1). Unfortunately,
determining the logical structure of (1) is not a simple and straightforward task. Despite
the efforts of numerous philosophers and linguists, this tenacious problem has remained
unsolved. In order to make the reader understand the tenacity of the problem, I shall
present and analyze Geach's original presentation of the problem.
Chapter I has three main sections. In the first section, I shall briefly clarify
Geach's problem of intentional identity, which I shall refer to as "Geach’s Puzzle." 1 shall
also attempt to state what is required for a solution to Geach's Puzzle. In the latter two
sections I shall demonstrate that Geach's Puzzle is a tenacious problem by considering
several of Geach's criticisms of several proposed formalizations of (1). In the second
section, I shall consider Geach's criticisms of transparent readings of (1)
and discuss
attempts to circumvent these criticisms. In the third section, I shall
present Geach s
lp. T. Geach, "Intentional Identity," Journal ofPhilosophy 64 (1967):
628.
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criticisms of opaque readings of ( 1). I shall comment both on Geach's criticisms and on
attempts to avoid Geach's criticisms. I shall conclude that Geach correctly argued that
none of the proposals he considered adequately formalized his intended reading of (1).
Geach’s Puzzle
Determining the logical structure of (1) is Geach's Puzzle. The logical structure of
( 1) is not absolute, but can vary in at least two respects. First, like many sentences
containing intentional idiom, (1) has several readings. Thus, determining the logical
structure of (1) is not simply a matter of finding the logical structure of (1), but rather
involves finding logical structures for multiple readings of (1). Geach was interested in
providing a logical structure for one particular reading of (l)--what he called the
"intentional identity" reading. In one sense then, determining the logical structure for
Geach's reading of (1) constitutes a solution to Geach's Puzzle. Since (1) has multiple
readings, however, Geach's reading may not be the only problematic reading. Thus, for
the sake of thoroughness, I am interested in providing all readings of ( 1 ) with adequate
logical structures.
One useful way to identify and distinguish the various readings of (1) is to
consider various contexts, i.e. states of affairs or situations, in which some reading of ( 1
)
is true. In some contexts certain readings of (1) are true while in others they are not. For
2
example, some readings of ( 1) are true only if there are witches—such readings are false in
situations in which there are no witches. Other readings are true only if Hob has a
particular object in mind as a witch-such readings are false if Hob has no particular object
in mind as the witch.
Second, logical structure is relative to a formal language. For example, in
propositional logic (1) may be translated as either H & N or perhaps as just H, whereas in
predicate logic (1) may be translated as 3x(T(h, [Wx & Bxm]) & Win, [Kxs])). Since
(1) has multiple readings, we are interested in determining the logical structures, relative to
some formal language, of all the readings of (1). In fact, part of solving Geach's Puzzle
may involve specifying enough of a formal language to show that all of the readings of ( 1)
have adequate formalizations in that language. For the purposes of this dissertation, a
logical formalization or translation, T, of a reading of ( 1), R, is adequate as long as for all
contexts, C, (i) T is true in C iff R is true in C and (ii) any valid argument containing R as
a premise or conclusion remains valid when T is substituted for R. Thus, I shall consider
Geach's Puzzle solved if, relative to some formal language, adequate logical structures can
be found for all readings of ( 1 ).
Since adequate formalizations of readings are true in a context iff the reading is
true in the context, if a context can be generated in which some reading of (1) is true and
yet none of the formalizations of (1) are true, then there must be some reading of (1) for
which an adequate formalization is lacking, in which case Geach's Puzzle remains
3
unsolved. Thus, Geach's Puzzle will be solved if all readings of (1) have adequate
formalizations. In the remainder of this chapter I shall consider numerous readings of (1)
provided by Geach. I shall argue, as did Geach, that these readings are easily formalized,
but that none of these readings is Geach's intended reading of (1) and so Geach’s reading
remains without an adequate formalization. I shall begin by considering transparent
readings of (1).
Transparent Readings of Geach's Sentence
Geach is interested in formalizing a particular reading of:
( 1 ) Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether she
(the same witch) killed Cob's sow.
He illustrates the existence of this reading by providing contexts in which his intended
reading of (1) is true and yet other readings, for various reasons, cannot be true. Geach
begins by pointing out that "Quine has distinguished opaque and transparent ways of
construing indirect-speech clauses."2 Geach goes on to claim that "neither sort of
construction will give an appropriate sense to [(l)].”3 Let us begin by considering the
two transparent readings that Geach presents and rejects.
The first transparent reading of (1) Geach provides is:
(2) As regards some witch, Hob thinks she has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob
wonders whether she killed Cob's sow.
^Geach, 628.
^Geach, 628.
4
which is intended by Geach to have the following logical structure:
(2a) 3x(Wx & Hob thinks [Bxml & Nob wonders whether [Kxs]).4
Geach objects as follows: Imagine a speaker using (1) to report Hob's and Nob’s
intentional attitudes. (2) expresses what the speaker takes to "be the real, not the
intentional identity of a witch"5 and if the speaker does not believe in witches, the
speaker "could with consistency, assert [(1)] and deny [(2)]."6 More perspicuously, (2)
is not the intended, "intentional identity" reading. (2) implies the existence of witches and
Geach’s reading of ( 1 ) can be true in contexts in which there are no witches. Since (2)
cannot be true if there are no witches, (2a) is clearly not an adequate formalization of
Geach's reading of (1).
Since (2) and (2a) are not adequate, perhaps something like the following is:
(3) As regards somebody. Hob thinks she is a witch and has blighted Bob's
mare, and Nob wonders whether she killed Cob's sow.
(3) is intended to be formalized as:
(3a) 3x(Hob thinks [Wx & Bxm] & Nob wonders whether [Kxs]).
(3) and (3a) can be true if there are no witches, even though (2) and (2a) cannot. Geach,
4
'W', 'B', 'K' are the predicates 'is a witch', 'blighted', and 'killed'
respectively, 'm' is a name for Bob's mare and 's' is a name for Cob's sow. '3x' is an
actualist quantifier ranging over concrete objects. Though the intentional attitudes, Hob
thinks' and 'Nob wonders whether' are left unformalized, I shall be, in general, utilizing a
possible worlds semantics to analyze intentional attitudes.
5\vhat Geach means by "intentional identity" and "real identity" is extremely
unclear. Fortunately, Geach’s Puzzle can be both stated and shown to be extremely
difficult to solve without recourse to the terms. Thus, I shall generally avoid the terms.
fyjeach, 628.
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however, objects to (3) on the following grounds: (3) implies that Hob and Nob have
some particular person in mind and yet (1) might be true even if they "merely thought that
there was a witch around and their suspicions had not yet settled on a particular
person."7 Thus, (3a) is not an adequate formalization of Geach's reading of (1).
(2a) is inadequate because it is false in contexts in which there are no witches and
(3a) is inadequate because it is false in contexts in which Hob and Nob have no particular
person in mind as a witch. Notice, however, that if Geach’s objection against (3) holds,
then a similar objection will hold against (2)—(2) implies that Hob and Nob have a
particular witch in mind and yet even if there are witches. Hob and Nob may have no
particular witch in mind. Thus, perhaps there are two readings of (1) that so far elude
formalization-a reading which implies there are witches, but which fails to imply that Hob
and Nob have a particular witch in mind and a reading which does not imply there are
witches and which fails to imply that Hob and Nob have a particular object in mind.
Perhaps, on the other hand, there is only a single reading that eludes formalization-a
reading which fails to imply that Hob and Nob have a particular object in mind, witch or
otherwise. Undoubtedly, however, the key problem with (2a) and (3a) is that both imply
that Hob and Nob have a particular object in mind and there is at least one reading of (1)
that can be true even if Hob and Nob have no particular object in mind. So far, therefore,
the problematic contexts are contexts in which Hob and Nob have no particular person or
7Geach, 629.
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witch in mind. Thus, the current task is to provide a formalization that can be true when
Hob and Nob have no particular person or witch in mind.
Perhaps the formalization we want is already at hand. Shortly after Geach's
presentation of the problem, J. G. Barense argued, contra Geach, that (3) does not imply:
(4) Hob and Nob had some one person in mind as a suspected witch.
Barense argues as follows:
To see this consider
[(5)] As regards Jil or Lil, Hob thinks one (he knows not which) is
a witch and has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonder whether she
(the same one) killed Cob's sow.
Clearly | (5)] does logically imply [(3)]. Hence, since [(5)] is inconsistent
with [(4)], [(3)1 does not logically imply [(4)J.
8
If Barense is right, then, contra Geach, (3) might be an adequate reading of (1) in contexts
in which Hob and Nob have no particular person in mind.
But is Barense right? Barense's argument has the following form:
(i) []((5)-(3»
(ii) [l ((5)-~(4) , )
(iii) 0 ( (3) & ~(4))
The argument as it stands is invalid.9 If (5) is necessarily false, then (3) could still
logically imply (4). In other words, in order to be valid the argument needs the premise
(ii') 0 (5).
Adding premise (ii') seems benign enough, since it seems possible that as regards Jil or
8
J. G. Barense, "Identity in Indirect Disclosure," Journal ofPhilosophy 66
(1969): 382.
thank Ed Gettier for pointing out the invalidity of the argument to me.
7
Lil, Hob thinks one is a witch and has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether
she (the same one) killed Cob’s sow. Given the modified argument, the question
remains-is Barense right? Is it the case that (3) does not logically imply (4)?
What does Barense mean by the claim that (3) does not logically imply (4)?
Presumably. Barense is not suggesting that (3) formalized as (3a) does not imply (4).
(3a) does imply that Hob and Nob have some one person in mind as a suspected witch. If
(3a) is a logical translation of a reading of (3) which does imply (4), then, when Barense
claims that (3) does not imply (4), Barense must mean that there is another reading of (3)
which is neither translated as (3a) nor implies (4). Perhaps Barense thinks this other
reading of (3) is Geach’s intended reading of (1) and so argues that since "Geach has
given no other reasons for rejecting a transparent construal of ... (1), he has failed to give
any good reason for further considering the mysteries of ’intentional identity’." 10
But is there a reading of (3) that does not imply (4)? According to Barense, (5)
clearly implies such a reading of (3). If (5) clearly implies a reading of (3) that does not
imply (4), then
(6) As regards Jil or Lil, Hob thinks one (he knows not which) is a witch,
should equally as clearly imply a reading of
(7) As regards somebody. Hob thinks she is a witch,
that does not imply
^Barense, 382.
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(8) Hob has some one person in mind as a witch.
But, as I shall now argue, there is certainly no obvious reading of (6) that implies a
reading of (7) that does not imply (8).
If (6) were translated as:
(6a) 3x3y{(x = 1 & y = j) & (Hob thinks [Wx] v Hob thinks [Wy])}
then (6) would clearly imply (7). (6a), however, cannot translate the reading Barense has
in mind since (6a) also implies (8)—Hob has some one person in mind as a witch.
Perhaps (6) should be translated as:
(6b) 3x3y{(x = 1 & y = j) & Hob thinks [Wx v Wy]} 1
1
(6b) does not imply that Hob has some one person in mind as a witch. Unfortunately,
(6b) does not imply (7) either, but instead implies the opaque reading of:
(9) Hob thinks somebody is a witch.
If Hob truly does not know which one of Jil or Lil is a witch, then even if Hob knows
who Jil and Lil are and thinks one of them (which he is not sure) is a witch, it is not the
case that someone is such that Hob thinks she is a witch. The fact that (6b) is a
transparent reading of (6) in no way guarantees that a transparent version of (9) such as
(7) is implied by (6). Thus, (6) either fails to imply (7) at all or, if (6) does imply a
reading of (7), (6) also implies (8).
1 ^or a detailed discussion of analyzing plural de re sentences in quantified
modal logic see, Phillip Bricker, "Quantified Modal Logic and the Plural De Re,
"
Midwest Studies in Philosophy XIV (1989): 372-394.
9
The problems with (6) hold equally for (5). Either (5) fails to imply (3) at all, in
which case premise (i) is false, or if (5) does imply (3), then (5) also implies (4)~Hob and
Nob had some one person in mind as a suspected witch, in which case premise (ii) is
false. In short, premises (i) and (ii) cannot be true simultaneously and so Barense's
argument is unsound. Thus, Barense has not provided any reason to think that, contra
Geach, (3) is an adequate reading. Thus, I shall follow Geach and assume that there are
contexts in which Geach's intended reading of (1) is true and the transparent readings (2)
and (3) are both false, and thus inadequate.
Opaque Readings of Geach’s Sentence
Consider the following pair of sentences:
(10) I owe John a horse.
(11) There is a horse I owe John.
If 'owe' is analyzed as 'ought to give', then ( 1 0) and (11) become:
(10a) O [3x{Hx & Gijx}]
(11a) 3x[Hx & 0{Gijx}]
Since in (10a) 'BxHx' is inside the scope of the ought-operator, we can say that (10a)
Joes not imply that there is any particular horse that I owe John, whereas (11a) does
imply that there is a particular horse that I owe John. In other words, giving the
existential quantifier wide scope relative to the ought-operator implies that there is a
10
particular horse I owe John, whereas giving the existential quantifier narrow scope does
not. Since we are interested in formalizing readings of (1) true in contexts in which Hob
and Nob do not have a particular person or witch in mind, perhaps we should give any
existential quantifier used in formalizing these readings of (1) narrow scope.
Unfortunately, as Geach points out, giving the existential quantifier in either (2a)
or (3a) narrow scope will not work. For example, if we take the '3xWx' in (2a) and put it
inside the scope of 'thinks' we get:
(12a) Hob thinks [3x(Wx & Bxm)] & Nob wonders whether [Kxs].
Besides being badly formed, ( 12a) has "a pronoun in one indirect-speech clause [that] is
on the face of it bound to a quantified phrase in another such oblique context; the scope of
the quantified phrase thus seems both to lie wholly within the earlier oblique context and
to cover something in a later context." 12 This is clearly absurd-the scope of the
existential quantifier cannot both be restricted by the scope of Tlob thinks' and include the
variable in 'Kxs.' Thus, (12a) is not an adequate formalization of (1). Some means other
than just merely giving the quantifier narrow scope is needed Geach provides several
suggestions, which we shall examine below. Before considering Geach's opaque
readings, however, I shall present several relevant contexts for our discussion of Geach's
intended reading of (1).
Context I: Last night Bob's mare became quite ill. Hob, who tends Bob's bam,
inferred that a witch blighted her. This morning Hob said to his friend, Nob, "A
l^Geach, 630.
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witch blighted Bob's mare." Nob believes what Hob has told him. Nob thinks
for a moment, and says, "Cob's sow died early this morning. I'll bet the same
witch killed the sow, too."
Context II: The Gotham Tribune has reported that a witch has been on the
rampage. Both Hob and Nob have read the Tribune
,
and like most folks, they
believe the stories about the witch. Hob thinks the witch has blighted Bob's mare
and Nob thinks the witch has killed Cob's sow. Nob has no beliefs about Hob or
about Bob's mare and is unaware of the existence of either. Hob has no beliefs
about Nob or about Cob's sow and is unaware of the existence of either.
Context III: Hob, being a rather superstitious type, thinks a witch has blighted
Bob's mare. Hob has no other explanation for the mare's illness. Nob, also
being a rather superstitious type, thinks a witch has killed Cob’s sow. Nob has no
other explanation for the sow's death. Neither have heard anything about witches
recently. All information they have about witches, we may suppose, is of a rather
unspecific kind such as that witches generally kill sows or blight mares. We may
even suppose that Hob and Nob received this information about witches from
separate sources. Nob has no beliefs about Hob or about Bob's mare and is
unaware of the existence of either. Hob has no beliefs about Nob or about Cob's
sow and is unaware of the existence of either.
Let us assume that in all three contexts Hob and Nob have no particular person in
mind as the witch. Given this assumption, all three contexts are part of a continuum. In
Context I, Hob is the source of Nob's beliefs. In Context III, on the other hand, Hob's
and Nob's beliefs are completely unrelated; there is no link joining Hob's and Nob's
beliefs. Context II falls in the middle somewhere. Hob's and Nob's beliefs ultimately
have a common source, yet neither Hob's nor Nob's beliefs are directly related to the
other's. I shall demonstrate that (1) can be adequately dealt with in all three contexts. The
question will then be whether there is some other context on the continuum in which (i)
some reading of (1) is true and (ii) all formalizations considered thus far are false. I shall
12
be particularly interested in cases between Contexts II and ID. I shall now examine
Geach's opaque readings of (1).
Geach begins by suggesting that the "she" in the second clause of (1) is an
anaphoric substitute—what is sometimes called "a pronoun of laziness." Thus, perhaps
(1) is short for:
(13) Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob’s mare, and Nob wonders whether the
witch who blighted Bob's mare killed Cob's sow,
which might be formalized as:
(13a) Hob thinks [3x(Wx & Bxm)l & Nob wonders whether [3x(Wx & Bxm &
Kxs)],
or perhaps as:
(13b) Hob thinks |3x(Wx & Bxm)] & Nob wonders whether [K(ix(Wx &
Bxm), s)],
or perhaps as:
(13c) Hob thinks ]3x(Wx & Bxm)] & Nob wonders whether [3x(Wx & Bxm &
Vy(Wy & Bym -*• x = y) & Kxs)]. 13
Depending upon one's tastes, one of these three suggestions will adequately
formalize a reading of (1) true in Context I. In Context I, Nob really does wonder
whether the witch who blighted Bob's mare killed Cob's sow. At the same time, none of
the formalizations are true in Context II. In Context II, Nob does not wonder whether the
witch who blighted Bob's mare killed Cob's sow. How could he? Nob has never heard
13(13c) is a modification of a formalization suggested by Walter Edelberg, "A
New Puzzle About Intentional Identity," Journal ofPhilosophical Logic 15 (1986): 4.
Edelberg's formalization is Bh(3x)(Wx & Bx) & B n|(3x)(Wx & Bx) & (y)(Wy & By ->
x = y) & Cx]. As far as I can tell, this leaves the 'x' in 'Cx' and in 'x = y' free and thus
cannot be what Edelberg wants-presumably he justs needs to add a pair of brackets.
13
of Bob or his mare and does not even know they exist. Since Geach suggests that his
reading can be true even if Nob has never heard of Bob or his mare, there are clearly
contexts in which Geach's reading of (1) is true and (13) is false. Thus, while the
pronoun of laziness solution works in contexts of type I, it fails in contexts of type II.
Geach himself, while discussing a second objection to (13), fails to keep Contexts
I and II separate. Geach claims that ( 13) is further analyzable as:
( 14) Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob’s mare and Nob wonders whether just
one witch blighted Bob’s mare, and she killed Cob’s sow.
or perhaps as:
(15) Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob’s mare and Nob assumes that just one
witch blighted Bob’s mare, and Nob wonders whether she (the same witch) killed
Cob’s sow.
Both (14) and ( 15) are not adequate renditions of Geach's intended reading of (1) in
Context II for the reasons given above—Nob has never heard of Bob or his mare so Nob
does not wonder whether a w-itch blighted Bob’s mare. Geach argues that neither (14) nor
(15) work for other reasons as well. Geach objects to (14) on the following grounds.
Nob is not wondering whether just one witch killed Bob's mare. Nob assumes or
believes that just one witch killed Bob's mare and wonders whether that witch killed
Cob's sow. Thus, Geach prefers (15) to (14).
Geach admits, however, that he is not sure of his objection to (14) since it is easy
to confound the second conjunct of ( 14) with:
(16) Nob wonders whether just one witch blighted Bob's mare and (Nob
wonders whether) she killed Cob's sow.
14
Geach points out that objections "to [(16)] as an analysis of "Nob wonders whether the
witch who blighted Bob's mare killed Cob's sow' naturally do not carry over to
[(14)]."14 Geach is correct to be unsure of his objection. Geach's objection holds for
(16), since according to (16) Nob really does wonder whether just one witch blighted
Bob's mare and no such wonder takes place in (13). Does Nob wonder whether just one
witch blighted Bob's mare according to (14)? No. Nob wonders whether there is some
one thing that both blighted Bob's mare and killed Cob's sow. Nob can wonder the latter
even if Nob is absolutely positive that just one thing blighted Bob's mare. Nob is merely
unsure whether the blighter of Bob's mare is also the thing that killed Cob's sow.
Geach's objection to (14) fails and (14) is no worse off than (13).
Regardless, Geach thinks that (15) is a more accurate analysis of (13) than (14).
Geach claims, however, that (15) reintroduces the problem of intentional identity and thus
is "quite useless as a way of getting rid of intentional identity." 15 (15)'s second conjunct,
(17) Nob assumes just one witch blighted Bob's mare and Nob wonders whether
she killed Cob's sow,
might be formalized as:
(17a) Nob assumes [3x(Wx & Bxm & Vy(Wy & Bym -* x = y)] & Nob
wonders whether [Kxs].
As in (12a), in (17a) the variable x in Kxs seems to be bound by the quantifier in the
earlier indirect speech clause and yet it cannot be so bound. Nob is assuming and
l^Geach, 631.
l^Geach, 632.
15
wondering about the same thing—the problem is to get the logical structure to be well-
formed and to convey that Nob is assuming and wondering about the same thing. This
problem is another version of finding a well-formed logical structure for readings of (1)
that conveys the fact that Nob is wondering about the same thing Hob has beliefs about.
Geach is right-(15) reintroduces the problem into the solution and that is no solution.
Geach is mistaken that (15) reintroduces an unsolvable problem. Presumably
what we are trying to convey with (17) is the following:
( 1 8) Nob assumes that just one witch blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders
whether the witch who blighted Bob's mare killed Cob's sow.
(18) has the following formal structure:
(18a) Nob assumes |3x((Wx & Bxm) & Vy((Wy & Bym) -*• x = y)))] & Nob
wonders whether [K(ix(Wx & Bxm), s)J.
(18) is a pronoun of laziness analysis of (17) and will work as long as (17) is uttered in a
context of type I. Remember that in contexts of type I Nob really does wonder about the
object of a prior attitude. For example, (13) is true in Context I because Nob really does
wonder whether the witch who blighted Bob's mare (the object of Hob's belief) killed
Cob's sow. We saw that (13) was false in contexts in which Nob knew nothing of Hob
or Bob's mare and thus could not wonder about Bob's mare.
Can ( 1 8) be false because Nob has never heard of Nob or is not aware of Nob's
assumptions? Not plausibly. Since Nob's attitudes are simultaneous, there is no issue as
to whether Nob intends to be wondering about the same witch he has assumptions about.
Jonathan Cohen makes a similar point, though not for the same reason, when he claims
16
that Geach s problem is easily solved "if the two reports so related are about attitudes of
the same kind that are taken up by the same person at the same time." 16 Why is Geach's
problem easily solved? Because whether a single individual with simultaneous attitudes
means to be talking about one and the same thing in both attitudes is not an issue. Thus,
( 1 8) adequately analyzes the second conjunct of ( 15), and of (13), and removes Geach's
worry that (15) reintroduces the formalization problem.
(18) also solves a problem that D. C. Dennett has for (15). (15) was obtained
from (13) by expansion of the wonders attitude into the combination of an assumes
attitude and a wonders attitude. Dennett argues that since (15) still contains a wonders
attitude, the second conjunct of (15), viz. (17), ought to be further analyzed as:
(19) Nob assumes that just one witch blighted Bob's mare, and Nob assumes that
just one witch is such that Nob assumes it to have blighted Bob's mare, and Nob
wonders whether she (the latter witch?) killed Cob’s sow. 17
Dennett concludes that "we can go on to analyze the 'wonder' context of [(19)] into yet
another combination of assuming and wondering, and so forth." 18 Geach's expansion
of "wonders whether" generates an infinite regress. Given this infinite regress Dennett
accepts (14), rather than (15), as the proper expansion of (13), Geach's qualms aside.
Jonathan Cohen, "Geach's Problem About Intentional Identity," Journal of
Philosophy 65 (1968): 329-330. In (13), the attitudes are not the same. I do not think
this is a problem.
17D. C. Dennett, "Geach on Intentional Identity," Journal ofPhilosophy 65
(1968): 339. (13) is Dennett's (B).
1
^Dennett, 339.
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How does (18) solve Dennett's infinite regress problem? Here are (1), (13), (15),
and (18) again:
(1) Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob’s mare, and Nob wonders whether she
(the same witch) killed Cob's sow.
( 1 3) Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether the
witch who blighted Bob’s mare killed Cob’s sow.
(15) Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare and Nob assumes that just one
witch blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether she (the same witch) killed
Cob's sow.
( 1 8) Nob assumes that just one witch blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders
whether the witch who blighted Bob's mare killed Cob's sow.
We get from (1) to (13) by treating the "she" in (1) as a pronoun of laziness. We get from
(13) to (15) by analyzing "wonders whether the F is H" into "assumes just one F" and
"wonders whether she is H", for some F and H. We get from the second conjunct of ( 15)
to ( 1 8) by again applying the pronoun of laziness solution-replacing the "she" in the
scope of the wonders attitude by "the witch who killed Bob's mare." By applying the
pronoun of laziness solution to the second conjunct of (15) and thereby getting (18) we
can now see that (19) is an incorrect analysis of the second conjunct of (15).
The moves from ( 1 ) to ( 1 3) to ( 1 5) to ( 1 8) set up a pattern. If we follow that
pattern we will get, not (19), but:
(20) Nob assumes just one witch blighted Bob's mare and Nob assumes just one
witch blighted Bob's mare and wonders whether she killed Cob's sow.
(15) comes from (13) by expanding the second conjunct of (13). The second conjunct of
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(13) is identical to the second conjunct of (18). Therefore, we should expand (18) in the
exact same manner as we expanded (13) to get (15). The result is (20). Need we expand
( 1 8) to (20)? No. The expansion only serves to introduce the redundant phrase "Nob
assumes just one witch blighted Bob's mare." (20) introduces no new information and is
logically equivalent to the more concise (18). The more concise (18) is, therefore, all that
is required—Dennett's infinite regress is blocked.
Let me summarize the discussion of (13), (14), and (15). Geach objects to (14) as
an analysis of (13) because Nob does not wonder whether just one witch blighted Bob's
mare. We saw that Geach's objection failed because (14) does not imply that Nob
wonders whether just one witch blighted Bob's mare. Geach objected to (15) as an
analysis of (13) because it reintroduced the formalization problem. We saw, however,
that (15) did not reintroduce an unsolvable problem-the second conjunct of (15) was
adequately formalized by appeal to the pronoun of laziness solution. The pronoun of
laziness solution also avoided Dennett's charge that (15) introduces an infinite regress of
analysis. Thus, Geach's concerns that (13) introduces new problems when analyzed as
either ( 14) or ( 15) are unfounded.
Unfortunately, (13), (14), and (15) are still false in contexts of type U-contexts in
which Nob has never heard of Hob or of Bob's mare. But Geach still has one more
candidate to offer. Geach suggests that the intended reading of (1) might be:
(2 1 ) Hob thinks that the (one and only) witch that is F has blighted Bob's mare
and Nob wonders whether the witch that is F killed Cob's sow,
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for some suitable interpretation of "F". Geach thinks that his second objection to (13),
namely that the analysis of "wonders” into "assumes" and "wonders" reintroduces
intentional identity, is also a problem for analyzing "wonders" in (21). As we saw above
the analysis of "wonders" into "assumes" and "wonders" does not reintroduce an
unsolvable problem. In addition to being able to sidestep Geach's worry, (21), like the
intended reading of (1), is true in contexts of type II. It is true that Hob thinks that the
witch described in the Tribune blighted Bob's mare and that Nob wonders whether the
witch described in the Tribune killed Cob's sow. Description F in this case is "the witch
described in the Tribune." Geach, however, has a second objection to (21).
According to Dennett, Geach claims "that although if [(21)] is true for some F,
[(1 )] will be true, the converse need not hold; there need be no shared definite description
for it to be true of Hob and Nob that they are thinking of the same witch." 19 In other
words, Hob and Nob can be thinking of the same witch even though there is no definite
description, F, that can be plugged into (21) and make (21) true. Thus, the intended
reading of (1) can be true even if (21) is false. Since (21) is a reading of (1) that is true in
contexts of type II (and also of type I), if Geach’s reading of (1) can be true while (21) is
false, there must be other contexts in which Geach's reading of (1) is true and yet none of
the formalizations considered thus far is true. I shall examine such contexts after I present
and analyze Dennett's claim that Geach is wrong to think (21) is inadequate.
^Dennett, 337. See also, Geach, 632.
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Dennett claims that for non-actual "intentional objects, 'same' can at best mean
exactly similar in characteristics, [and] if we try to set laxer requirements [than identical
descriptions] some strange puzzles will result. For example, according to Dennett, if
Geach is right, Hob can believe that a blue-eyed witch blighted Bob's mare and Nob can
wonder whether a brown-eyed witch killed Cob's sow and Hob and Nob can be thinking
about the same witch. Since the witch does not exist how could we tell Hob or Nob that
one of them is wrong? Since Geach allows that Hob and Nob can be thinking of the same
witch even if they share no description in common, Dennett argues that Hob and Nob can
be thinking of a blue-eyed brown-eyed witch, which Dennett thinks is absurd. Thus, "far
from it being the case, as Geach contends, that no descriptions need be shared for us to
speak of intentional identity, on the contrary, unless all descriptions are shared, the
notion of the identity of intentionally inexistent objects dissolves into nonsense."21
If Dennett's objection holds and there are no cases in which the intended reading
of ( 1) is true and (21) is false, then perhaps Geach's Puzzle is solved. Dennett certainly
thinks the problem is solved-he writes:
Geach has failed to produce a coherent sense of [(1)] that resists capture in
Quine's net. Either the [utterer of (1)] is a believer and had in mind [(2)] or
[(3)], which are transparent, or he is a skeptic and had in mind [(13)] or
[(21)]..., which are opaque.22
20l)ennett. 337.
Dennett, 337.
^Dennett, 338.
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But has the problem really been solved? What of Context III? In Context III there is no
connection between "Hob's witch" and "Nob’s witch." The use of the pronoun "she" in
the indirect speech clause expressing Nob's wonderment, however, connects "Nob’s
witch" to "Hob's witch", when no such connection exits. Presumably, therefore, no
reading of (1) is true in Context III. (13) is false in Context III, since Nob does not
wonder whether the witch who blighted Bob's mare killed Cob’s sow. But what of (21)?
Despite the fact that there is no connection between "Hob's witch" and "Nob's witch"
might Hob and Nob nevertheless share some description F that applies to their respective
witches? Perhaps both Hob and Nob think their respective witches are the only blue-eyed
witches that exist Thus, perhaps, "Hob thinks the one and only blue-eyed witch blighted
Bob's mare and Nob wonders whether the blue-eyed witch killed Cob's sow," an instance
of (21), is true in Context III. But if (21) is true in Context III, whereas the intended
reading of (1) is not, then (21) is not adequate.
Geach's reading is one that can be true in Contexts I and II, but is false in III.
Neither (13) nor (21) match this requirement. (13) is true in I and false in III, but is false
in n. (21) is true in I and n, but not necessarily false in Context III. Thus, neither (13)
nor (21) is adequate. Thus, Dennett is wrong-Geach's reading avoids capture in Quine's
net.
On the other hand, one might argue as follows-maybe Geach's reading does not
really exist-there is no reading of (1) that can true in Contexts I and II and is false in III.
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Our intuition that there is such a reading may just be a conflation of (13) and (21). One
thinks (1) is true in Contexts I and II because of (21) and false in Context II because of
(13). But really there is no unified reading of ( 1 ) that can be true in I and II and is false in
III.
We could avoid this last problem if we could find a context in which (i) there is a
true reading of ( 1 ) and yet both ( 1 3) and (2 1 ) are false or (ii) there is a false reading of ( 1
)
and yet both (13) and (2 1 ) are true. Is there a context of either kind? I think there is at
least a context of the first kind. Consider the following context.
Context IV: Hob has heard a rumor from X that there is a witch about and Hob,
seeing Bob's sick mare, thinks that the witch blighted Bob's mare. Nob has heard
from Y that there is a witch plaguing the village and Nob, seeing Cob's dead sow,
wonders whether the witch killed Cob's sow. Hob has never heard of Nob or of
Cob or even of Y. Nob has never heard of Hob, Bob, nor X. Now X and Y got
their information from Z. Z told X and Y simultaneously that there was a witch
about. Neither Hob nor Nob know of the existence of Z.
Clearly Context IV is somewhere between Contexts II and III on the continuum.
Since Hob's and Nob's ideas about the current witch rampage ultimately have the
same source, viz. Z, there is a reading of ( 1) that is true in context IV. At the same time
no version of (21) adequately captures this reading of (1). The reason is quite
straighforward. There is no description F that Hob and Nob share such that they both
think or wonder about the witch that is F. Hob thinks that the witch described by X
blighted Bob's mare and Nob wonders whether the witch described by Y killed Cob's
sow. Neither think or wonder whether the witch described to X and Y by Z did anything
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since Hob does not know of Y or Z and Nob does not know of X or Z. Thus, in Context
IV a reading of (1) is true and yet (21) is false. Dennett's reply to Geach is mistaken—
Hob and Nob need not share all descriptions in common in order to be thinking about the
same non-existent thing. I shall now attempt to point out Dennett’s error.
Dennett may be right that we cannot talk of the identity of intentional objects unless
they share all descriptions. Dennett is incorrect in assuming therefore that Hob and Nob
need to share identical descriptions to be talking about the same object In Context IV
Hob and Nob do not know all the relevant descriptions of the witch and none of the
descriptions that Hob knows are descriptions that Nob knows. Still, the context is such
that if the rumor were true, all the descriptions would apply to the same witch. Thus, Hob
and Nob can share no description in common and still be talking about the same witch as
long as the sources or causes for Hob's and Nob's descriptions can be traced back to
some one single source or cause.23 Dennett's assumption that Hob and Nob needed to
share identical descriptions in order to be talking about the same thing is clearly too
strong. I shall now consider an objection to Context IV.
Objection: The use of "she" in (1) in context IV is illegitimate. The use of the
"she" makes it seem that there is a closer connection between Hob and Nob's attitudes
than there actually is. Upon hearing or reading ( 1), we believe that the "she" is part of
^Notice that Context II also involves a common cause. The difference between
Contexts II and IV is that in II both Hob and Nob have direct access to the common cause,
whereas in IV they do not. Because Hob and Nob have mediated access to the common
cause in Context IV, it is possible that they share no descriptions of the alleged witch.
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Nob's wonderings and that Nob would have to assent to it to make it legitimate. In
Context IV, Nob would not accept the use of the "she", because upon hearing of Hob's
beliefs, Nob himself would not think there was suitable connection to merit using "she."
Nob himself would doubt that he was wondering about the same witch.
Reply: The fact that the "she" in ( 1) is taken to imply that there is a closer
connection between Hob's and Nob's attitudes than there actually is is irrelevant. The fact
that Nob would not assent to the use of the "she" after being told Hob’s beliefs is also
irrelevant. The first fact is irrelevant because it merely shows that there is a reading of (1
)
other than the reading to which we are perhaps most naturally inclined. Upon finding out
that Nob has never heard of Hob we are not thereby led to claim that (1) is false, but rather
we should be led to re-evaluate what was meant by (1) in the first place. The second fact
is irrelevant because we often report people's attitudes in such a way that they would not
assent to the report. The report, however, might still be true. Notice that in the current
case, Nob, upon hearing the entire circumstances of Context IV, would probably think he
was wondering about the same witch who Hob believed blighted Bob's mare and would
therefore think that there was a suitable connection to merit using "she." Thus, given that
a reading of (1) is true in Context IV, Dennett is wrong; Geach (at least with help) has
offered a coherent use of (1) that escapes Quine's net. There is a context, viz. Context IV,
in which a reading of (1) is true and yet no satisfactory formalization is forthcoming.
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Conclusion
Solving Geach’s Puzzle is not as easy as it may appear at first glance. Geach,
contra Barense, is correct to argue that a reading of (1) can be true, even though none of
the most obvious and natural transparent readings of (1), viz. (2) and (3). are true. The
transparent readings both must be false if Hob and Nob have no particular person or witch
or group of people or witches in mind. Unless some other transparent reading of (1) can
be provided that fails to imply that Hob and Nob have a particular object in mind, no
transparent reading of (1) will capture Geach's intended reading of (1). In the next four
chapters, I shall examine numerous other attempts to give (1) a transparent reading that
fails to imply that Hob and Nob have a particular object in mind.
Geach, contra Dennett, is also correct to argue that his intended reading of ( 1 ) can
be true, even though none of the most obvious and natural opaque readings of (1), viz.
( 1 3) and (2 1 ), is true. The opaque reading, ( 1 3), requires that Nob be aware of Hob and
of Bob's mare. The opaque reading, (21), requires that Hob and Nob share some
description of the witch. As Context IV demonstrates, however, the intended reading of
( 1 ) can be true even if Nob is unaware of Hob and Bob's mare, and Hob and Nob share
no witch description. Unless some other opaque reading of (1) can be provided that
avoids the difficulties facing (13) and (21), no opaque reading of (1) will capture Geach's
intended reading of (1). In Chapter VI, I shall examine the possibility of giving (1) an
opaque reading that is true even if Nob is unaware of Hob and Hob and Nob share no
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witch description. Regardless, since a reading of (1) is true in Context IV, while (2), (3),
( 1 3), and (2 1 ) are all false, there is a reading of ( 1 ) that has not yet been formalized.
Thus, so far at least, Geach's Puzzle remains unsolved.
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CHAPTER II
GUISES. ASPECTS, AND SUBSTITUTIONAL QUANTIFICATION
In this chapter I shall consider three attempts to give ( 1 ) a transparent reading that
avoids Geach's criticisms. Let me briefly reiterate those criticisms before I begin
analyzing the new transparent readings. Geach considered the following two transparent
readings:
(2) As regards some witch. Hob thinks she has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob
wonders whether she killed Cob's sow.
(3) As regards somebody. Hob thinks she is a witch and has blighted Bob's
mare, and Nob wonders whether she killed Cob's sow.
(2) entails the existence of witches, but there are cases in which a reading of (1) is true and
there are no witches. (3) commits Hob and Nob to having a particular person in mind, but
there are cases in which a reading of (1) is true even though Hob's and Nob's suspicions
have not settled on any particular person. Thus, so far the problem with transparent
readings of ( 1 ) is that they imply either (i) there are witches or (ii) Hob and Nob have a
particular person, or perhaps even object, in mind as the witch, or both.
In this chapter. I shall examine Hector-Neri Castaneda's solution based on
quantifying over guises and Peter Geach's solution based on quantifying over aspects,
i.e., the senses of proper names. I shall also examine the substitutional quantification
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solution of Michael Pendlebury. In the first section I shall present Castaneda's and
Geach s theories. In the second section I shall consider how these theories might provide
solutions to Geach s Puzzle. I shall argue that neither theory is able to provide an
adequate solution to Geach's Puzzle. In the final main section I shall present
Pendlebury's proposed solution and argue that Pendlebury has also failed to solve
Geach s Puzzle. Thus, I shall conclude that none of the alleged solutions considered in
this chapter provide a satisfactory solution to Geach's Puzzle.
Guises and Aspects
In "Perception, Belief, and the Structure of Physical Objects and Consciousness"
and "Thinking and the Structure of the World" Hector-Neri Castaneda puts forward his
Guise-Con substantiation theory of individuals. Castaneda claims in both articles that his
theory solves Geach's problem of intentional identity. He writes, "the Guise-
Consubstantiation theory is applied to the solution of other problems, e.g. the reference of
objects across different propositional attitudes, whether of the same person or not."24 In
the conclusion of "Thinking and the Structure of the World" Castaneda claims that his
theory "solves the puzzles discussed." One of the puzzles discussed is Geach's Puzzle.
Unfortunately, he leaves the reader to "assure himself this is so."25
24Hector-Neri Castaneda, "Perception, Belief, and the Structure of Physical
Objects and Consciousness," Synthese 35 (1977): 327.
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Ot constructions that follow verbs such as 'believes' and 'thinks' Peter Geach
writes, "I am going to put forward a theory that essentially involves quantifying over
senses of proper names; including senses of possible proper names, where the name
hasn t actually been conferred or introduced into our language."”^ Geach calls the senses
of names aspects". Geach goes on to claim that "There are various other problems,
e.g. my old problem about intentional identity, which I think can be cleared up in an
equally satisfactory way by quantifying over aspects."28 Geach leaves us to construct on
our own how his solution based on aspects might proceed.
Both Castaneda and Geach claim to have theories that solve the problem of
intentional identity. Neither show how their theories solve Geach's Puzzle. In this
section I shall present first Castaneda's and then Geach's theory. Based on these theories
I shall present various formalizations of (1). I shall briefly consider an objection Michael
Pendlebury has to these formalizations (and both theories in general) and then present
some objections of my own. I shall conclude that neither Castaneda nor Geach has
provided a solution to Geach’s Puzzle. I begin by briefly discussing Castaneda's
^^Hector-Neri Castaneda, "Thinking and the Structure of the World,"
Philosophia 4 (1974): 39.
26p.T. Geach, "Two Kinds of Intentionally?" The Monisr 59 (1976): 313.
^Geach, 314.
^Geach, 318.
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presentation ot the problem ot intentional identity and then presenting his Guise -
Consubstantiation theory.
According to Castaneda, given the sentence:
(22) John believes that there is a man at the door, and Paul believes that he (that
man) is a burglar,
and the assumption that there is in fact no one at the door, "we have Geach's problem of
identifying the entity which is the object of John's and Paul's beliefs."29 Castaneda
writes concerning (22), "[o|ne naive solution is this: take the quantifier 'there is a man' to
range not only over existing objects, but also over non-existing possible objects."30
There is more however. Castaneda does not stop with non-existing possible objects;
Castaneda is willing to extend the domain of quantification even further to include
impossible objects. Castaneda provides the following example:
(23) John believes that there is a blue round square and Paul thinks that it is
hollow.31
^Castaneda, "Thinking ...," 7.
^Castaneda, "Thinking ...," 7. [See also, "Perception ...," 316] Castaneda
calls this the naive solution, but one should not think therefore that Castaneda rejects this
solution. In fact Castaneda says "we can take the possible objects required for the
solution to Geach's problem to constitute the same domain of objects required for the
solution to Frege's perplexity. "[p. 7] Castaneda writes that making the naive solution to
Frege's puzzle sophisticated just means that he has to further explain what "exactly an
individual is and what it is for an individual to have properties, "[p. 6] This further
explanation is his Guise-Consubstantiation theory.
^Castaneda, "Thinking ...," 8. That (23) dictates that we move to quantifying
over impossible objects is not immediately obvious. (23) has several de re readings that
do not require impossible objects. There might be any of the following actually existing
objects which both Paul and John have in mind: a blue square, a blue object, an object, a
square, a blue round object None of these objects are impossible and in certain
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Castaneda argues that both (22) and (23) involve quantification over non-existing entities.
Castaneda presents his Guise-Consubstantiation theory as his theory of individuals-a
theory that allows both existing and non-existing individuals. 1 present this theory next.
Castaneda takes Forms to be the ultimate components of the world. Forms divide
into two categories-properties and operators. A concrete individual or an ontological
guise "is a particular constituted by a set of monadic properties ... and a particularizing
factor."32 The set of monadic properties is called a "guise core" and the particularizing
factor, the "concretizing operator." Given the monadic properties Pp P„,... and the
concretizing operator, c, we can represent the corresponding guise as, c{P,
,
P^,
... }
.
Slightly less abstract examples are c{being red} and c{being red, being round}. These
guises, c{ being red} and c {being red. being round}, are to be understood, in English, as-
-the thing which alone has nothing but thefollowing properties: being red
.
and the thing
which alone has nothing but the following properties: being red, being round
respectively.33
circumstances it may be the case that John and Paul mistakenly attribute certain properties
to these objects such that (23) is true. For example, (23) is true if there is a square (John
has pointed it out) that John believes is blue and round (John does not think the thing he
pointed out was a square perhaps because he needs new glasses) and Paul thinks it is
hollow. Still, one might think there is a reading on which the thing that Paul and John
have in mind is the round square in which case it seems we would require quantification
over impossible objects.
32castaneda, "Perception 312.
^Castaneda. "Perception ...," 315.
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Castaneda distinguishes between existing and non-existing guises. "The latter are
isolated, their non-existence consists in there not being joined with other guises in a real
object existing in physical spacetime." 34 The 'joining' of guises that makes them exist or
be actual is consubstantiarion
. Consubstantiation is "the only relation that connects
different concrete individuals and makes them both exist."33 According to Castaneda
existence just is self-consubstantiation. To say of some guise, x, that it exists, is just to
say C*(x, x), where 'C*' stands for the consubstantiation relation. The relation C* is
governed by the following laws:
C*l. (Conditional Reflexivity ]: C*(x. y) -*• C*(x, x)
C*2. [ Symmetry): C*(x, y) -> C*(y, x)
C*3. (Transitivity): C*(x, y) & C*(y, z) -> C*(x, z)
C*4. (Consistency): C*(x, x) -*• (x(F) -*• ~x(~F)), where x(F) means F is in the
guise core of x.
C*5. [Contiguity]: C*(c{Pp P2 ,...},c{...QlV ..}) — C*(c{Pp } ,c{
Q
p Pp
P
2 ,...})
C*6. (Completeness!: C*(c{P,...}, c{P....}) -* (C*(c{P,...}, c{Q. P,
...}) v
C*(c{P,...},c{~Q, P,
...}))
C*7. (Logical Closure]: [C*(c{P,
,
c{Q,,...}) & ... & C*(c{P,,...},
c {
Q
n— } )
]
- C*(c{Plv ..}, c{R, Pp ...}) provided \Q, & ...& QJ - R
is a theorem of standard quantification logic.
There are other closure laws, but the law of logical closure is the most general. According
to Castaneda these laws "segregate non-existing possible objects from all other
objects."36 The existing objects are the con substantiated guises, whereas the non-
34castaneda, "Perception ...," 317.
35castaneda, "Thinking ... 13.
^^Castaneda, "Perception ...," 324-25.
33
existing objects are the isolated guises—the guises not consubstantiated with anything.
Castaneda describes his theory of physical objects as a bundle-bundle theory. Guises are
bundles of properties and existing objects are bundles of consubstantiated guises. Here
then we have the essentials of Castaneda's Guise-Consubstantiation theory. I shall now
present Geach's theory of quantifying over aspects.
Aspects are the senses of names. Some names name existing tilings and some do
not. Thus, Geach distinguishes between a thing-aspect and the aspect ofa thing . 37 A
thing-aspect is the sense of a name that need not name any existing thing. An aspect of a
thing is the sense of a name that names an existing thing. For example, a witch-aspect is
the sense of some name that need not be the name of any existing witch, whereas an
aspect of a witch is the sense of a name that names an existing witch. Given the
distinction between tiling-aspects and aspects of things I shall now present several of the
examples that Geach considers.
Consider the sentence,
(24) Pegasus does not exist.
Geach claims that (24) "serves to say of the name 'Pegasus' that it does not name
anything." He adds that "we can recognize a certain use in which 'Pegasus' purports to
be the name of a horse, but in fact in that use names nothing at all."38 Accordingly, the
^Geach, 314.
^^Geach, 313.
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logical structure of (24), for Geach. is something like,
(24a) 3a(a = the sense of "Pegasus" & ~3x (Aax)),
Thus, instead of being analyzed as "There is nothing that is Pegasus", (24) is analyzed as
"There is a sense of "Pegasus" that is not an aspect of anything."
Now consider the sentence.
(25) Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob’s mare.
Given the distinction between a witch-aspect and an aspect of a witch there are several
possible readings of (25):
(25a) Hob thinks [3x(Wx & Bxm)]
(25b) 3 a( Witch-aspect a & Hob thinks |Bam])
(25c) 3 a( Witch -aspect a & 3x(Wx & Aax) & Hob thinks [Bam]).
How are (25b) and (25c) to be read? Take quantification into square brackets to be similar
to quantification into Quine-comers except that instead of quantifying over expressions we
are quantifying over aspects. Geach provides the following example to illustrate.
From the proposition:
For some aspect a. a = the sense in which the name "Sherlock
Holmes" is most commonly used, and Jones believes [a died in
1920)
we are not to infer:
Jones believes [the sense in which the name "Sherlock Holmes" is
most commonly used died in 1920]
but rather:
Jones believes [Sherlock Holmes died in 1920].
provided that here we do read "Sherlock Holmes" the way it is most
commonly used.39
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Thus, in (25c) the first two occurrences of 'a' are filled in by aspects, whereas the
third is filled in by a name. Which name? The name with the sense that is the aspect
substituted for the first two occurrences of 'a'. Thus, one instance of (25c) might be.
(26) The sense of "Hecate" is a witch-aspect and is an aspect of Hecate and Hob
thinks [Hecate blighted Bob’s mare].
Since, by the Fregean theory the reference of ("Hecate"] within the square brackets will
precisely be the sense in which that very name is most commonly used,"40 all three
substitutions for 'a' in (25c) refer to the sense of "Hecate", which is the desired result.
Note that (25b) and (25c) provide a means of distinguishing between Hob's having a
belief about a real witch and Hob’s having a belief about an imaginary one without appeal
to merely possible objects.
Recall, that Geach claims that his theory "essentially involves quantifying over the
senses of proper names."41 (25) does not contain a name, yet Geach still appeals to
aspects in the analysis of (25).42 How is this to be understood? Geach writes that:
39Geach, 316.
40Geach, 316.
41 Geach, 313.
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^A sentence that falls within the domain of his theory is
(27) Hob thinks that Hecate blighted Bob's mare.
How does Geach's theory translate (27). Recall, "Jones believes [Sherlock Holmes died
in 1920]. Geach does not explicitly suggest "Jones believes [Sherlock Holmes died in
1920]" be read as "For some aspect a, a = the sense in which "Sherlock Holmes" is most
commonly used, and Jones believes [a died in 1920]." However, given Geach's
Sherlock Holmes and Pegasus examples, I think the most reasonable interpretation of (27)
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we can recognize that there is a sense capable of embodiment in a proper
name independently of there being such a name. In an earlier paper, I
imagined a reporter visiting the village of Gotham, presently in the grip of
witch mania. They tell him much of the mishaps attributable to the witch,
whom they refer to as 'the witch', 'the old witch', the (expletives erased]
witch .... if the Gothamites begin to call her by the ad hoc proper name
'Maggoty Meg', the reporter may grasp that this name picks up the sense
previously made by 'the [expletives erased] witch'.43
In other words, the sense of a name can exist even if the name does not. Even if the name
"Maggoty Meg" was never given to the witch, we have the sense of a name that has not
actually been conferred or introduced into our language. The introduction of aspects in the
analysis of (25) is thus to be understood as introducing aspects of possible proper names.
I shall now discuss how the respective theories might attempt to solve Geach's Puzzle.
Aspects and Guises
Michael Pendlebury attributes the following version of ( 1 ) as a reading that
Castaneda would endorse:
(28) There is a witch-guise, a, such that Hob thinks [a has blighted Bob's mare]
and Nob wonders whether [a killed Cob's sow].44
is "For some aspect a, a = the sense of "Hecate" and Hob believes [a blighted Bob's
mare.]" This analysis will be assumed, even though Geach does not explicitly endorse it.
43Geach, 314.
44Michael Pendlebury, "Hob, Nob, and Hecate: The Problem of Quantifying
Out," Australian Journal ofPhilosophy, 60 (1982): 348. (28) is not exactly what
Pendlebury attributes. Pendlebury gives the following:
There is a guise a such that (a isj a witch & Hob thinks [a has blighted Bob's
mare] & Nob wonders whether [a killed Cob's sow]).
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Pendlebury also provides the following version of ( 1 ) as a reading that Geach would
endorse:
(29) There is an aspect a such that a is a witch-aspect and Hob thinks [a blighted
Bob's mare] & Nob wonders whether (a killed Cob's sow].45
Pendlebury objects to (28) and (29) on the grounds that appeal to guises and aspects
”involve[s] extravagant and unnecessary ontological commitments."46 In the third
section of this chapter we shall be analyzing Pendlebury's own solution to Geach's
problem. Since Pendlebury’s objection holds only if a more ontologically elegant solution
is forthcoming I shall ignore Pendlebury’s objection at least until the third section. Instead
I shall focus on Castaneda's theory and Geach's theory as given and attempt to determine
whether or not either truly has given a solution to Geach's problem.
Neither (28) nor (29) imply the existence of witches, though (28) implies the
existence of guises and (29) the existence of aspects. Thus, both (28) and (29) can be true
even if there are no witches. What about when Hob and Nob have no particular person or
witch in mind? Since people, according to Castaneda, are bundles of con substantiated
guises and (28) only involves quantifying over guises, (28) can be true even if Hob and
Nob do not have a particular person in mind as the witch. Since senses of names are not
By 'a isj a witch' Pendlebury means the property, being a witch, is in the guise core of
a. I mean the same by 'witch-guise a'. Both Pendlebury's locution and my locution are
formalized by 3a a(W). By rule C*4 above, x(F) just means F is in the guise core of x.
^Pendlebury, 348.
46pendlebury, 349.
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people and (29) only involves quantifying over senses, (29) can be true even if Hob and
Nob do not have a particular person in mind as the witch. In neither case need Hob and
Nob have a particular person or thing in mind. Thus, since both (28) and (29) can be true
in cases in which there are no witches and in which Hob and Nob have no particular
person or witch in mind, perhaps they are the desired readings of ( 1). Perhaps either
Castaneda or Geach has provided a solution to Geach's Puzzle.
So far both theories' renditions of Geach's intended reading of (1) avoid Geach's
original criticisms—they do not imply either that witches exist or that Hob and Nob have
some particular person or witch in mind. Therefore, (28) and (29), unlike (2) and (3),
may be adequate paraphrases of the intended reading of (1). Since Geach’s theory uses
far less machinery to get the same work done, Geach's theory is preferable.
Unfortunately the appearance of having provided a solution is illusory.
Aspects are the senses of possible proper names and senses are meanings of signs
in which are contained the manner and context of presentation.47 If aspects are modes of
presentation, or are meanings that contain the manner of presentation, then (29) can be
true only if Hob and Nob have the same manner or mode of presentation of the alleged
witch. But as we have already seen, there are situations, viz. contexts of type IV, in
^Gottlob Frege, "On Sense and Nominatum," (1892), in The Philosophy of
Language
,
2nd ed., A.P. Martinich, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990),
191. Geach himself writes, "the sense of a name is an aspect, or mode of presentation,
o/the thing named." |p. 314J.
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which a reading of ( 1 ) is true and Hob and Nob have no knowledge of each other and got
their information from different sources. Since there is a different manner and context of
presentation for Hob and Nob. the aspects of the alleged witch cannot be the same.48
Thus, there is no single aspect, a, such that Hob thinks |a blighted Bob’s marel and Nob
wonders whether |a killed Cob’s sow]. A reading of (1) is true and (29) is false in
contexts of type IV. Thus, (29) does not adequately formalize (1) and so Geach's theory
of aspects does not solve Geach's Puzzle. Perhaps the more intricate machinery of
Castaneda's guise theory will succeed where Geach's aspect theory fails.
Pendlebury's interpretation of Castaneda's reading of (1) is (28)-There is a witch-
guise. a, such that Hob thinks (a has blighted Bob's mare] and Nob wonders whether [a
killed Cob’s sow]. A more Castanedaish version of (1), however, is:
(30) There is some guise, a , with witchhood in its core that Hob thinks is
con substantiated with the guise, c {having blighted Bob's mare}, and that Nob
wonders whether is consubstantiated with the guise. c{having killed Cob's sow}.
(30) would be translated as:
48Geach himself admits that "we don't know quite what is the criterion of
identity of aspects,"[p. 318] though if they are modes of presentation or contain modes of
presentation, then different modes of presentation and senses of signs containing different
manners of presentation are not the same aspect. In "Belief Ascription," Stephen Schiffer
discusses objections to the Fregean 'mode of presentation theory' and to the 'hidden-
indexical mode of presentation theory." Several objections concern getting access to the
modes of presentations of others in order to check that different people's modes of
presentation are one and the same. The impossibility of making such a check seems to
make accurately reporting the intentional attitudes of others a matter of pure chance. I
suspect that these objections also tell against Geach's aspect theory. See. "Beliet
Ascription," Journal ofPhilosophy 89 ( 1992): 507-8 and 512-514.
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(30a) 3a (a (W) & Hob thinks[C*(a, c{having blighted Bob’s mare})] & Nob
wonders whether |C*(a, c{having killed Cob’s sow})]).49
Both (28) and (30) can be true even if Hob and Nob do not have a particular person in
mind. (28) and (30) cannot be true if Hob and Nob do not have a particular guise in
mind. Assuming guise theory is true, can (1) be true even if Hob and Nob have no
particular guise in mind? No. According to Castaneda, "concrete individuals [guises] are
objects of thought.’’50 Since guises are objects of thought, if Hob and Nob are having
^Actually, Castaneda would probably translate (1) with something more like:
(30b) 3a (a(W) & C**(a, a(being thought by Hob to have blighted Bob's
mare]) & C**(a, a[being wondered whether by Nob to have killed Cob’s sow])),
where "C**" is the consociation relation and where an
expression ot the form (4jl is an abbreviation of an expression having the
operator c prefixed to an expression of the union of the set of properties
making up the individual denoted by the sign a and the unit set whose
member is the property denoted by the symbol j. For example, if a is
(‘{Round, square}, a} Golden] is c{ Round, Square, Golden}.
| "Thinking ...," 15.]
That (30b) is probably how Castaneda would translate (1) is based on his discussion of
consociation in "Thinking and the Structure of the World" on page 18 and on the
following exposition by Alvin Plantinga of consociation in "Guise Theory," in Agent,
Language, and the Structure ofthe World
,
James E. Tomberlin, ed., (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Co., 1983). Plantinga writes:
Suppose Oedipus believes that the previous King of Thebes is dead; what
really goes on is that the the individual the previous King of Thebes is
consociated with its being-believed-by
-Oedipus-to-be-dead protraction; that
is, C {being the previous King ofThebes} is consociated with C{being the
previous King of Thebes
,
being believed by Oedipus to be
dead}. [Plantinga, p. 49.]
To say that two guises are consociated is just to say the guises are "thought to be of the
same object. "[Hector-Neri Castaneda, "Philosophic Method and the Theory of Predication
and Identity," Nous 12 (1978): 196. See also, "Identity and Sameness," Philosophia 5
(1975): 1 47. | Plantinga adds that guises "a and b are thought to be of the same object,
presumably, if someone thinks they are consubstantiated."] Plantinga, p. 49.] If Plantinga
is correct, then (30a) and (30b) say the same thing.
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thoughts about witches then they each have some particular witch-guise in mind. What
might that guise be? One obvious answer is c{being a witch}. c{being a witch}—the
thing which alone has nothing but the following properties: being a witch—is the most
minimal guise about witches that Hob and Nob could share. Unfortunately, this guise is
so minima] that Hob and Nob. not being philosophers, probably never have that particular
guise in mind. At the very least, Hob and Nob have thoughts about the witch in Gotham,
perhaps even the female witch in Gotham. But now there is a serious problem.
According to Castaneda definite descriptions refer to guises.5
1
At the same time,
he admits that the reference is normally ambiguous.52 Consider the definite description
"the witch in Gotham." The definite description is ambiguous between c{being a witch,
being in Gotham} and c{being a witch and being m Gotham}. Thus, even if Hob and
Nob are thinking of the witch in Gotham, they may fail to have the same guise in mind.
Perhaps Hob is thinking of c {being a witch, being in Gotham} while Nob is wondering
about c{being a witch and being in Gotham}. Thus, ( 1 ) can be true because Hob and
Nob both have intentional attitudes about the witch of Gotham, but (28) and (30) can be
false because Hob or Nob do not have the same guise in mind. If Hob and Nob can have
different guises in mind, even if they both are thinking of the witch of Gotham, then it is
^Castaneda, "Thinking...," 17.
5
^Castaneda, "Perception ...," 314, 319, 320 and "Thinking ...,” 23.
-^Castaneda, "Perception ...," 318.
42
even more likely that they have different guises in mind when they share no description of
the alleged witch. For example, in contexts of type IV in which Hob and Nob get their
information from different sources, the intended reading of (1) is true and yet Hob and
Nob may have no shared guise in mind. Thus, a reading of ( 1) is true even though (28)
and (30) are false and therefore neither (28) nor (30) is an adequate reading of ( 1)53
^Even if (30a) and (30b) say the same thing, one might think the objection I
gave to (30a) does not apply to (30b). According to Castaneda. mC**(a,b)' is true if
either ( 1 ) the guises a and b are thought to be of the same object, whether a fictional or a
real one, or (2) b is a protraction of the form a[x believes (thinks, supposes, etc. that —
is F] [Philosophic Method...," 1 96. ] It we take Castaneda at his word and translate
(31) Oedipus believes the previous King of Thebes is dead
as
(31a) C**(c{the previous King of Thebes}, c{the previous King of Thebes, being
believed by Oedipus to be dead}),
then by clause (2) above "Oedipus believes the previous King of Thebes is dead" must be
true. Also, clause (1) is satisfied if, say, 1 think that the previous King of Thebes and
the previous King of Thebes thought by Oedipus to be dead are the same thing. If I think
they are the same thing, then the two guises will be consociated and (31a) and (31) are
thereby true. But surely (31) is contingent and surely the truth of (31) depends on what
Oedipus thinks, rather than what I think. Thus, either Castaneda has to translate
intentional attitude statements in some other way or explain the truth of "C**(a,b)" in
some other manner.
A simple solution is to continue to allow Castaneda to translate intentional attitude
sentences such as (31) as (31a), but to let a sentence of the form "C**(a.b)" where b is a
protraction of the form ofbeing believed (thought, supposed, etc) by x to have (be) FJ be
true as long as a sentence of the form ”[x]C**(a, c{having (being) F})" is true. A
sentence of the form "(xlC**(a, c{having (being) F})" is true if the guises a and
c{ having (being) F} are thought to be by x of the same object. By adopting the
preceding explanation of consociation we can keep the desired translation and keep the
notion that consociation has to do with guises being thought of the same object, but avoid
the difficulties of Castaneda's explanation. Thus, if (30b) is true so must be:
(32) There is some guise, a, with witchhood in its core that is consociated [by
Hob] with the guise. c{having blighted Bob's mare} and is consociated [by Nob]
with the guise, c{having killed Cob's sow}.
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Perhaps Castaneda has a way out. Castaneda could accept that Hob and Nob have
different guises in mind, but argue that the two guises are connected in some way
.
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One means of connection between guises we have already seen is consubstantiation. If
the two guises were consubstantiated, they would be guises of the same actual object.
Thus, Castaneda might formalize ( 1 ) as:
(33a) 3x3y(x(W) & y(W) & Hob thinks [C*(x, c{having blighted Bob's mare})]
and Nob wonders whether [C*(y, c{having killed Cob's sow}] & C*( x,y )).55
According to (33a) Hob has a particular guise in mind and Nob has a particular guise, not
necessarily the same one, in mind. The two guises are consubstantiated with each other,
i.e. they are guises of the same actual object. Thus, (33a) conveys the fact that Hob and
Nob can have different ideas about the same object. Unfortunately, if (33a) is true, then
(32) might be translated as:
(32a) 3a(a(W) & [Hob]C**(a, c{having blighted Bob's mare}) &
[Nob]C**(a, c{having killed Cob's sow})).
Since the objection I gave to (30a) applies equally well to (32a), if (30b) can only be true
if something like (32a) is true, then the objection to (30a) does carry over to (30b).
^Though Castaneda could adopt the view that Hob and Nob have different
guises in mind, I am not suggesting that Castaneda would adopt the view. Concerning
Geach's Puzzle, Castaneda writes of "Benjamin believes that there is a fountain of life and
he hopes to drink from it," that the "quantifier 'there is (a fountain of life)' has to be the
dominant operator so that it can bind references to the same entity both within the scope
of 'believes' and within the scope of 'hopes.'"["Thinking...," 8—emphasis added.] Thus,
given (1), Castaneda presumably wants Hob and Nob to have the same guise in mind, and
as we have seen, especially in contexts of type IV, there is no reason to believe that Hob
and Nob need to have the same guise in mind in order for ( 1) to be true.
^^Letx = c{P], P2 }. Thus, x{P3 } is c{Pj, P£, P3 }. x(W) and y(W) just
signify that 'being a witch’ is in the guise core of x and y respectively.
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the two witch-guises are consubstantiated and so (33a) implies the existence of
witches.56 But the intended reading of ( 1 ) can be true if there are no witches. Thus.
(33a) is not adequate.
Castaneda is not through introducing machinery. He writes, "as Meinong
remarked, to think of an individual
... is to confer upon the individual some sort of
existence, even if the object is non-existent."57 Castaneda calls this sort of objectification
in thought co-objectification or consociation and represents it with the symbol C**. For
example, to say that Sherlock Holmes is a detective is not to say C*(c{being Sherlock
Holmes}, c{being Sherlock Holmes, being a detective}), since that would imply that
Sherlock Holmes existed, but rather C**(c{being Sherlock Holmes}, c{being Sherlock,
Holmes, being a detective}). In other words, the two guises c{being Sherlock Holmes}
and cjbeing a detective} are joined in thought in the same object. C**(c{is Sherlock
Holmes}, c{being Sherlock Holmes, being a detective}) does not imply that Sherlock
Holmes exists. Guises exist only if they are consubstantiated with other guises. Perhaps
then Castaneda will formalize (1) as:
(34a) 3x3y(x(W) & y(W) & Hob thinks [C*(x, c{having blighted Bob’s mare})]
and Nob wonders whether [C*(y,c{ having killed Cob's sow}] & C**( x,y)).
(34a) does not entail the existence of witches and does not imply that Hob and Nob have a
particular person in mind. At the same time, (34a) does not require for its truth that Hob
56c* 1: If C*(x,y) then C*(x,x); and C*(x,x) just means 'x exists'.
See the previous section.
5^Castaiieda, "Thinking ...," 17.
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and Nob have one and the same guise in mind. Thus, perhaps (34a) is the translation of
( 1) for which we are looking.
Unfortunately, however, (34a) has some serious new flaws. First, (34a) can be
true even if the intended reading of ( 1 ) is false. Assume we are in a context of type III
—
Hob s and Nob's intentional attitudes are completely unrelated. The final conjunct of
(34a), "C**(x, y)" is true as long as the guises x and y are thought to be of the same
object.58 Imagine some person. Rob. who lives very far way from Gotham and has
never heard of Hob, or of Nob. Rob does think a great deal about witches and by pure
chance does think that x and y are of the same object. Thus, if the other conjuncts of (34a)
are true, then given Rob's thoughts about x and y, (34a) is true, even though (1) is false.
Second, the intended reading of ( 1) can be true and (34a) false. Assume we are in a
context of type IV. Assume that no one other than Hob, Nob, X. Y. and Z, have
thoughts about witches. Let us also assume that none of the five have exactly the same
thoughts about witches, i.e. they share, at the very least, no pair of witch guises. Thus,
there is no one who thinks that guises x and y are of the same object. Thus, (34a) is false.
But (1), as intended, is true in Context IV. (34a) is not an adequate rendition of (1).
(34a)'s truth or falsity depends upon what people happen to think, rather than on
whether Hob and Nob are in fact thinking of the same witch. Thus, I consider (34a) to be
generally inadequate. If (34a) is inadequate, then independent of any criticism of
^Castaneda, "Philosophic Method 196.
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Castaneda's theory, such as Michael Pendlebury's charge of ontological extravagance.59
Castaneda s theory fails to solve Geach's Puzzle. Either his theory requires that Hob and
Nob have the same guise in mind and ( 1 ) can be true even if they do not or his theory
makes the truth or falsity of Geach's reading of ( 1 ) depend upon what people think about
the guises in question rather than on whether or not Hob and Nob are thinking of the same
witch. In the next section of this chapter I shall present Michael Pendlebury's attempt to
provide a solution to Geach's Puzzle by appealing to substitutional quantifiers.
Substitutional Quantifiers
Michael Pendlebury provides two readings of (1) that make no ontological
commitment to witches. The first, which is just a pronoun of laziness or anaphora type
solution, he thinks provides a formalization of the most natural reading of ( 1 ).60 His
anaphora solution offers no new insights over and above the anaphora solution offered in
Chapter I and suffers from the same defects. I shall, therefore, focus on the second
analysis Pendlebury offers. I shall first present his analysis and then provide objections.
59two relevant collections are J.E. Tomberlin, ed, Hector-Neri Castaneda
(Dordrecht, 1986) and J.E. Tomberlin, ed, Agent, Language, and the Structure ofthe
World (Indianapolis, 1983). For other objections to Castaneda's Guise Theory see Barry
Miller, "Whether Any Individual At All Could Have A Guise Structure," Philosophical
Studies 61 (1991): 285-293; James Van Cleve, "Three Versions of the Bundle Theory,"
Philosophical Studies 47 (1985): 95-107; and Jig-Chuen Lee, "Frege's Paradox of
Reference and Castaneda's Guise Theory," Philosophical Studies 46 (1984): 403-415.
^Pendlebury, 351.
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Pendlebury offers the following version of (1):
(la) Switch-term x (Hob thinks [Bxm] & Nob thinks [Kxs?]).6 *
Switch-term x" is a substitutional quantifier-it ranges over terms. In general, sentences
of the form "3Cv0" are true if and only if there is some C-term t such that the result of
substituting t for v in 0 is true.62 Thus, (la) is true iff there is some witch term that.
when substituted for x, makes "Hob thinks [Bxm] & Nob thinks [Kxs?]" true. Witch-
terms can exist even if there are no witches so ( la) does not entail the existence of
witches, (la) does not entail that Hob and Nob have some particular person in mind as
the witch, since Hob thinks Hecate has blighted Bob's mare and Nob wonders whether
Hecate killed Cob s sow can be true without Hob and Nob having any particular thing or
person in mind as Hecate. Both may have heard rumors about a witch called Hecate, but
have no idea who she is. So far then, ( la) avoids the standard problems for transparent
readings of (1).
I shall now' consider several objections to (la), beginning with an objection that
Pendlebury considers. Pendlebury writes:
It is easy ... to entertain the possibility that there is no English term (such as
’the evil witch’ or ’Hecate') which, so to speak, expresses the way in which
61 Pendlebury, 353. Pendlebury expresses "Switch-term x" as the quantifier
"Pwitch x". Note that Pendlebury analyses "wonders whether" as thinking a question. In
general I have left "wonders whether" unanalyzed since analyzing it seems to be a separate
problem from getting co-reference expressed. In general I shall continue this policy. A
different analysis of "wonders whether" can be found in Maxwell Cresswell, "Anaphoric
Attitudes," Philosophical Papers 19 (1980): 15.
62pendlebury, 353.
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both Hob and Nob (presumably) think about their fictional creature, or, in
other words, which expresses the specific kind of referential act which they
both suffer.63
The objection is the same as the objection made to:
(21) Hob thinks that the (one and only) witch that is F has blighted Bob’s mare
and Nob wonders whether the witch that is F killed Cob's sow,
in Chapter I. There may be no description of the witch that Hob and Nob share and yet
the reporter may be justified in uttering ( 1 ). Context IV was provided to support this
claim. Thus, (la) suffers from the same defect as (21).
Pendlebury replies as follows: I do not think we should regard our canonical
language simply as a version of an actual spoken language. Rather, we should view it as
a language which is sufficiently rich to express all thoughts whose structures are
representable by its syntactic structures.64 Thus, according to Pendlebury, even if there
is no English term that can be substituted for x. as long as there is a term in the canonical
language (of thought) that can be substituted for x and make "Hob thinks [Bxml & Nob
thinks [Kxs?]" true, then (34a) will be true. Walter Edelberg calls Pendlebury's modified
solution "ad hoc and inelegant."65 I agree, but I also have a more specific criticism. In
63pendlebury, 354.
^Pendlebury, 354.
^Walter Edelberg, "A New Puzzle About Intentional Identity," Journal of
Philosophical Logic 15 (1986): 10. Edelberg interprets Pendlebury's modification as
follows:" The idea is that whenever a de dicto intentional identity statement is true, a
special (unambiguous) name is introduced into the set of admissible substituends to
provide a suitable substitution instance. The problem with the suggestion is not only that
it is ad hoc and inelegant, it is hard to see what real advantage it offers over the referential
49
order to present my objection, I first need to further clarify Pendlebury's proposed
solution.
Pendlebury, after suggesting that a canonical language richer than English is
needed, writes "treating them[the quantifiers] as substitutional with respect to a
sufficiently rich language is merely a convenient device for interpreting in formal semantic
terms the thought that they 'range over' modes of mental reference."66 Earlier in the
paper he writes, "it should be clear that on my view the.. .quantifier 'ranges over' specific
kinds of modes of referential acts rather than over abstract entities."67 On the other
hand, Pendlebury also writes that thinking of a non-existent thing is a matter of:
suffering a mentaJ act of reference of a certain specific kind (which may be
expressible by means of a proper name or definite description). One way
of doing this would be by, so to speak, mentally uttering an English
sentence containing the name or description. But I don't suppose it is the
only way 68
interpretation, which countenances non-existent objects of thought." Edelberg goes on to
add that we now have to ask "under what conditions the artificial names are introduced"
and "under what conditions we should introduce two distinct artificial names rather than
one."
I have several comments. First, Pendlebury does not restrict the substituends to
names but rather terms. Second, if Pendlebury did suggest introducing a special term
whenever a de dicto intentional identity statement is true, then why would we have to ask
under what conditions artificial names are to be introduced? Regardless, Pendlebury does
not suggest introducing special terms whenever de dicto intentional identity statements are
true. Rather Pendlebury posits a canonical language richer than English to account for the
truth of some intentional identity statements and certainly not all true de dicto intentional
identity statements.
^Pendlebury, 354.
^Pendlebury, 352.
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We have already seen Pendlebury suggest that it might be the case that no English term
expresses the specific kind of referential act Hob and Nob both suffer. Thus, there are
two separate, but related, positions to consider. First, the quantifiers might not be
substitutional but rather range over modes or kinds or types of mental reference.69
Second, the quantifiers as substitutional and range over terms that express modes of
mental reference. Either way Pendlebury's solution is not satisfactory.
Why should we presume, as Pendlebury does, that there is a single way in which
both Hob and Nob are thinking about the witch at all? If there is none, then there certainly
is no mode ot reference they share. It they do not share a mode of reference, then there is
no single expression, in English or any language for that matter, that expresses a mode of
reference they share. In contexts of type IV there is no reason to suppose that Hob and
Nob think of the witch in the same way. Thus, they are not suffering from the same mode
of mental reference and (la) is false even though the intended reading of (1) is true. Thus,
( la) is not an adequate rendition of (1). Pendlebury has failed to provide a solution to
Geach's Puzzle.
^Pendlebury, 352 . Emphasis added.
6^We cannot quantify over mental references because (la) would then be false.
Presumably, Hob and Nob cannot suffer from the exact same mental reference unless they
share the same brain.
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Conclusion
In this chapter I have considered three attempts to construe (1) transparently.
While all three attempts avoid Geach's criticisms of transparent readings such as (2) and
(3) all three attempts fail in contexts of type IV. In contexts of type IV, in which Hob and
Nob have never heard of each other and have had different experiences concerning the
alleged witch, there is no reason to believe that Hob and Nob share the same aspect or the
same guise or the same mode of mental reference. Finally, the extra machinery of
Castaneda's theory allowed for the possibility of translating (1) along the lines of (34a)-
3x3y(x(W) & y(W) & Hob thinks |C*(x, c{having blighted Bob’s mare})] and Nob
wonders whether [C*(y,c{having killed Cob's sow}] & C**( x,y)). Unfortunately,
(34a) is generally inadequate because (34a)'s truth or falsity depends upon what people
(perhaps other than Hob and Nob) happen to think is the case, rather than on whether Hob
and Nob are in fact thinking of the same witch. Thus, I conclude that neither Castaneda,
Geach, nor Pendlebury has provided an adequate solution to Geach's Puzzle. All three
provide transparent readings of (1) that fail to be adequate because those readings are false
in contexts of type IV.
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CHAPTER III
POSSIBILIST QUANTIFIERS
In this chapter I shall consider several more attempts to give (1) a transparent
reading. For the most part, these transparent readings will involve possibilist quantifiers.
In the first section, I shall examine the possibilist quantifier solution of Maxwell
Cresswell. In the second section, I shall provide the background needed to examine Esa
Saarinen's possibilist quantifier renditions of (1). While providing this background I shall
present and examine a transparent reading of (1) provided by Saarinen that allegedly
avoids Geach's criticisms, but which is not based on possibilist quantifiers. Saarinen
thinks that this transparent reading is inadequate for other reasons and so adopts a
possibilist quantifier solution. Thus, in the third section, I shall critically examine Esa
Saarinen's proposed possibilist quantifier solution to Geach's Puzzle. I shall conclude
that none of the offered solutions provide a satisfactory solution to Geach's Puzzle.
Possibilist Quantifiers I
Maxwell Cresswell, in "Anaphoric Attitudes," considers the following possibility
for (1).
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(3b) 3 x(Hob believes |Wx & Bxm| & Nob wonders whether |Kxs|).7<>
According to Cressweli, 3P is a possibilist quantifier, "to the effect that there is something
in some world or other such that ,..."7 ' In other words, the quant, fter does no, range
over the domain of just the actual world, but rather the domains of all possible worlds.7?
In the case of (3b), Cressweli writes, "there is no commitment to an actual witch about
which Hob and Nob are both thinking."7 ? Cressweli goes on to say that an objection
might be made on the grounds that we cannot have thoughts about particular non-actual
things in other worlds. If this is true then he thinks that "that may be an argument that we
can never establish reference in such cases, or even co-reference." 74
What progress, if any. has proposing (3b) made? I shall argue none or, at the
very best, very little. Assume for the moment that Hob and Nob can have thoughts of
particular objects in other worlds. There is a reading of ( 1 ) that is true even though (3b) is
not, Geach s reading of ( 1 ) can be true even if Hob and Nob have no particular object,
actual or possible, in mind as the witch. Hob might think that all mares that are blighted in
^Maxwell Cressweli, "Anaphoric Attitudes," Philosophical Papers 19 (1980): 15.
7
^Cressweli, 1 1.
77Cresswell, 1 1 . Cresswell's examples using the possibilist quantifier indicate
that Cressweli assumes that the same object can exist in different possible worlds and have
different properties in different possible worlds.
"^Cressweli, 15.
74Cresswell, 15.
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that way are blighted by witches and have no particular object in mind at all as the witch.
(3b) faces the same objection as (3a)~3x(Hob believes [Wx & Bxm] & Nob wonders
whether [Kxs]). (3a) does not imply the existence of witches and neither does (3b), but
both (3a) and (3b) imply that Hob and Nob have some particular somebody or possible
object in mind. Thus, (3b) is not a satisfactory translation of Geach's reading of ( 1 ). In
this sense proposing (3b) is no progress at all.
Still, (3b) provides something that (3a) does not, just not something that helps in
cases in which Hob and Nob have no particular entity in mind as the witch. What does
(3b) provide? Consider the possibilist quantifier applied to (2), in which case we get:
(2b) 3 px(Wx & Hob thinks [Bxm] & Nob wonders whether [Kxs]).
Whereas (2a) implies the existence of (actual) witches, (2b) does not. Whereas (2a) is
true only in cases in which Hob and Nob have a particular actual witch in mind, (2b) is
true in cases in which there are no witches, but Hob and Nob have a particular entity in
mind. (2b), (3a) and (3b) are three different readings of ( 1 ). (2b) implies Hob and Nob
have a particular, possible witch in mind; (3a) implies they have a particular actual person
in mind, and (3b) implies they have a particular possible person in mind. Adding the
possibilist quantifier provides for finer discriminations among transparent readings. In
this sense, proposing (3b) makes a little progress. Next, I shall present the background
required to examine Esa Saarinen's possibilist quantifier solution.
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Descriptive and Perspectival Quantifiers
Esa Saarinen also provides a possibilist quantifier type solution to Geach's Puzzle.
Saarinen's proposed solution differs from Cresswell's in that Saarinen's introduces two
kinds of possibilist quantifiers rather than just one. Since Saarinen's motivation for
introducing these quantifiers is independent of Saarinen's goal of solving Geach's Puzzle,
in order to understand Saarinen's possibilist quantifiers and ultimately his proposed
solution, we need first to attempt to understand Saarinen's motivation for introducing his
two types of quantifiers. I shall present and discuss Saarinen’s motivation next.
Saarinen takes the problem of "cross-identification between possible worlds"75 or
what David Kaplan calls the "problem of determining transworld heir lines"76 very
seriously. To cross-identify objects in different possible worlds is to determine that
objects in two or more different possible worlds are in fact one and the same object-or
more precisely, to determine that two or more world-bound objects in different possible
worlds are manifestations, in those different possible worlds, of a single entity. For
example, to cross-identify a in one possible world with b in another possible is to
determine that a and b are manifestations of one entity or what amounts to the same
thing-they are connected by a transworld heir line. The problem of cross-identification is
75Esa Saarinen, "Intentional Identity Interpreted: A Case Study of the Relations
Among Quantifiers. Pronouns, and Propositional Attitudes," Linguistics and Philosophy
2 (1978): 180.
76David Kaplan, "Transworld Heir Lines," in The Possible and the Actual ,
Michael J. Loux, ed., (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), p. 94.
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to determine how this cross-identification is to be carried out. Saarinen, who is heavily
influenced by the work of Jaakko Hintikka, adopts Hintikka's proposed solution to the
problem of cross-identification.
According to Saarinen and Hintikka, "we actually cross-identify in TWO
essentially different ways." 77 The first way, the descriptive or physical method.
according to Hintikka comprises methods that
are just the kind of methods we use in trying to cross-identify between real
life and a roman a clef. (This example illustrates not only the general
nature of the methods but also the difficulty of spelling them out.) To
describe these methods a little bit more fully, one can say that they often rely
on the continuity of individuals in space and time.78
Hintikka provides slightly more detail on the relevant continuity when he writes that the
descriptive method turns
on such facts as bodily continuity, continuity of memory, certain obvious
features of the behaviour of materials bodies vis-a-vis space and time (one
77
'
'Saarinen, 180; Hintikka argues for the two ways of cross-identifying in "On
The Logic of Perception," in Perception and Personal Identity, Norman S. Care and
Robert M. Grimm, eds., (Cleveland: The Press of Case Western Reserve University,
1969) pp. 140-173; reprinted in Jaakko Hintikka, Models For Modalities
,
(Dordrecht: D.
Reidel Publishing Co., 1969) pp. 151-183. See also "Objects of Knowledge and Belief:
Acquaintances and Public Figures," Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970): 869-883.
David Lewis writes that "both kinds of cross-identification may be further
subdivided." See "Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation," The Philosophical
Review XCII, (1983): 8. In other words, the two ways of cross-identification are better
described as two families of ways of cross-identifying.
78jaakko Hintikka, Knowledge and the Known
,
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel
Publishing Co., 1974), p. 218. The chapter from which this quotation is drawn was
originally published as a separate article "Knowledge by Acquaintance - Individuation by
Acquaintance" in Bertrand Russell: A Collection ofCritical Essays , David Pears ed.,
(New York: Doubleday and Company Inc., 1972), pp. 52-79.
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and the same body cannot be at two places at the same time; it takes time for
it to get from one place to another; it does not change its shape or size
instantaneously, etc.), and many similar physical and psychological
regularities.79
Finally, Hintikka also writes that the descriptive method "turns on continuity plus
similarity. 80 The second way, the perspectival or contextual method, according to
Hintikka,
relies on the role of the person whose attitudes we are discussing. Let us
suppose that that individual is myself and that the propositional attitude in
question is memory. Then my own firsthand memories of persons,times,
places, and objects create a framework which serves to cross-identify
people, places, objects, etc. As long as they play the same role in my
personally remembered past. I can treat them as identical. 81
Hintikka also writes,
Even when a does not remember who someone (say b) is, he may be able
to locate b uniquely in all these stories by reference to his own role in them.
("She is the blond girl I met at the New Year's party two years ago.") This
enables us to draw, so to speak, a world line connecting all the persons who
in several stories play the same role vis-a-vis a
,
no matter whether they are
descriptively the same individual or not.82
Saarinen, who cites some, but not all, of the passages above, writes that "[a]ll
these points concerning the nature of cross-identification are controversial and prompt a
number of further questions." He goes on to add that it is not his purpose to "clarify the
^Hintikka, Models For Modalities, p. 170.
^^Hintikka, "Objects of Knowledge ...," 873.
^Ijaakko Hintikka, Knowledge and the Known
, pp. 218-219.
^Hintikka, "Objects of Knowledge ...," 876.
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nature of cross-identification" and that "the Hintikkian notion of trans-world identity is
sufficiently well-established and that no further analysis of the notion will affect our
discussion in an important way.”83 Regardless, I think some clarification of the two
methods of cross-identification is required. Thus, before moving on to explain what
Saarinen does with the two ways of cross-identifying, 1 shall (i) briefly iterate some
essential points concerning Hintikka's two ways of cross-identification that I think can be
gleaned from the passage and (ii) provide an example that, at the very most, gives an
intuitive and sketchy account of how the two methods operate.
Both the descriptive and the perspectival methods determine whether objects in
different possible worlds are manifestations of one and the same object, i.e. whether they
are connected by a transworld heir line, by examining the properties or relations true of the
objects. The methods differ on which properties and relations are relevant The
descriptive method, according to Hintikka, relies on properties and relations pertaining to
the physical and psychological continuity of objects in addition to the descriptive similarity
of the objects. David Lewis interprets Hintikka’s suggestion as ”[counterparts are to be
related alike by continuity to individuals in a region of good match where cross-
identification is especially easy.”84 In other words, two objects, perhaps with radically
different local surroundings, in separate possible worlds are to be cross-identified
^Saarinen, 181.
S^David Lewis, 8-9, n. 6.
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descriptively as long as both objects can be traced back, using physical and psychological
continuities, to objects in a region of good match between the two possible worlds such
that cross-identification, presumably by sharing sufficient descriptions, is especially
easy.85 The perspectival method, on the other hand, relies on properties and relations
pertaining to the role the objects play relative to some particular agent. Two objects in
separate possible will be cross-identified perspectivally as long as in both possible worlds
one and the same individual is acquainted with the objects in a sufficiently similar manner.
Given that different properties and relations are relevant to each method of cross-
identification, an object in this world can be descriptively cross-identified with one object
and perspectivally cross-identified with a different object in one and the same alternate
world. For example, a particular person in this world, say Bill Clinton, will be
descriptively cross-identified with objects in alternative worlds that bear appropriate
physical and psychological continuity and similarity with Bill Clinton. Bill Clinton will be
perspectivally cross-identified with any object in an alternative world that, relative to some
agent, say A, plays the same role for A in its world as the actual Bill Clinton plays for A in
this world.86 Thus, if A is speaking to Clinton on the phone, but A is unaware of who is
^Regardless of whether Hintikka would in fact agree with Lewis' interpretation,
I shall understand cross-identification by description in Lewis' terms. Otherwise it is
difficult to see what Hintikka means by appealing to physical and psychological
continuities to establish cross-identification.
86Lewis has argued, successfully 1 think, that there is a special problem
associated with cross-identifying A in the alternative worlds such that perspectival cross-
identification can be accomplished. Neither descriptive nor perspectival cross-
identification is sufficient to cross-identify A-yet a third way of cross-identifying is
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on the line, then in some alternative worlds, such as those compatible with everything of
which A is aware, the role the person A is speaking to on the phone is filled by an object
that would not be descriptively cross-identified with Bill Clinton. Since, however, the
object plays the same role for A in its world as Bill Clinton does in this world. Bill Clinton
is perspectivally cross-identified with that object, even though that object may not share
sufficient physical and psychological continuity and similarity with Bill Clinton to merit
descriptive cross-identification.
Given the incomplete nature of the above remarks, let us assume for the moment
that Saannen is right-a fuller understanding of the two methods of cross-identification is
not necessary for Saarinen’s purposes. Now' both Saarinen and Hintikka argue that the
existence of the two methods of cross-identification and the fact that in some
circumstances the methods cross-identify a single object in one world with two different
objects in some other world imply that "an adequate logic of propositional attitudes
containing quantifiers should contain two pairs of quantifiers.. .quantifiers based on
physical (descriptive) trans-world criteria, and ...quantifiers based on perspectival trans-
world criteria."87 Let "3Dx" and "V Dx" be quantifiers based on descriptive trans-world
required. See"Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation." I shall leave this
problem aside and assume that whenever perspectival cross-identification is being carried
out the subject has already, in some appropriate manner, been cross-identified in all the
relevant alternatives.
^Saarinen, 181; Hintikka. Modelsfor Modalities, p. 172; Hintikka,
Knowledge and the Known
, pp. 2 1 9-220.
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criteria or "descriptive" quantifiers and let "3pX" and "Vpx" be quantifiers based on
perspective trans-world criteria or "perspective" quantifiers. Both sets of quantifiers are
taken to have existential import. A genere idea of how these quantifiers operate can be
determined by considering the following example.
Jimmy points to a figure on the stairs and says, "That is a lady.” We report as
follows:
(35) Jimmy believes there is a lady on the stairs.
There is in fact an object that Jimmy has in mind as the lady on the stairs, viz. the figure
he sees on the stairs. Given our two quantifiers we have at least two translation choices,
viz.,
(35a) 3Dx(Jimmy believes |Lx & Sx|)
and
(35b) 3pX(Jimmy believes |Lx & Sxj).
According to Saarinen, to say that "Jimmy believes P" is to say that in all the possible
worlds compatible with everything Jimmy believes P is true .88 Thus, (35a) will be
evaluated as follows. Start in the actual world and pick out some object, say a, in the
domain of the actual world. Now go to Jimmy's belief worlds, i.e. those worlds
compatible with everything Jimmy believes-and find a (using descriptive criteria) in
those belief worlds. If "La & Sa" is true in all those worlds for some a, then (35a) is
^Saarinen, 153 .
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true. Otherwise (35a) is false. (35b) will be evaluated similarly except that in Jimmy’s
belief worlds we find a by using descriptive methods, rather than perspectival ones.
For example, assume the figure on the stairs is in fact a lady. According to
Saannen, the figure "has descriptive and physical properties which make it possible to
cross-identify it with a lady (a human being). Thus it is e.g. necessary that the figure.. .IS
a human being."89 In other words, since the figure, a, is a human being, at least one
descriptive criterion that must be met by any object purporting to be a in Jimmy's belief
worlds is that the object be human.90 If, in all of Jimmy’s belief worlds, there is a lady
on the stairs that shares sufficient descriptive similarities with a in the actual world, then
(35a) is true. If, on the other hand, some of these ladies do not share the relevant
descriptive similarities with a or if in some of Jimmy's belief worlds the figure on the
stairs is not a lady, then (35a) is false. If, in all of Jimmy's belief worlds, the ladies (or
figures) on the stairs share the relevant perspectival similarities, i.e. they all play the same
role for Jimmy as a does in the actual world, then (35b) is true. Otherwise (35b) is false.
^Saarinen, 213.
90jt is not absolutely clear from Hintikka's minimal discussion of physical and
psychological continuity and similarity that, given an object of kind F, when one
descriptively cross-identifies one must also end up with an object of kind F. Since his
discussion does not rule out the requirement either, I shall assume with Saannen that
similarity of kind is one of the properties of physical and psychological continuity and
similarity we rely on to cross-identify descriptively. Lewis, on the other hand, explicitly
states that ”[c]ounterparts by description are united partly by similarity in their intrinsic
character." (Lewis, 8)
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Now assume that the figure on the stairs is in fact a wax figure and not a human
being. Thus, a, when descriptively identitied will be a wax figure in all of Jimmy's
belief worlds. Since no wax figure is a lady, "La & Sa" is false in all of Jimmy's belief
worlds and so is (35a). But what of (35b)? Since we are cross-identifying perspectivally.
Saarinen claims that it is required that a "bears an appropriate causal relation to that belief
of Jimmy s reported in f (35)], and that from the point of view of Jimmy's belief the figure
counts as a well-defined individual."91 In other words, I take the role that has to be
fulfilled something like the object that causes the beliefin Jimmy that there is a lady on
the stairs. Since the object that causes the belief can be a real lady, we can cross-identify
a in the actual world, a wax figure, with real human beings in Jimmy's belief worlds, as
long as in those worlds, the real human beings are the cause of Jimmy's belief that there is
a lady on the stairs. Thus, as long as the objects in Jimmy's belief worlds that are
perspectivally cross-identified with the wax figure a are both ladies and on the stairs, then
(35b) is true, even though (35a) is false. If on the other hand, in some of Jimmy's belief
worlds the figure on the stairs is a wax figure, then even though each figure may be
perspectivally cross-identified with a, since no wax figure is a lady, (35b) will be false.
Armed with the descriptive and perspectival quantifiers and a tenuous grasp of
how they operate we can begin to examine Saarinen's proposals for solving Geach's
Puzzle. Not surprisingly, once Saarinen has introduced his two kinds of quantifiers he
Saarinen, 213.
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begins by considering:
(3c) 3pX(Hob thinks [Wx &Bxm] & Nob wonders whether [Kxs]),
and
(3d) ElpXtHob thinks [Wx &Bxm] & Nob wonders whether [Kxs])
as renditions of our target sentence, (l)-Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare and
Nob wonders whether she killed Cob's sow. Both (3c) and (3d) appear to be translations
of (1) interpreted as (3)~As regards somebody. Hob thinks that she is a witch and has
blighted Bob's mare and Nob wonders whether she killed Cob’s sow. But, (3), as we
saw in the previous chapter, fails to capture Geach's intended reading because, as Geach
puts it, ”[(3)| would imply that Hob and Nob had some one person in mind as a suspected
witch; whereas it might be the case, to the knowledge of our reporter, that Hob and Nob
merely thought that there was a witch around and their suspicions had not yet settled on a
particular person."92
Saarinen himself cites the Geach passage as a possible criticism of (3c) and (3d),
but Saarinen goes on to respond as follows:
For various reasons it is plausible to assume that in putting forward [(3)]
Geach has in mind THAT reading of it which bases the relevant quantifier
on descriptive criteria. If so, Geach's criticism levelled against [(3)] as a
paraphrase of (1) is correct.. ..In case the quantifier somebody in [(3)] is
based on perspectival cross-identification criteria we get a reading to which
Geach's criticism does not speak.93
92p. T. Geach, "Intentional Identity," Journal ofPhilosophy 64 (1967): 629.
^Saarinen, 195.
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Since the reading of (3) with a descriptive quantifier is (3d) and the reading of (3) with a
perspectival quantifier is (3c), Saarinen is claiming that Geach's criticism applies to (3d),
but not to (3c). Why does Saarinen think (3c) does not imply that Hob and Nob have a
particular person in mind? Concerning (3c) he writes:
it might very well be that neither Nob nor Hob has settled his
suspicion on a particular person. It is only presupposed, first that from the
point of view of Hob’s thoughts there is some specific individual who is a
witch that has blighted Bob’s mare. Second, it is presupposed that from the
point of view of Nob’s beliefs there is some specific individual who has
killed Cob’s sow.
Both these conditions can be fulfilled without Hob or Nob knowing
who has blighted Bob’s mare or who has killed Cob’s sow.94
Thus, for Saarinen at least, the fact that from Hob’s point of view there is a specific
individual who blighted Bob’s mare is not enough to guarantee that Hob has some
particular object in mind. In order to guarantee that Hob has some particular object in
mind Hob has to "know who" the object is. Since, according to Saarinen, (3c) can be true
even if neither Hob nor Nob knows who the witch is, then neither Hob nor Nob need
have a particular witch in mind in order for (3c) to be true.
In order to analyze Saarinen's defense of (3c) I shall very briefly present and
discuss two theses about quantifying into propositional attitude contexts.95 Let a de re
^Saarinen, 196. [Emphasis added.]
95xhe discussion that follows is meant to be a very rough discussion of (i)
quantifying into propositional attitude contexts (ii) having a particular object in mind, and
(iii) knowing who or what an object is. Given the tremendous amount of detailed debate
on issues such as the relationship between de re and de dicto propositional attitudes and
necessary conditions for quantifying into propositional attitude contexts I cannot hope to
adequately capture all the varied views on the issues in the brief discussion that I provide.
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propositional attitude sentence be a sentence that has a free variable within the scope of the
propositional attitude verb- eg. in Bx (Hob thinks [Wx]), within the scope of "Hob
thinks" the variable "x" is free.
T hesis I: If a de re propositional attitude sentence is true, then the agent having
the propositional attitude has a particular object in mind.
Thesis II: If an agent has a particular object in mind, then the agent knows who
or what the object is.
Thesis I, I take to be the commonly, though not universally, held view ofde re attitudes
that grounds Geach's criticism of sentences such as (3), (3d), and (3c). In other words
de re attitude sentences such as "There is somebody Hob thinks is a witch" are
paraphrasable as "There is somebody such that Hob thinks ofher\hdX she is a witch" or
"Of somebody in particular. Hob thinks she is a witch." Thesis I might also be rendered
by the slogan-"No de re attitudes without having particular objects in mind." Thesis II, I
take to be one proposal for a necessary condition for having a particular object in mind.
Thesis II might be rendered by the slogan-"No having particular objects in mind without
knowing who or what the object is."
In his book, Knowledge and Belief Jaakko Hintikka can be construed as
advocating both Theses I and II.96 In his later work in which he introduces perspectival
cross-identification and perspectival quantifiers he explicitly equates sentences of the form
"BpXjd perceives that a = x) and '^^(d knows that a = x)" with the sentences "d
^Jaakko Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1962), pp. 144-159 especially.
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perceives what (or who) a is" and "d knows what (or who) a is" and sentences of the form
3pX(d perceives that a = x)" with the sentence "d perceives a"97 In other words, de re
attitudes involving descriptive quantifiers presuppose knowing who, whereas de re
attitudes involving perspectival quantifiers do not. Thus, Hintikka, in his later work, can
no longer be considered an advocate of both I and II. Which is Hintikka giving up?
According to Saarinen, Geach's criticism that Hob and Nob need not have a
particular object in mind in order for ( 1 ) to be true applies to (3d), but not to (3c).
Saarinen argues that (3c)--3 px(Hob thinks [Wx &Bxm] & Nob wonders whether [Kxs])-
-can be true even if Hob and Nob do not have a particular witch in mind because (3c) can
be true even if Hob and Nob do not know who the witch is. Thus, Saarinen would have
Hintikka keep Thesis Il-no having a particular object in mind without knowing who or
what the object is, but reject Thesis I-no de re attitudes without having a particular object
in mind. Instead of Thesis I, we might suppose that Saarinen would have Hintikka
advocate the following:
Thesis III: If a descriptive quantifier de re propositional attitude sentence is
true, then the agent having the propositional attitude has a particular object in mind.
At the same time, Saarinen would have Hintikka reject
Thesis IV: If a perspectival quantifier de re propositional attitude sentences is
true, then the agent having the propositional attitude has a particular object in mind.
Descriptive, but not perspectival, de re attitudes imply a particular object is had in mind.
97Hintikka, Modelsfar Modality, p. 173. See also, "Objects of Knowledge
and Belief," 875 and Knowledge and the Known , p. 216, 220.
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Though Saarinen would have Hintikka keep Thesis II and drop Thesis I,
Hintikka's comments about descriptive and perspective quantifiers need not be interpreted
in this way. Though Hintikka clearly equates "knowing who" locutions with the
descriptive quantifiers. Hintikka never argues against Thesis IV (and so Thesis I).
Consider the following from Hintikka concerning perspectival cross-identification.
The position different objects occupy in the framework of a's visual
geometry creates a similarity among the possible states of affairs compatible
with what he sees, a similarity which can be used to individuate them
irrespective of whether they can be individuated by description. These are
the individuals to whom a can point and say , " That is the individual I am
talking about!"98
If, as Hintikka suggests, perspectivally cross-identified individuals are such that a can. in
some sense, point to and pick them out as the individuals he is talking about, then, even
though a may not know who the individual in question is, surely a has a particular object
in mind. Perhaps Hintikka is distinguishing two types of cases within contexts in which
an agent has a particular object in mind. If the agent knows who or what the object is,
descriptive quantifiers are appropriate. If the agent has a particular object in mind, but
does not know who the agent is, then perspectival quantifiers are appropriate. On this
interpretation Hintikka accepts Thesis I, i.e. both Thesis UI and IV, but rejects Thesis II.
Saarinen cannot, therefore, appeal to Hintikka's discussion of descriptive and
perspectival quantification to support rejecting Thesis I and so Geach's criticism of (3c).
At the same time, Saarinen's defense of (3c) assumes the truth of Thesis II without any
^Hintikka, "Objects of Knowledge and Belief," 874.
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argument for the truth of Thesis II. The problem is that Thesis II ("No particular object in
mind without knowing who or what the object is”) is far from universally held." With
no argument for Thesis II and with counterproposals available, the claim that (3c) can be
true even though Hob and Nob do not know who is the witch fails to support the claim
that (3c) can be true even though Hob and Nob have no particular object in mind.
To summarize: Saarinen claims that Geach's criticism that Hob and Nob need not
have a particular object in mind fails to apply to (3c) because (3c) can be true even if Hob
and Nob do not know who the witch is (and so (3c) fails to imply Hob and Nob have a
particular object in mind.) But we have just seen that Saarinen cannot appeal to Hintikka
to support the claim that perspectival de re attitudes do not imply a particular object is had
in mind and that Saarinen cannot justifiably assume that Hob and Nob need to know who
the witch is in order to be able to have her in mind. Saarinen needs some other way of
^^Hintikka's discussion of "knowing who" in Knowledge and Beliefis an
attempt to provide the premises required to validly quantify into propositional attitude
sentences such as (26) Hob thinks that Hecate blighted Bob's mare. In other words, what
has to be true in order to conclude from (26) that someone is such that Hob thinks that she
blighted Bob's mare. Hintikka would add the premise "Hob knows who Hecate is" (and
perhaps the premise "There is something that is Hecate" to insure that 'Hecate' refers to an
existing object). [Knowledge and Belief, pp. 144-45.] Despite the fact that what exactly
"Hob knows who Hecate is" amounts to is a matter of contention [see Steven E. Boer and
William G. Lycan, Knowing Who, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986) for several
possibilities], there are many who hold that quantifying into (26) does not require a
premise as strong as "Hob knows who Hecate is." See, for example, Michael Devitt,
Designafion, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981)[Chapter Nine especially]
and Tyler Burge,
"
De Re Belief," Journal ofPhilosophy 1A (1977): 338-62. Still
others, latitudinarians, would hold that no extra premises are needed to validly quantify in.
See, for example, Ernest Sosa, "Propositional Attitudes De Dicto and De Re," Journal
of Philosophy 67 (1970): 883-96 and "Rejoinder to Hintikka," Journal ofPhilosophy 68
(1971): 498-501. Thus, there is ample to reason to believe that Thesis II may be false.
70
arguing that Geach s criticism that Hob and Nob need not have a particular object in mind
fails to apply to (3c).
In Saannen s overall discussion ot perspectival quantifiers, some of his comments
suggest a different reason to reject Geach s criticism of (3c). Concerning sentences such
as (3c)-3pX(Hob thinks [Wx &Bxm] & Nob wonders whether [Kxs])~Saarinen writes
the attitudes are de dicto in the sense that they are not (necessarily) directed to any
physically (descriptively) cross-identified individual." 100 He also writes:
Notice that in this solution to Geach's puzzle we do not assume that Hob's
thoughts or Nob's beliefs were directed to a specific witch (or a specific
individual). Admittedly, the two attitudes are directed to a specific
perspectivally identified individual. In other words, from their point of
view there is a specific witch (a specific individual) towards which the
attitudes are directed. But there need not be any descriptively identified
individual of the kind, and so, in the most common sense of the phrase, the
two attitudes are not of a particular individual. In that sense, they are not de
re.
i°i
To say that Hob's and Nob's thoughts are directed to a specific perspectivally identified
individual, but not to a specific descriptively identified individual, is to say that Hob's and
Nob's thoughts are directed to many different descriptively identified individuals. In other
words, what counts as the same individual on perspectival grounds counts as different
individuals on descriptive grounds. Thus, Saarinen argues that since sentences such as
(3c) are not directed toward a specific descriptively cross-identified individual, i.e. they
^Saarinen, 185.
101 Saarinen, 202-203.
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are directed toward many different descriptively cross-identified individuals, they are not
about one particular individual at all . 102
Saarinen’s new reason is also problematic. Using Saarinen's reasoning one could
argue that Odj-EipXiFIob thinks [Wx &Bxm] & Nob wonders whether [Kxs])--is not
really about a particular individual since it is directed toward many different perspectivally
cross-identified individuals. Since it is about many such individuals it cannot be about
one particular individual and so in this sense is not de re. The only way to avoid the
parallel argument is to claim that descriptive cross-identification is somehow more basic
than perspectival cross-identification. There are two ways in which Saarinen might claim
that descriptive cross-identification is more basic than perspectival cross-identification.
First, Saarinen might claim that descriptive cross-identification is ontologically more
basic--descriptively cross-identified objects are the genuine individuals whereas the
perspectivally cross-identified ones are not. Second. Saarinen might claim that descriptive
cross-identification is semantically more basic—descriptively cross-identified individuals
are the individuals we have in mind when we have a particular object in mind whereas
perspectivally cross-identified individuals are not. Can Saarinen justifiably make either
claim? Before I answer this question, let me first clarify the notion of perspectivally or
descriptively cross-identified individual.
102O f a version of ( 1 ) that also seems prey to Geach's objection to (3), but which
Saarinen rejects for other reasons, Saarinen writes "there being several objects for the
attitude to be about, there is no one PARTICULAR object which it is about."(178).
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So far we have been treating the quantifiers in the standard way-in sentences or
sentence parts in which the quantifiers have widest scope the quantifiers range over the
objects in the domain of the world in which we are currently evaluating the particular
sentence or sentence part Just because there are two types of quantifiers does not mean
that there are two types of object in each world. Instead, if. when evaluating a sentence or
sentence part, we are required to move to a different possible world, the type of quantifier
determines which object in the new possible world counts as the same object as the one
already picked out by the quantifier in the original world of evaluation. This is how
Hintikka originally conceived the two quantifiers. 103
There is however a second way to treat the quantifiers—a way suggested by some
of Hintikka's later writings on perspectival and descriptive quantifiers. According to
Hintikka "an individual virtually becomes, for logical purposes, tantamount to the "world
line". ..connecting its manifestations in these possible worlds." 104 In other words, objects
in each possible world are merely manifestations of the logically real individuals. The
logically real individuals, i.e. the individuals over which the quantifiers range, are the
world lines connecting objects in different possible worlds. Since there are two ways of
drawing world lines there will be two kinds of objects-descriptive world lines and
perspectival world lines. The quantifier "BpX" will range over the descriptive world lines
lO^See Hintikka, Modelsfor Modalities, pp. 172-173.
^Hintikka, "Objects of Knowledge and Belief," 870-871.
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and the quantifier "3px" will range over the perspectival world lines. The two ways of
treating the quantifiers will generate equivalent results as long as whenever we are
evaluating a sentence and have to pick a world line we restrict ourselves to world lines that
have manifestations in the world of evaluation.
Do either ot these two ways of treating the quantifiers give support to Saarinen's
implicit assumption that descriptive cross-identification is somehow more basic than
perspectival cross-identification? Neither way supports the claim that descriptive cross-
identification is ontologically more basic. According to the first way the quantifiers range
over exactly the same objects while providing two different means of determining what
counts as one and the same object. Since the means are based on different criteria, what
counts as the same object based on one cross-identification method may count as a
different object on the other method. Both methods, however, are equally valid-neither
method really tells us which objects are one and the same. According to Hintikka "the
notion of a (well-defined) individual is in a perfectly good sense relative to a cross-world
comparison method as soon as one starts quantifying into propositional attitudes." 105
What counts as a particular object is relative to cross-identification method.
In the second way the quantifiers range over different individuals-different world
lines. Hintikka points out in several places that perspectival world lines are well-defined
individuals on a par with descriptive world lines. For example, he writes: "the jcross-
1
^Hintikka, Knowledge and the Known
, p. 220.
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world] comparison can be carried out in more than one way, yielding two different
domains of "genuine," well-defined individuals although the possible worlds and all that
can said of each of them and its inhabitants (qua its inhabitants only) remain precisely the
same" 106 and "in speaking of propositional attitudes the "real" ("unique," "well-defined")
individuals are in the last analysis the "world lines" that connect the manifestations or
embodiments of the same individual in different possible worlds. Now that we have
uncovered two different sets of such world lines,..." 10 ^ Since the perspectival world
lines are genuine, real individuals, on a par with the descriptive world lines Saarinen
cannot claim that descriptive cross-identification is ontologically more basic than
perspectival cross-identification.
What of claiming that descriptive cross-identification is semantically more basic?
Consider a set of alternatives of someone, a. Assume that in each ofd s alternatives
there is some individual that is P. There are three possibilities concerning these
individuals: (i) all the individuals are descriptively similar enough such that they are all
manifestations of one descriptively cross-identified object; (ii) all the individuals are
perspectival ly similar enough such that they are all manifestations of one perspectivally
cross-identified object; (iii) neither (i) nor (ii) holds--there is no sense in which ail the
l^Hintikka, "Objects of Knowledge and Belief," 872-873.
lO^Hintikka, Knowledge and the Known
, pp. 219-220. For more evidence that
Hintikka views perspectivally cross-identified objects as ontologically on a par with
descriptively cross-identified objects see "Existential Presuppositions and Uniqueness
Presuppositions" in Models for Modalities, pp. 138-139; and "Semantics for
Propositional Attitudes" in Modelsfor Modalities, p. 102.
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individuals are mani testations ot a single object. Saarinen would have us understand
having a particular object in mind" in terms of whether or not possibility (i) holds.
According to Saarinen, whether or not possibility (ii) holds is not relevant to whether or
not someone has a particular object in mind.
Is Saarinen justified in having us understand "having a particular object in mind"
in terms of whether of not possibility (i) holds while ignoring whether or not possibility
(ii) holds? All Saarinen needs to claim is that, in at least some instances, in order to have a
particular object in mind we must be able to do more than say what causal role the object
plays in causing our beliefs, our perceptual field, etc. or, in Lewis' terms, do more than
say how we are acquainted with the object. This claim does seem quite plausible. If I
receive an anonymous letter from someone, then I can believe that one and only person
sent me the letter without having any particular person in mind as the sender. At the same
time, according to Lewis, receiving a letter from someone is a way of becoming
acquainted with the sender. 108 Thus, perhaps Saarinen could claim that descriptive cross-
identification is semantically more basic than perspectival cross-identification, in which
case Saarinen is correct--(3c) does not imply that Hob and Nob have a particular object in
mind, since "having a particular object in mind" is to be understood in terms of whether or
not there is a single descriptively cross-identified individual and not whether or not there is
a single perspectivally cross-identified individual.
^Lewis, 10.
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I have two comments to make. First, without a much more detailed analysis of
having a particular object in mind," (an analysis that would take us too far afield at this
time), we cannot say for sure whether or not Saarinen is justified in excluding the truth or
falsity of possibility (ii) from our understanding of "having a particular object in mind."
Regardless, since it is at least plausible that there being a single perspectivally cross-
identified object is not sufficient for having a particular object in mind, we shall grant
Saarinen's claim that Geach's objection to (3) and (3d) does not apply to (3c). Second.
Saarinen admits (3c)--3pX(Hob thinks |Wx &Bxm] & Nob wonders whether [Kxs])~is
about a specific perspectivally cross-identified individual. In other words, for (3c) to be
true possibility (ii) must hold. Thus, if it is possible that Geach's reading of (1) is true in
a case in which possibility (iii) holds, then (3c) will be inadequate. (3c) will be inadequate
because (3c) implies that a particular perspectival object is under consideration, which is
not the case if possibility (iii) holds. Can the intended reading of ( 1) be true even though
no particular descriptive or perspectival object is under consideration?
Without knowing exactly what is required for two objects to be perspectivally
cross-identified I am not sure that we can answer this question. Unfortunately, Saarinen
sticks to his word and does not elaborate the nature of perspectival cross-identification.
Consider, however, the following passage from Lewis:
Cross-identification by acquaintance can be put to good use in describing a
subject's state. Holmes begins his investigation with an open mind: each of
his doxastic alternatives has some murderer or other, since he believes
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someone is the murderer, but in no sense is it the same murderer throughout
the alternatives. Later there is someone in particular whom he believes to be
the murderer, the murderers of the alternatives that remain uneliminated are
counterparts by acquaintance for Holmes ot one another, and in that sense
they comprise a definite individual. (They need not be counterparts by
description....) Holmes comes to believe: the murderer is the one I am
acquainted with in such-and-such ways . 1 ^9
According to Lewis, Holmes can believe one person is the murderer without there being
any particular descriptive or perspective object such that Holmes believes it is the
murderer. Could not the same be true of Hob and the witch? Could not Hob believe one
witch blighted Bob's mare without there being any particular descriptive or perspective
object such that Hob thinks it is a witch and blighted Bob’s mare? It depends upon how
many acquaintance relations two objects must share in order to be perspectivally cross-
identified. If Holmes needs only the most minimal acquentance relation such as hearing
Watson say that Dr. Roylott has been murdered in order for there to be some particular
perspectivally cross-identified object such that Holmes thinks it murdered Dr. Roylott,
then I doubt that there is ever truly a case in which Holmes thinks someone is the
murderer without there also being a particular perspectival object that Holmes thinks is the
murderer. Similarly, if Hob need merely have heard there is a witch about from X in
order for there to be a perspectivally cross-identified object such that Hob thinks it is a
witch and blighted Bob's mare, then again I doubt there really is a case in which
possibility (iii) holds-at the very least possibility (ii) holds.
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On the other hand, since Lewis describes Holmes' perspectival object as the object
Holmes is acquainted with in such and such ways, perhaps Lewis is suggesting that there
must be several acquaintance relationships shared by objects before they can be
perspectivally cross-identified. If so, then the "good use" to which Lewis wants to put
cross-identification by acquaintance, viz. distinguishing having beliefs about a particular
perspectival object from having beliefs about no particular object at all. remains tenable.
But if, in order to be perspectivally cross-identified, two objects must share several
acquaintance relations, then in contexts such as Context IV (in which Hob's only
acquaintance with the witch is from hearing X say there is a witch about) there is no
particular perspectival object such that Hob thinks she is a witch and blighted Bob's mare.
Since the intended reading of ( 1) is true in Context IV, (3c) will be inadequate if
perspectival cross-identification relies upon sharing multiple acquaintance relations.
Since Saarinen is not specific about what exactly is required for perspectival cross-
identification we cannot be sure whether (3c) is adequate or not. (3c) clearly implies that
there is a particular perspectival object under consideration. If Context IV is a context in
which some reading of (1 ) is true even though no particular object is under consideration,
then a Geach-like criticism still applies to (3c). One unfortunate consequence of making
(3c) true in Context IV is to eliminate the possibility that there is no object our attitudes are
about-at the very least they are about some perspectivally cross-identified object. Thus,
even though Saarinen may be correct that Geach's criticism does not apply to (3c),
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depending upon the ultimate nature of perspective cross-identification, perhaps a Geach-
like criticism still applies to (3c).
Regardless of whether (3c) succumbs to a Geach-like criticism, Saarinen thinks
there is a minor flaw with (3c). Saarinen claims that (3c) demands "that in the actual
world there is something which has an appropriate cause relation to entities which are
witches in certain other worlds," but that "it is implicit in his [Geach's] discussions that
the intended reading of (1) should not make ANY claims about actue objects, neither of
witches or of any other objects." 1 10 In other words (3c) implies that something in the
actual world is playing the role of a witch for Hob and Nob in the actue world and (1) can
be true even if there is no such object at all. Saarinen's solution is simple. Drop the
existential import of the quantifier. I shall examine the viability of this proposal next.
Possibilist Quantifiers II
Saarinen proposes that we treat the quantifier in (3c) as a possibilist quantifier.
How should we do this? We certainly cannot use Hintikka's original method of having
the quantifiers range over the domains of particular worlds since this method always picks
out objects that exist in the world. Instead we should treat the quantifiers as ranging over
world lines. As long as the following two conditions hold we will get possibilist
quantifiers. First, there must be partial world lines, that is world lines that in some worlds
*
^Saarinen, 201.
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have no manifestation at all. Second, regardless of the world of evaluation, the domain of
the respective quantifiers must be all the respective world lines and not just the world lines
with manifestations in that world. If both of these conditions hold, then for some worlds
the quantifiers will pick out objects that do not exist at that world, i.e. world lines with no
manifestation at that world.
A convenient way to represent world lines is by utilizing functions that take
possible worlds to objects within the domain of that possible world. Thus, to say that
object a in world- 1 and object b in world-2 and object c in world-3 are one and the same
object, i.e. are manifestations of one world line, is to say that there is a function, /, such
that the value of / in world- 1 is a, in world-2 is b and in world-3 is c. To say that the
world line is partial. i..e there is a world in which no manifestation exists, is just to say
that the value of the function in that world is undefined.
Given that there are two kinds of world lines there will be two sets of functions.
Let I
cj
be the set of functions representing descriptive world lines and l
p
be the set of
functions representing perspectival world lines. 1 11 Let d be any member of ld and p be
1 1
1 What follows is a paraphrase of Saarinen's discussion of representing world
lines as functions on page 189 of "Intentional Identity Interpreted." Saarinen also adds the
following complication:
it is necessary that two sets, I^(v) and Ip(v), are assigned to each possible
world, v.
.... For each v € U, [the domain of all possible worlds] lj(v) and Ip(v)
will represent, respectively, the set of descriptively drawn world lines (from
the point of view of v) and the set of perspectivally drawn world lines
(from the point of view of v.)[ 1 89
1
In other words, there is not just one set of descriptive world lines for all possible worlds.
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any member of Ip. d and p will be functions (possibly partial) from the set of all
possible worlds. Given a possible world u\ d(w) and p(w), if defined, will be
members ot the domain of w. Thus, each member d of /(jl and each member p of / is
a world line, while d (w) and p(w), for each possible world vc, are the manifestations of
d and p in w. Let "3 D
p
x" be the possibilist descriptive quantifier that ranges over 1
1
and let "3 p
p
x" be the possibilist perspectival quantifier that ranges over /
Given Saarinen's desire to drop the existential presuppositions from the existential
quantifiers, (3c) and (3d) can be rewritten as follows:
(3e) 3 p
px(Hob thinks [Wx &Bxm] & Nob wonder whether |Kxs]),
and
(30 3D
px(Hob thinks |Wx &Bxm] & Nob wonders whether [Kxs)).
Whereas the quantifiers in (3c) and (3d) ranged over either objects in the actual world only
or world lines with manifestation in the actual world only, the quantifiers in (3e) and (3f)
range over world lines that do not have manifestations in the actual world as well as world
lines that do. (3e) solves Saarinen's problem with (3c). (3e) need not be about any object
in the actual world at all. At the same time, Saarinen also thinks that (30 "captures
Geach's intended reading of ( 1
)"
and that therefore "|o]ne can fulfill his [Geach's]
but rather each world has its own set. I imagine that some of the worlds will have the
same set of descriptive worlds lines, but that some sets may differ. The same will hold
true for sets of perspectival world lines. I ignore this complication since it will have no
bearing on Saarinen's ultimate proposed solution.
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requirement in two essentially different ways." 1 12 In other words Saarinen thinks that
both (3e) and (3f) will solve Geach's problem. Is he correct? In order to answer this
question I shall start by considering (3f).
Whereas (3d)-- BpXiHob thinks [Wx &Bxm] & Nob wonders whether [Kxs])~
clearly implies that Hob and Nob have some actual object in mind as a possible witch. (3f)
does not. (3f) can be true even if Hob and Nob have no particular actual object in mind as
the suspected witch. Saarinen himself writes of (3f) that "(s]ince there is no actual object
for Hob's thoughts and Nob's beliefs to be of. there is at least one sense in which we can
say the attitudes are not de re. they are not of any particular actual object." 1 13 But the fact
that (30 can be true even if Hob and Nob have no particular actual object in mind fails to
help Saarinen at all, since (30 still implies that Hob and Nob have some possible, though
perhaps not actual, object in mind. Since (30 implies that Hob and Nob have at the very
least a possible object in mind, then (30 is just another version of Max Cresswell's
possibilist quantifier reading, (3b)-3 px(Hob believes [Wx & Bxm] & Nob wonders
whether [Kxs]). (30 has the same problems as Cresswell's (3b). Either it is impossible
to have a particular merely possible object in mind at all. or if it is, Geach's reading of ( 1
)
can be true even if Hob and Nob do not have any particular possible object in mind at all
—
they just think that blightings or killings like the one they experienced are performed by
1
^Saarinen, 208.
*
^Saarinen, 207-208.
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witches and there is a rumor that a witch is about Gotham. Since (3f) implies that Hob
and Nob have a particular possible object in mind, (3f) is unsatisfactory as a formalization
of (1).
How about (3e)~3 ppx(Hob thinks [Wx &Bxm] & Nob wonder whether [Kxs])?
In order for (3e) to be true there must be some perspectival world tine such that in all of
Hob's thought-worlds the manifestation of that world line is a witch who blighted Bob's
mare and in all of Nob's wonders-worlds the manifestation of that world line killed Cob's
sow. The world line need not have a manifestation in the actual world. Objects in
different possible worlds are all manifestations of the same perspectival world line if each
object plays the same role relative to some agent. Even though we only have the intuitive
notion of what counts as the same role presented in the previous section. I think we can
show that (3e) is unsatisfactory.
Notice that nothing dictates that the perspectival world line that makes (3e) true be
an object from either Hob's or Nob's perspective. (3e) merely requires that there be a
perspectival world line fulfilling certain conditions. Perhaps the perspectival world line in
question is an object that plays a certain role from the perspective of some third person,
Rob. Suppose, for instance, Rob has talked extensively with both Hob and Nob. Now
Rob believes that the witch Hob is talking about in fact blighted Bob's mare and that the
witch Nob is wondering about in fact killed Cob's sow. Rob also comes to believe, for
who knows what reason, that the two witches are in fact one and the same. From Rob's
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perspective there is a single object filling the role of blighter of Bob's mare and killer of
Cob's sow.
But surely we do not want the truth of (3e) to depend upon what Rob believes. In
Chapter I, I introduced contexts of type III. In general in contexts of type III, Hob has
never heard ot Nob and vice versa. Hob's information about witches comes from a
completely different source than Nob's information. There is absolutely no reason to
think that Hob and Nob have attitudes about the same thing. Thus, in contexts of type III,
no reading of (1) is true. But, if Rob, after talking with Nob and Hob. mistakenly comes
to think that they have attitudes about the same thing, perhaps the perspectival world line
representing the object that from Rob's point of view blighted Bob's mare and killed
Cob's sow will make (3e) true. If the perspectival world line representing Rob's witch
can make (3e) true, then (3e) will not be adequate. What Rob believes or what Rob
counts as a well-defined object should have no bearing on the truth or falsity of (1).
Saarinen has two ways of avoiding this problem. First, Saarinen might deny that
it is possible for the perspectival world line representing Rob's witch to make (3e) true.
Saarinen can claim that to make (3e) true, Hob's and Nob's belief worlds would have to
be a subset of Rob's belief worlds and that without actually being Hob or Nob, Rob could
not possibly believe everything they believe and more. Unfortunately, whether or not
Rob could believe everything Hob and Nob believe such that Hob's and Nob's belief
worlds are subsets of Rob's belief worlds is an open question. Saarinen still has to show
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that the perspectival world line representing Rob's witch cannot make (3e) true. Second.
Saarinen could avoid the problem by restricting allowable substituends in (3e) to
perspectival world lines that represent objects from the point of view of either Hob or
Nob. In other words, instead of ranging over all perspectival world lines, the quantifier in
(3e) would range over perspectival world lines that represent objects from the point of
view of either Hob or Nob. In fact there is some evidence that Saarinen intends just such
a restriction. Of perspectival quantifier sentences in general such as:
(36a) 3 px(a believes [Px|)
Saarinen writes: "|t]he truth of | (36a) ] secures that from the point of view of d s beliefs,
there is an individual playing a specific role and he is believed by a to be P." 1 14 In other
words, the person for whom there is an individual playing a specific role is the person
who is having the propositional attitude. Given such a restriction. (3e) can only be made
true by perspectival world lines representing objects from the point of view of Hob or
Nob, which is as it should be.
Saarinen has to make (3e) such that only perspectival world lines representing
objects of Hob’s or of Nob's can make (3e) true. Unfortunately, neither will do, since
our reading of ( 1 ) can be true in situations (such as Context IV) in which Hob has never
heard of Nob and vice versa. Therefore, it is consistent with what Hob thinks and what
Nob wonders that Nob fails to exist and that Hob fails to exist. Therefore, in some ot
1 l^Saarinen, 200.
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Hob s worlds, Nob does not exist and in some of Nob's worlds. Hob does not exist.
Since Hob does not exist in all the relevant worlds there can be no object that plays a
particular role for Hob in all those worlds. Since Nob does not exist in all those worlds
there can be no object that plays a particular role for Nob in all those worlds. Thus, even
if Saarinen restricts the perspectival world-lines that can be picked out by the quantifier in
(3e) to those that represent individuals from the point of view of Hob or Nob, rather from
the point of view of anyone, (3e) can still be false when our reading of (1) is true.
Unfortunately, even though Saarinen never provides a logical form other than
(3e), Saarinen might not intend to evaluate (3e) as the structure of (3e) seems to dictate.
Speaking of sentences like ( 1 ) in general, Saarinen proposes the following method of
evaluation. The first step is be to pick an object (a function) from / , say /, such that in
all of Hob's belief worlds the manifestation of i is a witch who blighted Bob's mare. The
second step is be to pick an object from /
,
not necessarily the same object, say j, such
that in all of Nob's wonders worlds the manifestation ofj killed Cob's sow. In order for
( 1) to be true, the following has to hold: /(@) =j[@), where @ stands for the actual
world. In other words the manifestation of i in the actual world has to be the same as the
manifestation of / in the actual world.
1 15 Thus, despite the fact that Saarinen writes as if
1 Saarinen, 190. Saarinen expresses what I have just said in terms of his game
theoretic formulation of propositional attitudes and pronouns. The relevant game theoretic
rule goes as follows:
Assume the game has reached a possible world v and a sentence of the
form X-pron-Y.. ..Determine the individual to which 'pron' refers as earlier.
Say the individual is /'. The defender may choose an individual from Ij(v)
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(3e) is the desired logical structure of (1), Saarinen evaluates (1) as if it had the following
structure:
(37a) 3 p
p
x(Hob thinks [Wx & Bxm) & 3 p
py(Nob wonders whether [Kys] &
x = y))
1 16
(37a) is true as long as there is a perspectival world line such that in all of Hob's think-
worlds the manifestation of the world line is a witch who blighted Bob's mare and there is
a perspectival world line such that in all of Nob's wonder-worlds the manifestation of the
world line killed Cob’s sow and the manifestations of the two world lines in the actual
world are identical. As long as the first perspectival quantifier only ranges over
perspectival world lines that are objects from Hob's point of view and the second
perspectival quantifier only ranges over perspectival world lines that are objects from
Nob's point of view, (37a) will avoid most of the criticisms I levelled against (3c). 1 17
or /p(v), say j. If i(v) = j(v), then the game is continued with respect to
v and the sentence
X-a-Y
where 'a' names rigidly j. If i(v)* j(v), then the game ends and the
opponent has won it.
[Note that if the opponent wins the sentence is false, otherwise the sentences is true. For
more on game theoretic semantics see Saarinen, 161-169 and Jaakko Hintikka,
"Quantifiers vs. Quantification Theory" Linguistic Inquiry 5(1974: 153-177.
|
I
^Saarinen, 203. Again, Saarinen does not explicitly provide (37a), but rather
(37a) is reconstructed from how he evaluates (1). (37a) does, however, match several of
his examples, including his general form for sentences such as (1). See especially his
sentence ( 1 16) on page 198.
I I
^Note that despite appearances, (3e) and (37a) are not logically equivalent. Part
of the problem is that 'x' and 'y' are refering to functions when part of the quantifier and
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Unfortunately, (37a) seems to face a new criticism-according to (37a) the manifestations
of the two world lines in the actual world are identical. Presumably, since (1) is not
supposed to be about any actual object whatsoever, the manifestations of the two world
lines in the actual world are undefined. What, then, does it mean to say that the
manifestations are identical?
Saarinen, who is aware of this problem writes:
how could g(u) [the manifestation of Nob's perspectival world line in the
actual worldj be identical with/fwj [the manifestation of Hob's perspectival
world line in the actual world] in u, if neither g nor/is defined in w?
There is however no paradox here. That/and g are not defined in u
means that they do not exist in that possible world. Since g and/ are both
perspectivally cross-identified individuals (perspectival world lines), it
follows that our problem reduces to the problem of cross-identifying, in a
world, two perspectivally cross-identified individuals which do not exist in
that world. But we have already shown above how this question can be
answered. 1 18
Given what we have so far concerning perspectival cross-identification, Saarinen's reply
seems like gibberish, g and/are perspectival world lines. But we do not cross-identify
refering to values of those functions when used as variables bound to that quantifier.
More explicitly (3e) and (37a) are:
(3g) 3 p
px(Hob thinks [W(v(x)) & B(v(x),m)] & Nob wonders whether
|K(v(x),s)])
and
(37b) 3 p
px(Hob thinks [W(v(x)) & B(v(x),m)] & 3 p
py(Nob wonders whether
[K(v(y), s)] & v(x) = v(y)))
which are not logically equivalent. (37b), unlike (3g), requires that the values of x and y
be the same in the actual world. (3g), unlike (37b). requires that there be a function
encompassing all of Hob's belief worlds and all of Nob's wonders whether worlds.
1
^Saarinen, 203-204.
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world lines-we cross-identify objects in different worlds, i.e. determine that they are
manifestations of one and the same world line. What then could Saarinen mean by cross-
identifying two perspectival world lines?
Since to cross-identify individuals is just to determine that individuals are one and
the same, the most obvious interpretation of the problem of cross-identifying two
perspectival world lines is the following—determine when world lines are one and the
same. But this problem has a simple solution. World lines are one and the same if and
only it tor each possible world the manifestations of the world lines are identical in that
world. In other words, world lines are identical iff the functions representing them are
identical and functions are identical as long as, for every input, the values of the functions
are identical. Now. if Saarinen is suggesting that, when/and g are undefined in @,
g{@) =/(@) iff / = £, then (37a) will be logically equivalent to (3e). This might
explain why Saarinen never explicitly provides (37a), but instead provides (3e).
Unfortunately, if (37a) is interpreted such that it is logically equivalent to (3e). then (37a)
inherits all the problems of (3e), which, as we have already seen, make (3e) inadequate.
The above interpretation, however, is not, I think, the interpretation that Saarinen
intends. Saarinen intends, I think, a proto-version of the type of solution I shall be
considering at length in the next two chapters. Thus, I shall leave off presenting
Saarinen’s proposed interpretation of cross-identifying two perspectivally cross-identitied
individuals until the next chapter.
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Conclusion
In this chapter we considered several attempts to construe ( 1) as (3) and then treat
the existential quantifier in (3) as a possibilist quantifier. Max Cresswell's attempt to
represent (1) using possibilist quantifiers fails because it is unable to satisfy the condition
that Hob and Nob do not have a particular person or thing in mind as the witch. I argued
that Esa Saarinen's two interpretations of (3) that utilized descriptive quantifiers, viz. (3d)
and (3f), also both fail to satisfy this condition. Saarinen, on the other hand, argued that
his two perspectival quantifier readings of (3), viz. (3c) and (3e), did not imply that Hob
and Nob have a particular object in mind. Though Saarinen may be correct, we saw that
(3c) and (3e) do imply that a particular perspectival object is under consideration and that
perhaps the intended reading of ( 1 ) can be true even if no particular object is under
consideration. Thus, a general problem facing the possibility quantifier interpretations of
( 1) is that they at the very least imply that a particular object of some sort is under
consideration and it is unclear that our reading of (1) carries this implication.
Even if we assume that Saarinen has somehow overcome this general problem we
saw that (3c) and (3e) are still inadequate. (3c), as Saarinen noted, implies that there is an
object in the actual world playing a particular role and our reading of (1) can be true even
if this is not so. On the other hand, (3e) requires restricting the relevant perspectival
world lines to those representing objects from Hob's or Nob's point of view.
Unfortunately, in contexts such as Context IV in which Hob and Nob have never heard of
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each other, no such object exists that satisfies (3e). Thus, Saarinen’s proposed possibilist
quantifier readings of ( 1) also fail to solve Geach's Puzzle.
Unfortunately, we also saw that even though Saarinen puts (3e) forward as the
logical form of (1) intended to capture the problematic readings of ( 1), Saarinen evaluates
(1) along the lines of (37a)~3 p
p
x(Hob thinks [Wx & Bxml & 3 ppy(Nob wonders
whether [ Kys] & x = y))—rather than (3e). The problem with (37a) is to determine how to
evaluate the "x=y" clause when the world lines picked out by x and y have no
mani testations at the actual world. Saarinen called this problem the problem of "cross-
identifying two perspectivally cross-identified individuals (world lines)." Thus, until a
solution to this problem is forthcoming, the question of whether Saarinen has provided, in
(37a), a solution to Geach's Puzzle remains open. Saarinen's proposed solution and the
viability of (37a) as a solution to Geach's Puzzle will be discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER rv
THE TRANSMISSION ANALYSIS
In this chapter I shall begin discussing several attempts to solve the problem of
intentional identity that posit (i) thought, notional, conceptual, or intentional objects and
(ii) some sort of causal connection between Hob and Nob such that they either share
intentional objects or have intentional objects that are 'counterparts' of each other. Walter
Edelberg calls the type of alleged solutions that I will be discussing "transmission analysis
interpretations of intentional identity." 1 19 Edelberg thinks that the transmission analysis
interpretation of intentional identity does not succeed. My goal in this chapter is to present
several versions of the transmission analysis, hereafter TA, and to give at least a
preliminary evaluation of Edelberg's claim that TA fails.
This chapter has five main sections. In the first section I shall present Edelberg’s
version of TA and briefly demonstrate how TA analyzes (1) in Contexts I-IV. In the
second section I shall finish my discussion of Esa Saarinen's proposed solution to
Geach's Puzzle. I shall argue that Saarinen's proposal is, at the very least, a proto-
version of TA. In the third section I shall present and discuss a version of TA based on
1
1
^Walter Edelberg, "Intentional Identity and the Attitudes," Linguistics and
Philosophy 15 (1992): 572.
93
the causal theory of reference advocated by Michael Devitt. In the fourth section I shall
present and discuss several versions of TA advocated by the Discourse Representation
theorists, Hans Kamp, Nicholas Asher, and Henk Zeevat. Finally, in the fifth section I
shall present Edelberg s alleged counterexample to TA and discuss whether or not
Edelberg succeeds in showing that TA fails. I shall conclude that Edelberg succeeds in
showing only that some, but not all, of the versions of TA considered here fail.
The Transmission Analysis of Intentional Identity
In previous chapters we have seen various attempts to formalize (l)-Hob thinks
that a witch has blighted Bob's mare and Nob wonders whether she killed Cob's sow—
along the following general lines:
(38a) 3a(Hob thinks [Wa & Bam] & Nob wonders whether [Kas])
or
(39a) 3a(Hob thinks [Wa & Bam] & 3(3(Nob wonders whether [K(3s] &
a R (3)).
In other words, either there is one entity that plays a role in Hob's and Nob's attitudes, as
in (38a), or there are (possibly) separate entities that are somehow related, as in (39a) For
example, if a in (38a) ranges over aspects, guises, or perspectival world-lines we have
interpretations of (1) that might be endorsed by Geach, Castaneda, and Saarinen
respectively. If in (39a), a and (3 range over guises and "a R (3" means that guises are
consociated or co-objectified we have another possible Castanedaish interpretation of (1).
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If, instead a and P range over perspective world lines and "a R P" means the world lines
are cross-identified, then we have the version of (1) that Esa Saarinen seems to ultimately
intend. Except for the last example, we have seen that all these attempts to analyze (1) in
terms of either (38a) or (39a) fail.
Let us examine (38a) and (39a) in more detail. If the relation between a and P in
(39a) is identity, (39a) will be equivalent to (38a), in which case (38a) is just a particular
case of (39a). Thus, I shall focus on (39a). In order to make (39a) even begin to be an
acceptable interpretation of (1), one must answer two questions. First, what are the
entities over which a and P range? Second, what is the relationship represented by "R"
and when is "a R p" true? According to Edelberg, one way to answer these questions is
as follows.
a and P range over what he calls after David Kaplan "intermediate objects."
Intermediate objects are what are referred to by singular terms in opaque or oblique
discourse. Standard examples of oblique discourse include expressions within quotation
marks, expressions bound by a necessity operator, and expressions bound by intentional
attitude verbs such as "believes." 120 What then are the objects to which singular terms
refer in such discourses? According to Kaplan, the objects are the expressions
12°Edelberg, "Intentional Identity...," 562-563; David Kaplan, "Quantifying In,"
in The Philosophy ofLanguage, 2nd ed., A. P. Martinich, ed., (New York: Oxford
University Press), pp. 374-375. "Quantifying In" originally appeared in Synthese 19
(1968).
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themselves. 1 - 1 Unfortunately, Edelberg is a little less forthcoming. He writes that
Kaplan supposes that an I-object [intermediate objectl can represent an (ordinary)
object... for a person." Edelberg also writes that
[t]he role of what I call I-objects (alternatively, I-singular terms) in Kaplan's
theory overlaps with that assigned to ideas by Descartes, Locke, and many
others. Such ideas represented objects for people:you knew of a real object
by having an idea that represented it. The historical connection is important
enough to capture in our current terminology—even if the early modem
philosophers' conceptions of ideas were often modeled on pictorial images
rather than the more promising case of names.
Therefore, Edelberg proposes to "refer to I-objects [intermediate objects] as ideas. " 122
Edelberg acknowledges that Kaplan "assigns each expression to itself' in oblique
discourses, but adds that "[i]t is not essential to Kaplan's theory that I -propositions be
sentences, or that I-objects or ideas be names." 123 Finally, Edelberg also claims that a
"premature choice of I-entities might prejudge issues about individuation in a way that
ultimately conflicts with linguistic evidence." 124
Kaplan, p. 375.
l^^Edelberg, 653-564.
123Edelberg, 565-566. Edelberg points out that Kaplan "suggests that (what
we're calling) I-objects or ideas might be visual, auditory, or other kinds of images."
[Edelberg, 566. See also Kaplan, p. 387] Edelberg also cites the following passage from
Kaplan as "Kaplan's attitude about I-entities: "[Edelberg, 566]
My own view is that Frege's explanation, by way of ambiguity, of what
appears to be the logically deviant behavior of terms in intermediate contexts
is so theoretically satisfying that if we have not yet discovered or
satisfactory grasped the peculiar intermediate entities in question, then we
should simply keep looking.JKaplan, p. 3741
^Edelberg, 566.
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Let me summarize. For Edelberg, a and (3 range over ideas, where ideas are
entities that are at the very least (i) referred to by singular terms in opaque contexts such as
those created by intentional attitude verbs and (ii) able to represent ordinary objects (such
as tables and chairs and people, etc) for people. Beyond satisfying these two conditions,
and despite indications that Edelberg thinks names or expressions are the most promising
candidates for ideas, Edelberg leaves the nature of ideas open.
Given that a and (3 range over ideas, what is "R" and when is "a R (3" true?
According to Edelberg, "R" is a counterpart relation and is defined as follows: "for any
two ideas i
}
and /'„ z
y
R z\ iff either z
y
and z, are directly linked by a chain of ideas, or
ij and z, are linked by two chains to a third idea, zi ." A chain of ideas is defined "as a
set of ideas linearly ordered under the relation of primitive intentional identity." According
to Edelberg, primitive intentional identity "holds between a pair of ideas when one is
based on the other by the means of the normal mechanisms of conversation." Edelberg
admits that an adequate theory of primitive intentional identity "would no doubt be of
staggering complexity," but asks us to "assume that such a theory is possible" and so
leaves the primitive intentional identity relation unexplained.
125 He calls this analysis of
intentional identity statements the transmission analysis of intentional identity. Despite
the sketchy details of the transmission analysis, TA, let me attempt to indicate how TA
would fair evaluating (39a)~3cx(Hob thinks [Wa & Bamj & 3(3(Nob wonders whether
^Edelberg, 572.
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[K(3s] & a R P))--in some of the contexts in which (1) is true. In so doing, I hope to
provide a little more detail to TA. I shall begin by attempting to determine the status of "a
R (3" in each of Contexts I through IV.
Context I from Chapter I is a case in which Hob tells Nob that a witch blighted
Bob's mare. Nob believes what Hob has told him. Nob, who knows that Cob’s sow
died earlier wonders whether the witch also killed the sow. Let us assume that Hob has
an idea, a, that represents a witch who blighted Bob’s mare. Since, Hob may have no
actual object in mind as the witch, let us also assume that Hob's idea represents no
particular actual object. When Hob tells Nob that a witch blighted Bob's mare and Nob
believes Hob we might suppose that; (i) Hob's idea, a, is at least partially responsible for
Hob’s telling Nob about the witch he thinks blighted Bob's mare; (ii) Hob's words cause
in Nob the formation of an idea, say (3; and (iii) since Nob believes Hob. p represents a
witch who blighted Bob's mare, but again no actual witch. In this way we might suppose
that P is based on a by means of normal mechanisms ofconversation. Since P is based
upon a, there is, according to Edelberg, a chain of ideas linking a and P and since there is
a chain of ideas linking a and P, a R P is true. Thus, given our sketchy picture of how
one idea might be based upon another, in Context I, a R p.
Context II from Chapter I is a case in which both Hob and Nob learn about the
witch from the Gotham Tribune. Let us suppose that the person who wrote the article in
the Tribune
,
call him Rob, has an idea, 5. that represents a witch who has been plaguing
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Gotham. Let us also suppose that 5 represents no actual object. Since Rob has idea 5. we
may suppose that 5 is at least partially responsible for the content of Rob's article. Hob
and Nob both read Rob’s article and as a result Hob forms an idea, a, about a (possibly
non-existent) witch and Nob forms an idea, (3, about a (possibly non-existent) witch. If
we assume that Hob’s reading Rob’s article and Nob’s reading Rob’s article is a form of a
conversation between Hob and Rob and between Nob and Rob respectively, we can
suppose that both a and (3 are based upon 5 by normal mechanisms of conversation.
Thus, there is a chain of ideas linking a and 5 and a chain of ideas linking (3 and 5. Since
(3 and and a are linked by chains of ideas to some third idea, 5, according to the definition
of "R,"«K (3.
Context III is a case in which Hob and Nob have general ideas about witches, but
Hob and Nob are not thinking about the same witch. What Hob learnt about witches
ultimately arose from different sources than what Nob learnt about witches. Let us
suppose that Hob has an idea, a, that represents a (possibly non-existent) witch who
blighted Bob’s mare. Let us also suppose that Nob has an idea, (3, that represents a
(possibly non-existent) witch who Nob suspects might have killed Cob’s sow. Now a
and p may be based on other ideas and so linked in chains of ideas, but since what Hob
learnt about witches has a different origin than what Nob learnt about witches, there can
be no one idea that is linked to both a and (3. Thus, in Context III, "a R (3" is false.
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Finally, Context IV is a case in which Z told X and Y about a witch roaming the
neighborhood and X told Hob about the witch and Y told Nob about the witch. To keep
things short we can suppose that Z has an idea, x, which is the basis of X's witch idea, 5.
and Y's witch idea, z. Now X’s idea is the basis of Hob's witch idea, a, and Y's idea is
the basis of Nob's witch idea, (3. Thus, there is a chain of ideas that links a, 5, and x and
another chain of ideas that links (3, e, and X- Finally, since a and (3 are linked by chains
of ideas to x, a R (3. Thus, in Contexts I, II, and IV, a R (3 holds, and so (39a) might
be true, whereas in Context III it does not and so (39a) is false. Since the intended
reading of (1) is true in Contexts I, II and IV and false in Context III, so far TA's
proposed evaluation of (39a) succeeds.
So far, however, we have considered "a R (3"-what of "3a(Hob thinks [Wa &
Bam] & 3(3(Nob wonders whether ]K(3s]))7" a ranges over ideas, but we surely do not
want to say "3a(Hob thinks [Wa & Bam]" is true if and only if there is an idea such that
Hob thinks it is a witch and blighted Bob's mare. Presumably Hob does not think that
ideas are witches or that they blight anything. Instead, let us suppose that "3 a(Hob
thinks [Wa & Bam]" is true if and only if there is an idea, a, such that in all of the
worlds consistent with what Hob thinks, (Hob's think-worlds), a represents an object
that is both a witch and blighted Bob's mare. Similarly, "3(3(Nob wonders whether
]K(3s]))" will be true as long as in all of the worlds consistent with what Nob wonders
whether, (Nob's wonder-worlds), (3 represents an object that killed Cob's sow. The
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exact nature of the "represents" relation will, of course, depend upon whatever ideas tum
out to be. For example, if ideas are names or expressions, "3 a(Hob thinks [Wa &
Bam]" is true iff there is an expression such that in all of Hob's think worlds it
"represents," i.e. refers to, an object that is a witch and blighted Bob's mare.
In all four Contexts, Hob does think that a witch blighted Bob's mare and Nob
does wonder whether a witch killed Cob's sow. If "Hob thinks that a witch has blighted
Bob's mare" just means that Hob has some idea that, in all of Hob's think-worlds,
represents a witch who blighted Bob's mare, and if "Nob wonders whether a witch killed
Cob's sow" just means that Nob has some idea that, in all of Nob's wonder-worlds,
represents a witch who killed Cob's sow, then "3a(Hob thinks [Wa & Bamj & 3(3(Nob
wonders whether [K[3s]))" is true in all four Contexts. Since "a R P" is true in Contexts
I, II, and IV, but false in Context III, (39a) will be true in Contexts I, II, and IV, but false
in Context III, just as the intended reading of (1) is. Since TA seems to account for even
the problematic Context IV, perhaps TA provides a solution to Geach's Puzzle.
Recall, however, that Edelberg does not think that TA solves Geach's Puzzle. He
has a counterexample designed to show that TA fails. Before I consider Edelberg's
counterexample, I shall supplement my presentation of Edelberg's version of TA by
presenting several other versions of TA. I begin in the next section by arguing that Esa
Saarinen's ultimate interpretation of (1) is a proto-version of the transmissions analysis.
In subsequent sections, I shall present versions ofTA advocated by Michael Devitt on the
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one hand and several Discourse Representation theorists on the other. By presenting these
versions of TA, I hope to provide a more detailed understanding of TA against which
Edelberg s counterexample can be examined. I begin by returning to our discussion of
Esa Saarinen’s interpretation of (1).
Saarinen's Transmission Analysis
Recall from the previous chapter that Saarinen evaluates (1) as:
(37a) 3 p
p
x(Hob thinks [Wx & Bxm] & 3 p
py(Nob wonders whether [Kys] &
x = y)).
The problem with (37a) that we left unanswered in Chapter III was to determine how to
evaluate "x=y," especially when the perspectival world lines represented by x and y have
no manifestations in the actual world. We did see that if "=" is taken to express literal
identity between the world lines x and y, (37a) is logically equivalent to (3e)-3 p
px(Hob
thinks [Wx &Bxm] & Nob wonder whether [Kxs])—which we saw is generally
inadequate. I also suggested at the end of Chapter III that Saarinen may not intend to treat
"=" as expressing literal identity. What then does Saarinen intend "=" to express?
When Saarinen asks, ”[h]ow could two perspectivally cross-identified individuals
be one and the same," i.e. how could x = y, he writes that "the literature on the two cross-
identification methods is not of direct use here." 126 Since the literature on cross-
1261^ Saarinen, "Intentional Identity Interpreted: A Case Study of the Relations
Among Quantifiers, Pronouns, and Propositional Attitudes," Linguistics and Philosophy
2 (1978): 198.
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identification methods is concerned with cross-identifying objects in worlds, not world
lines, we should not be surprised. Saarinen, however, goes on to add that an
insight of Hintikka's is nevertheless helpful here.... Hintikka's suggestion
is that perspectival cross-identification between an actual object a and one
of the perceivers 'visual objects' say b
, takes places when there is some
sort of appropriate CAUSAL connection between the two. 127
Though Saarinen does not specify what Hintikka means by "appropriate causal
connection," Hintikka's insight leads Saarinen to suggest that "two perspectivally
identified individuals are cross-identified if and only if they can be traced back to the same
individual in the actual world." 1 28 In order to account for cases in which there is no actual
object, Saarinen suggests that in order for ( 1) to be true there must be "a perspectivally
cross-identified individual / in Hob's think-alternatives such that in each of those worlds
she is a witch and she has blighted Bob's mare" and "a perspectivally cross-identified
individual j in Nob's belief-alternatives such that in each of those worlds she is a witch
and she killed Cob's sow. Moreover, i bears an appropriate causal relation to j. " 129 In
other worlds, x = y as long as x and y bear an appropriate causal relation to each other.
What counts as an "appropriate causal relation?" Saarinen does not provide an
explicit answer, but several passages are suggestive. First, concerning an individual from
127Saarinen, 198-199. Note that Hintikka is talking about cross-identifying
objects in worlds rather than cross-identifying world lines.
^Saarinen, 199.
1
^Saarinen, 201-202.
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the point of view of some agent, cl, i.e. a perspectival world line. Saarinen writes:
Now even though that individual does not exist [has no manifestation in the
real world], he can have causal connections to various aspects of the actual
world. This is because he is an individual from the point of view of d s
beliefs and d s beliefs are something which take place in the actual world.
Other people may become aware ofd s beliefs and of the fact that from the
point of view of ds beliefs, there is something which counts as an
individual and which has certain properties. 130
Second, concerning Hob's and Nob's thoughts he writes:
a causal relation can obtain because Hob's thoughts as well as Nob's beliefs
are part of the vocabulary of the actual world. Hob's thoughts and Nob's
beliefs may interact with the course of the actual world in various ways.
...assume that it was in Hob's mind that the witch mania first arose.
It was he who started to speak about witches and it was in his mind and from
the point of view of his beliefs that the witches first started to take shape.
From the point of view of his thoughts, there is a certain witch who blighted
Bob's mare. Of that, from his point of view, particular witch he has talked
to Nob; Nob who relies on Hob's authority, also gets caught up in the witch
mania, indeed to such an extent that from the point of view of his beliefs, the
witch that killed Cob's sow is a particular witch. 131
I think three key points can be gleaned from these passages. First, people can become
aware that from the point of view of some agent, say Hob, there are objects that Hob
takes to be actual existent objects. In other words, we can put ourselves in Hob's frame
of mind so to speak and realize that if we were Hob we would include among those things
that actually exist, the witch that has blighted Bob's mare. We can do this even if we do
not think there is a witch who blighted Bob's mare--we can still recognize thatfrom
Hob's point of view there is a witch who blighted Bob's mare. Second, becoming aware
1 ^Saarinen, 200.
131 Saarinen, 202.
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of the fact that from Hob's point of view there is a witch may cause us to add to our list of
the existing objects a witch who blighted Bob's mare. In Saarinen's example Nob relies
on Hob s authority and, because Nob takes Hob to be talking about a real individual,
comes to believe that there is a witch about. Third and finally, Saarinen's example
illustrates that one way we become aware of the objects Hob takes to be actual is through
what Hob says-in other words, through communication with Hob.
From these three points we can construct the following basic picture of what
Saarinen might take to count as an "appropriate causal relation" between two perspectival
world lines. Let x be a perspectival world line, that is an object from the point of view of
some agent, cl If some agent, b, becomes aware of x through communication with a
and thereby comes to believe that there is an object of which a speaks, then there is a
perspectival world line y that from b' s point of view is the object of which a speaks and
y bears am appropriate causal relation to x. "x = y" is true as long as x bears an
appropriate causal relation to y, i.e. awareness of x through communication causes the
existence of y. Thus, our reconstruction of Saarinen's answer to the question of when "x
= y" is true is, at the very least, a proto-version of the transmission analysis.
I say "proto-version" because what counts as an "appropriate causal relation"
requires more elaboration than has been provided by Saarinen's single example.
Regardless, if we assume that being appropriately causally related is transitive (this
generates "chains of perspectival world lines") and that two world lines appropriately
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causally related to a third world line are thereby appropriately causally related to each other
(this captures situations in which Hob’s and Nob’s objects are ultimately caused by some
single source object, such as Z's in Context IV), then perhaps (37a)-3 p
p
x(Hob thinks
|Wx & Bxm] & 3 ppy(Nob wonders whether [Kys] & x = y))—is an adequate rendition of
(1) for the same reasons that (39a)~3a(Hob thinks [Wa & Bam] & 3(3(Nob wonders
whether [K0sl & a R p))-appears adequate. In fact, if "3a(Hob thinks [Wa & Bam]"
is true if and only if there is some idea that, in all of Hob's think-worlds, represents a
witch who blighted Bob's mare, then one could conveniently treat ideas as world lines. 132
The objects an idea represents would just be the manifestations of the corresponding
world line. Saarinen describes these perspectival world lines "as individuals from the
point of view of Hob's thoughts and Nob's beliefs." 133 Surely objects from the point of
view of Hob are excellent candidates for Hob's ideas. If perspectival world lines are
ideas, then (37a) just is a version of (39a). Thus, if Saarinen does intend to interpret
(37a) along the lines I have suggested, then Saarinen is an advocate ofTA and has
perhaps provided the basis for a solution to Geach's Puzzle.
jn an unpublished article, "A Perspectival ist Semantics for
Propositional Attitudes" explicitly treats ideas as world lines.
1
-^Saarinen, 202. See also, 196, 200, and 213. Note that Edelberg's world lines
in "A Perspectivalist Semantics for Propositional Attitudes" do not correspond to
Saarinen's perspectival world lines. Regardless, I shall leave aside questions concerning
both (i) the relevance, if any, of the differences between Edelberg's world lines and
Saarinen's and (ii) whether perspectival world lines are adequate to play the role of ideas.
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Devitt's Transmission Analysis
Michael Devitt, who Edelberg cites as an explicit advocate of the transmission
analysis, 134 proposes a causal theory of reference for names. Unfortunately, the
problematic aspect of sentences such as (1) does not involve names. Devitt himself admits
that a full answer (to Geach's Puzzle] would require a general account of indefinite
singular terms and their role in attitude contexts... [which] I have not given." 136
Nevertheless, he proposes to offer a partial solution. Devitt asks us to consider the
following sentence:
(40) Tom believes that Pegasus flies and Ralph believes that he eats grass.
Given (40) he writes:
Suppose that Tom expresses his belief, [a flies], and Ralph his belief, [b
eats grass], [(where a and b are terms)]. For [(40)] to be true, the
mechanisms underlying a and b must be causally related in a certain sort of
way. This causal relationship is the explanation of the common focus.
Now, under the same supposition, precisely the same remark applies to
[(41)] Tom believes a horse flies and Ralph believes he eats grass.
What still needs to be done is to specify the ways in which the mechanisms
must be causally related. 136
Devitt, who expends considerable effort developing a causal theory of reference for
1 34Edelberg, "intentional Identity ...," 572.
1
^Michael Devitt, Designation, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981),
p. 269.
136Devitt, pp. 269-270.
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names, therefore suggests that sentences such as (1) and (41) might be treated along the
same lines as (40). In other words, "[underlying the singular terms Hob and Nob use to
express their beliefs—or would use, for it is not essential that they say anything-is a
causal network similar to that underlying a name." 137 Since Devitt does not back up or
support his proposal, our best hope for understanding Devitt'
s partial solution to Geach's
Puzzle is to examine his theory of names and how it applies to sentences such as (40).
In order to better explicate Devitt's theory, let us first consider the following
example. 138 A and B recently got a new kitten. A says "Let's call her 'Nana' after Zola's
courtesan." B agrees. Later, not in the presence of Nana, B tells C, "Our new cat, Nana,
is cute." Subsequently, C goes on to tell D, "A's and B's new cat, Nana, is cute." There
are several uses of 'Nana' in this example-the first when A names the cat, the second
when B tells C Nana is cute, and the third when C tells D Nana is cute. Let us begin with
the first use of 'Nana'-A's naming of the cat.
Devitt writes:
What happened to those present at the naming of Nana? They perceived the
ceremony, using at least their eyes and ears. To perceive something is to be
causally affected by it. As a result of the effect it had on them, they were in
a position to use the name 'Nana' later to designate the cat. What they
gained at the ceremony, we might say, was 'an ability to designate Nana by
’Nana" 139
1
^Devitt, p_ 270.
138xhis is a modified version of Devitt's primary example. Devitt. p. 26.
l-^Devitt, p. 27.
108
How did they gain this ability to designate? Partly from perceiving the cat. The
perception of the cat in fact forms the first link in the causal chain linking A's use of
'Nana' to the cat. This perception of the object to be designated forms the basis of what
Devitt calls a grounding'. According to Devitt, a "grounding consists in the person
coming to have ... thoughts about that object as a result of the act of perceiving the
object." The thought is about the object if it "includes a mental representation of that
object brought about by an act of perception." 140 Generally, a grounding is a perception
of an object that causes a mental representation of that object in the perceiver.
More is required for A and B to have the ability to designate Nana with 'Nana'.
Devitt writes that "we should see a person's ability to designate with a term as. basically,
his having thoughts that include mental representations which are both of the object and
associated with the term." 141 A's act of naming of the cat produces thoughts, in A and B,
that include mental representations which are both of the cat and associated with 'Nana.'.
For example, B not only perceives the cat, but also hears A's wish to name the cat 'Nana'
and assents to A's wish. As a result, according to Devitt' s picture, B associates the
mental representation of the cat caused by perceiving the cat with the term 'Nana' that B
heard A utter. B now has the ability to designate Nana with 'Nana.' Thus, when B tells
C that "Our cat is named 'Nana'" B uses 'Nana' to designate Nana.
140[)ev jtt, p. 133; see also p. 278.
Devitt, p. 130.
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What happens to C when B tells C about Nana? According to Devitt, C "borrows"
the reference from A. 142 Reference borrowings are "communication situations" 143 in
which "the act of perceiving a designation of the object by the term plays the role for the
borrower that the earlier act of perceiving the object played for a person present at a
grounding." 144 Even though Nana is not present, to paraphrase Devitt, A has exercised
A's ability which is causally grounded in Nana. C hears A. This causally links C through
A’s ability to Nana. 145 As a result, when C says to D "A's and B's cat is named 'Nana'"
C designates Nana with 'Nana.' D. in turn, gains the ability to designate Nana with
'Nana' from C.
Given our example, Devitt asserts
a name token designates an object if and only if underlying the name token
is a d-chain [short for designating-chain] grounded in the object. D-chains
consist of three different kinds of link: groundings which link the chain to
an object, abilities to designate, and communication situations in which
abilities are passed on or reinforced (reference borrowings). 146
Both A and B have mental representations of Nana caused by perceiving Nana. Both A
and B have associated the term 'Nana' with this representation through hearing A's wish
to call the cat 'Nana.' As a result, underlying both A's and B's use of 'Nana' is a d-chain
1
^Devitt, p. 29.
*
^Devitt, p. 129 and p. 278.
^^Devitt, p. 137.
^Devitt, p. 30.
146p)evitt, P- 64; see also p. 29.
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grounded in Nana. For example, B's use of ’Nana’ in "Our cat. Nana, is cute."
successfully designates Nana because B associates the term ’Nana’ with a mental
representation that was caused by Nana. Neither C nor D have mental representations of
Nana caused by perceiving Nana. However, C's hearing of A's use of the term 'Nana'
causes C to have a mental representation that, for C, stands for Nana. C associates
Nana with this mental representation and so has the ability to designate Nana with
Nana. C s use of the term is the result of A’s use of the term, which is the result of an
actual perception of Nana. Thus, underlying C's use of the term 'Nana' is a d-chain
grounded in Nana. A similar chain would underlie any of D’s uses of the term 'Nana.'
Let us now attempt to apply Devitt's theory to (40). First consider:
(42) Pegasus flies.
Assume tor the moment that Pegasus exists. Then, according to Devitt's theory. (42) is
given the following analysis.
(42a) 3x(’Pegasus' Des x & x flies)
'Des' stands for 'designates.' Thus, (42) is true as long as there is some object
designated by 'Pegasus' that flies. In order for some object to be designated by 'Pegasus'
there would have to be a d-chain connecting the use of 'Pegasus' to the object.
Now consider:
(43) Tom believes that Pegasus flies.
Ill
According to Devitt, if [(43) | is true, Tom will either stand in a certain relationship to a
token of I'Pegasus flies*] or be disposed to stand in it.” 147 In order to stand in the
required relationship. Tom
will stand in a certain relationship to a pair of token mechanisms of
reference. One member of the pair is a mechanism appropriately related to
the speaker's [’Pegasus'], and the other to his ['flies']. I shall adopt
ordinary usage by saying that the relationship that Tom stands in to this pair
of mechanisms, in virtue of which he has his belief is the believing
relationship....The role of ['Pegasus flies'] in [(43)] is to refer to pairs of
this sort. 148
Thus, (43) gets analyzed as:
(43a) 3x3y3z('Tom’ Des x & ’Pegasus’ Spec y & 'flies' Spec z & x believes
<y,z>).
’Spec' stands for specifies. In order for ’Pegasus’ to designate there must be a d-chain
linking the use of 'Pegasus’ to Pegasus. In belief contexts, according to Devitt. 'Pegasus'
is used, not to designate Pegasus, but rather to specify some d-chain that does designate
Pegasus. Thus, (43) is true as long as some object designated by 'Tom' stands in the
appropriate relation to the mechanisms of reference specified by 'Pegasus' and 'flies'
respectively.
Let us now drop our assumption that Pegasus exists. Since Pegasus does not
exist, there is no object connected by a d-chain to the name token 'Pegasus' used in (42)
and no d-chain specified by 'Pegasus' in (43). Thus, Devitt needs to refine his theory to
account for what he calls "empty names,"-names that do not designate anything.
147p)ev jtt, p. 238.
148p)ev itt, p. 238.
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According to Devitt,
( w]hat underlies an empty name is a causal chain of a certain sort forming
part of a network
. The chain is not a d-chain because it is not grounded: it
"arises out of an imaginative act or the naming sentence in a failed
ceremony. So a name in an opaque context specifies chains that may not be
d-chains. However, all the chains are part of the one causal network; they
arise out of the same source. 149
Thus, instead of specifying a chain grounded in some actual flying horse, 'Pegasus'
specifies a chain originating in some story or legend or a failed naming ceremony. Even
though Devitt does not provide more information about these chains and restricts himself
to discussing d-chains, I believe that Devitt has provided enough suggestions to piece
together his partial solution to Geach's problem.
Let us call chains underlying empty names or terms "e-chains". E-chains have
many of the same elements as d-chains except that instead of being grounded in an object,
i.e. having as their first link a perception of the object in question, they arise out of
imaginative acts or failed naming (or term introduction) ceremonies. Since Pegasus does
not exist, the relevant reference mechanism specified by 'Pegasus' in (43a) will be an e-
chain, not a d-chain. What about (40)-Tom believes that Pegasus flies and Ralph
believes that he eats grass? Clearly the following is not enough:
(40a) 3x3y3z3w3u3v[('Tom' Des x & 'Pegasus' Spec y & 'flies' Spec z & x
believes <y, z>) & ('Ralph' Des w & 'he' Spec u & 'eats grass' Spec v & w
believes <u, v>)],
since there is no guarantee that the causal chains specified by 'Pegasus' and 'he' are in any
way related.
149[)evitt, pp. 243-44; see also p. 176.
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Recall that Devitt specifies that for (40) to be true the mechanisms underlying
Pegasus and he must be causally related in a certain sort of way. 150 More specifically.
Devitt writes that in order for (40) to be true, "Ralph’s belief must involve a mechanism
arising out of the same myth." 151 Earlier I cited Devitt’s claim that empty names can be
part of one causal network arising out of the same source. I introduce the predicate 'SS.'
short for 'same source,' to represent the relation between two causal chains that have the
same source. Thus, I assume that (40) is to be analyzed as:
(40b) 3x3y3z3w3u3v[('Tom’ Des x & 'Pegasus' Spec y & 'flies' Spec z & x
believes <y, z>) & ('Ralph' Des w & 'he' Spec u & 'eats grass' Spec v & w
believes <u, v>) & SS (y, u)J.
In order for (40) to be true, the chain specified by 'Pegasus' and the chain specified by
'he' must have the same source, i.e. same imaginative act, failed naming ceremony, etc.
If we assume that Devitt's causal theory of reference can be extended from names
to other terms, including indefinites such as 'a horse' or 'a witch,' then both (41) and (1)
would get analyzed along the lines of (40b). (41) would be analyzed as exactly as (40b)
except instead of the clause "'Pegasus' Spec y" (4 1 )'s analysis would have the clause '"a
horse' Spec y." (1) would get partially analyzed as:
(lb) 3x3y3z3w3u3v[('Hob' Des x & 'a witch' Spec y & 'blighted Bob's mare'
Spec z & x thinks <y, z>) & ('Nob' Des w & 'she' Spec u & 'killed Cob's sow'
Spec v & w wonders whether <u, v>) & SS (y, u)].
In all three cases the mechanisms of reference, y and u, have the same source.
150i)evitt, p. 269.
Devitt, p. 269.
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SS has almost the same effect as R except that SS is a relation between causal
chains and R is a relation between intentional objects. The difference is inconsequential.
Devitt s causal chains are causal chains involving mental representations associated with a
particular term. Presumably these mental representations are excellent candidates for
ideas. As well, links in these causal chains are formed by communication between agents.
The ability to designate an object is, according to Devitt, transmitted from agent to agent
by communication between the agents. Clearly then Devitt's theory is a version of the
transmission analysis. Next, I consider Discourse Representation Theory.
Discourse Representation Theory and the Transmission Analysis
Discourse Representation Theory (DR theory), a non-standard theory of
semantics, 152 has two central elements-the DRS construction algorithm and the
theory originates with the independent work of Irene Heim in The
Semantics ofDefinite and Indefinite Noun Phrases, Ph.D. thesis, University of
Massachusetts, 1982, and of Hans Kamp in "A Theory of Truth and Semantic
Representation,” in Formal Methods in the Study ofLanguage, ed. J. Groenendjik, T.
Janssen, and M. Stokhof, (Amsterdam: Mathematisch Centrum Tracts, 1981): 277-322. I
use more recent work as the foundation of my discussion of DR theory. In particular, my
discussion is derived from Hans Kamp, "Context, Thought, and Communication,"
Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Society 85 (1985): 239-261; Hans Kamp, "Prolegomena
to a Structural Account of Belief and Other Attitudes," in Propositional Attitudes, ed. C.
Anthony Anderson and Joseph Owens, (Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and
Information, 1990), 27-90; Nicholas Asher, "Belief in Discourse Representation Theory,"
Journal ofPhilosophical Logic 15, (1986): 127-189; Nicholas Asher, "A Typology For
Attitude Verbs and their Anaphoric Properties," Linguistics and Philosophy 10 (1987):
125-197; Nicholas Asher, "Belief, Acceptance and Belief Reports," Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 19 (1989): 327-362; and Henk Zeevat, "A Treatment of Belief Sentences in
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correctness definition. The DRS construction algorithm maps natural language discourse
(a sentence or a string of sentences) onto discourse representation structures (DRSs).
The correctness definition maps DRSs into some intensional model. DRSs in turn have
two central components, a set of reference markers comprising the Universe of the DRS
and a set of conditions. Reference markers are roughly akin to logical variables and
conditions are roughly akin to predicates. For example, from the sentence,
(44) Socrates is bald,
the following DRS can be constructed:
(44a)
Socrates(x)
BaH(x)
"x" is a reference marker and " Socrates) x)" and "Bald(x)" stand for conditions. Before
going on to consider how DR theory treats attitude reports, I shall briefly elaborate how
we are to understand the construction algorithm, DRSs, and the correctness definition.
The construction algorithm, in its simplest form, "produces a DRS from the
syntactic parses of the individual sentences of a discourse."
153 In order to generate
Discourse Representation Theory," in Studies in Discourse Representation Theory and
the Theory ofGeneralized Quantifiers , ed. Joroen Groenendijk, Dick de Jongh. Martin
Stokhof, (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1987), 189-215.
1
^Nicholas Asher, "A Typology For Attitude Verbs and their Anaphoric
Properties," Linguistics and Philosophy 10 (1987): 133. See also Hans Kamp,
"Context, Thought, and Communication," PrtKeedings ofthe Aristotelian Society-
85
(1985): 242.
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realistic representations of natural language discourses, however, the construction
algorithm requires two inputs: (i) the syntactic description of the sentence under
consideration and (ii) the context of use. The simplest context of use for a particular
sentence in a discourse is just the DRS or DRSs that have been constructed from previous
sentences. 1 54 In order to account for de re belief and for some aspects of verbal
discourse, Kamp argues that additional information introduced into the context via other
than verbal channels 155 is required. Asher argues that in the case of belief reports in
general, "an explicit, partial representation of the subject’s total cognitive state,” 156 needs
to be included in the context of use. To avoid digressing into a detailed discussion of
what should or should not be included in the context of use, I shall for the most part
ignore the construction algorithm part of DR theory and focus on the DRSs and the
correctness definition. I shall assume for the discourses and corresponding DRSs that
follow that the relevant context input has been determined and that a construction
algorithm exists that will generate the given DRSs. I briefly clarify how 1 shall understand
DRSs next.
1 ^4Hans Kamp, "Prolegomena to a Structural Account of Belief and Other
Attitudes," in Propositional Attitudes, ed. C. Anthony Anderson and Joseph Owens,
(Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Information, 1990), 37. See also
Nicholas Asher in "Belief in Discourse Representation Theory," Journal ofPhilosophical
Logic 15, (1986): 128.
l^Kamp, "Prolegomena ...,"53.
1-^Asher, "Belief in Discourse ...," 139.
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According to Kamp and Asher, DRSs "are intended to model the structure and
content of the information that a competent speaker recovers from some verbal input that
he receives."! 57 Henk Zeevat on the other hand writes, "DR [theory] provides a logical
syntax that is non-standard..
.[whereby] it becomes plausible to assume that natural
language and thought are more similar to DRS-like systems than to, say, predicate
logic. 158 The difference in attitude towards the DRSs manifests itself in the number of
conditions included in a particular DRS. Zeevat, in general includes the least number
whereas Kamp the most. For example, Kamp, who takes "information received" to mean
"change in the recipients belief state as a result of the discourse", would include within the
DRS of (44) a condition that the utterer of (44) believes (44). 159 I shall not construe
"information received" quite so broadly. As a result I generally follow Asher-DRSs
represent more than logical structure, but less than the total change in the recipient's belief
state. Finally, I briefly explicate the correctness definition below.
A simple correctness definition provided by Hans Kamp is: "[a] DRS. K, with
universe UK and condition set C^, is defined as true (with respect to a given model M) if
^Nicholas Asher, "Belief in Discourse 129. See also Asher, "A Typology
133, and Kamp, "Context...," 246.
^Henk Zeevat, "A Treatment of Belief Sentences in Discourse Representation
Theory." in Studies in Discourse Representation Theory and the Theory ofGeneralized
Quantifiers
,
ed. Joroen Groenendijk, Dick de Jongh, Martin Stokhof, (Dordrecht: Foris
Publications, 1987), 189.
159Kamp, "Prolegomena 72.
118
it is possible to assign an entity (from M) to each member ofUK in such a way that these
entities satisfy all the conditions in involving the corresponding markers." 160 Thus.
(44a) is true iff there is an object in M that is both Socrates and is bald. As the conditions
within a DRS get more complex, eg. to accommodate beliefs, determining whether the
conditions are satisfied within a given model becomes increasingly difficult. Regardless,
the idea is that a DRS is true iff it can be mapped into or embedded in a given model. I
shall be particularly interested in determining whether or not an adequate correctness
definition can be provided for (1). First, I shall consider a simpler belief report.
Consider again (25)~Hob thinks a witch blighted Bob's mare. In de dicto
contexts, the construction algorithm might produce the following DRS.
(25d) X,p
Hob(x)
Thmk(x, p)
p: y, 2
vitch(y)
Bob's mare(z)
blighted(y,z)
The final condition is a complex condition containing a mental state reference marker, p,
y>z
vitch(y)
Bob's mare(z)
blighted(y,z)
and a DRS, K:
^^Hans Kamp. "Context ...," 243.
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In general, where K is a variable ranging over DRSs, the condition p: K is a condition on
mental states. In the simplest belief report case then, "a belief report yields a DRS itself
containing a DRS purporting to characterize a belief of the subject of the report. The
report will be true or false depending upon whether the characterization matches the
content and ultimately the structure of a belief of the subject.” 161 Given (25d), p is a
mental state reference marker standing for a belief, and the DRS, K, purports to represent
the content of the belief. In order to determine whether the characterization matches the
content and structure of the subject's beliefs we need to know what beliefs the subject has.
Asher introduces what he calls "delineated DRSs" 162 to represent the sum of a
subject’s mental states. A delineated DRS. K, is a triple, <UK , { K, , ..., Kn }, Con K>,
where UK is the universe (a set of reference markers) of the delineated DRS, {K,, ...,
K
n }
is the set of DRSs representing the subject's various mental states, and Cor^ is the
set of conditions in the delineated DRS, i.e. the union of the set of conditions in each DRS
in {K,
. ..., K
n
}. Asher writes, "a delineated DRS K may characterize the actual total
cognitive state or some relevant portion thereof of a believer a. A true belief report
concerning a will correctly describe some proper portion of K,
" 163 Thus, the p: K
condition in (25d) is satisfied if some alphabetic variant of K is in the set of DRSs in the
16lAsher, "Belief in Discourse 134.
l^Kamp can s them "articulated DRSs."
163Asher, "Belief in Discourse ...," 143.
120
delineated DRS representing Hob's total cognitive state. (25d) was derived from a de
dicto context. What of a de re context?
According to DR theory, directly referential terms and de re contexts generate
what are called "external anchors." A de re context of use for (25) might therefore
generate the DRS:
<x, Hob>
<y,
X,p
Hob(x)
ThiiduX p)
p: y, 2
vitch(y)
Bob's mare(z)
blighted(y,z)
<x, Hob> and <y, w> are external anchors which "serve to constrain the admissible
correlations between discourse referents and entities in the world |or model]." 164 The
reference marker (or discourse referent) x is correlated with Hob and the reference marker
y is correlated with one particular object w in the model. Let KH be the delineated DRS
that represents Hob's mental states. Now in order for condition p: K to be satisfied in
(25e) there must be some alphabetic variant of K in KH , say:
K
l
y',2'
witch(y')
Bob's mare(z')
blighted(y' ,z')
<yL v>
164Kamp, "Prolegomena 51. See also Asher, "Belief in Discourse 133.
Strictly speaking the DRS (25d) would also contain the external anchor <x, Hob>. The
difference between de dicto and de re beliefs turns on whether y is externally anchored
or not.
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Notice that in Kp y' is also externally anchored to w. The external anchor <y, w> in
(25e) also constrains the choice of alphabetic variants of K in Hob's delineated DRS.
DR theory, however, does not stop with external anchors. DR theorists consider
DR theory particularly useful because it provides "a framework enabling us to speak
coherently of two distinct beliefs being about the same object in an "internal" sense so that
the truth ot describing two beliefs as so related does not depend on there being an
external object that these two beliefs are about." 166 Not only does the construction
algorithm, in certain contexts, generate external anchors, but internal anchors or internal
links as well. Internal anchors link reference markers to other reference markers.
According to the DR theorists, internal anchors play a crucial role in solving many
traditional problems associated with propositional attitudes, including Geach’s problem of
intentional identity. 166
According to Kamp. "an internal link is simply a pair <x', x> of two discourse
referents which, roughly speaking, stipulates that these discourse referents represent the
same individuals." 167 At the same time, both Kamp and Asher distinguish several kinds
of internal anchors based upon the reference markers that are being linked. Two kinds
165Asher, "Belief in Discourse ...," 128; See also Kamp, "Context ...," 249.
166Kamp, "Context 249-250; Asher, "Belief in Discourse ...," 127-28;
Zeevat, 206-213.
167]<_arnp ? "Prolegomena ...," 74.
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that are important for our purposes are (i) internal anchors that link reference markers in
DRSs representing reports of an agent, ds, attitudes to reference markers in the universe
of the delineated DRS that represents 4s total attitudinal state168 and (ii) internal anchors
that link reference markers in the delineated DRS of one agent with the reference markers
in the delineated DRS of another agent. 169 In order to be able to visually separate external
anchors from internal anchors and the two kinds of internal anchors from each other I
shall reserve '<’, '>’ brackets for external anchors. I shall represent the internal anchors
between reference markers in reports ofd s beliefs with reference markers in d s
delineated DRS by using the brackets, and and the internal anchors between
reference markers in the delineated DRSs of two separate agents by using the brackets '['
1 68j\j0te that both Kamp and Asher sometimes use the term "internal anchor" to
refer to the set of DRSs in d s delineated DRS that contain a reference marker, x', which
is linked to a reference marker, x, in a DRS representing a report of d s beliefs. Kamp,
"Context ...," 253; "Prolegomena ...," 75; Asher, "Belief in Discourse ...," 144; and "A
Typology ...," 139.
1
^Kamp also refers to this kind of internal anchor as "sharing discourse
referents." ["Prolegomena ...," 78-84.) Sharing discourse referents, for Kamp at least,
involves introducing both an internal condition and an external pairing of reference
markers. The internal condition is the result of Kamp's claim that what "is crucial for
sharing discourse referents is that the participants take themselves to be sharing those
discourse referents. "[p. 81 j I ignore this 'crucial' aspect of sharing discourse referents
since (i) it is motivated by Kamp's interpretation of DRSs as representing the change in
the belief state of someone who receives a given discourse and I am not following Kamp's
interpretation and (ii) people can have beliefs about the same thing without intending to
have beliefs about the same thing. For example, since Hob and Nob, in certain contexts,
have never heard of each other, they cannot intend to share discourse referents with each
other. Thus, the connection between Hob's witch discourse referent and Nob's witch
discourse referent cannot be one of sharing and so Kamp is incorrect to think that "sharing
lies at the heart of the notorious Hob-Nob problem." ["Prolegomena ...," 83. n. 39.]
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and ] . I shall examine internal anchors by exploring their role in attempts by DR theorists
to solve Geach's Puzzle.
How does DR theory represent (l)-Hob thinks a witch blighted Bob's mare and
Nob wonders whether she killed Cob's sow? Without anchors, the target reading of (1)
has the following basic structure:
X, P
Hob(
Third
p:
x)
4x,p)
Nob(u)
Wonders vhether(u, q)
y, 2
vitch(y)
Bob's mare(z)
blighted(y,z)
q:
V, V
Cob's scv(v)
killed(v, v)
Let us assume that ( 1 ) reports the attitudes of actual people. Hob and Nob. Thus, there
are external anchors linking x to Hob and u to Nob. Let KH be a delineated DRS
representing the attitudinal state of Hob and let KN be a delineated DRS representing the
attitudinal state of Nob. Recall that a delineated DRS is a triple <UK , {Kp 1C,, ..., Kn },
ConK> where UK a set of discourse referents (the union of the discourse referents
appearing in Kp 1C,,
..., K
n );
{K,, 1C,,
..., K
n }
is a set of DRSs each member of which
represents some attitude; and ConK is a set of conditions (the union of the conditions
appearing in Kj
,
Kn , ..., Kn ). Let y' be the discourse referent in KH that is part of the
conditions "witch(y')" and "blighted (y\ z')" in ConK . Let w' be the discourse referentH
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in K
n
that is part of the condition "killed(w', v') in ConK ^. Since ( lc) represents a report
of Hob's and Nob's attitudes, there are internal anchors linking discourse referents in the
DRSs representing Hob's and Nob's attitudes, viz.
y, 2 V, V
vitch(y)
Bob's maie(z)
bl]ghted(y,z)
Cob's sov(y)
killed(v, v)
with discourse referents in KH and KN respectively. In this case y will be internally
anchored to y' in KH and w to w' in KN . Finally, in order for Hob and Nob to be thinking
about the same witch, there must be an internal anchor linking the discourse referent
representing the witch for Hob with the discourse referent representing the witch for Nob.
In other words, y' and w' must be internally anchored to each other. The result is:
<x, Hob>
Nob>
{y, y'}
{V, V'}
[y\ v]
x, p u, q
Hob(x)
Thmk(x, p)
Nob(u)
Wonders vhether(u, q)
p: y,z
q:
V
,
V
vitch(y)
Bob's mane(z)
blighted(y,z)
Cob's sow(v)
killed(v, v)
Other external anchors can be added to constrain Hob's and Nob's beliefs to being about
an actual witch, but we are not interested in such cases.
^
170in order to simplify our discussion, I have omitted anchors from the DRS
representing (1). For example, I have left out the external anchors linking z to Bob's
mare
and v to Cob's sow and the internal anchors linking z to z' in KH and v to v' in KN .
Let us assume for the moment that the construction algorithm generates (Id) for
( 1 ). ( 1 d) is true if and only if it can be embedded in a given intensional model. Without
going into the details of such intensional models, which are quite complex
,
1 (Id) will be
true as long as there are entities, a.b. c, and d. in the model, M, that satisfy the conditions
Hob(a), Thinks(a. b), b: K, Nob(c), Wonders whether(c, d), and d: K'. The external
anchors <x, Hob> and <u, Nob> guarantee that conditions Hob(a) and Nob(c) will be
satisfied. Thinks(a,b) and Wonders whether(c, d) will be satisfied as long as a and b are
in the extension of 'Thinks' and c and d are in the extension of 'Wonders whether.'
Finally, b: K will be satisfied as long as there is some alphabetic variant of K in the
delineated DRS, KH , representing Flob's total attitudinal state. The internal anchor {y. y'}
mandates that the alphabetic variant of K in KH must contain y' everywhere that y appears
in K. Similarly, d: K' will be true as long as there is some alphabetic variant of K'
containing v' everywhere v appears in K in the delineated DRS. KN .
172 So far Hob and
Nob are not necessarily thinking of the same witch. If (Id) did not also contain the anchor
[y', w'], then ( 1 d) could be true even if Hob and Nob were thinking of completely
separate witches.
l^For examples, see Asher, "Belief in Discourse 150-160; and "A
Typology 142-147.
1
"^Mher utilizes a slightly weaker condition than alphabetic variance. For
example, Thinks(a
,
b) will be true as long as there is some alphabetic variant of an
extension ofK in KH , where an extension of K is a DRS that has the same domain and
conditions as K, but which may also contain conditions not in K. [Asher, "A
Typology...," 145-46.]
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The anchor |y’, w'] is meant to guarantee that Hob and Nob are thinking of the
same witch. [y\ w'] does not, however, function like the internal anchors {y, y'} and
(w, w }. Without the internal anchors {y, y'} and {w, w'} any alphabetic variant of K
and K would satisfy the conditions p: K and q: K'. The internal anchors restrict the
allowable alphabetic variants of K and K' to variants containing y' and w' respectively.
In other words, these anchors constrain what will count as satisfaction of the conditions p:
K and q: K'. [y', w'|, on the other hand, does not constrain what will count as
satisfaction of the conditions, but rather is, in effect, another condition that needs to be
satisfied in order for (Id) to be true. What needs to be the case such that [y\ w'] is
satisfied? Kamp, Zeevat, and Asher offer various answers which I shall examine in turn.
How does Kamp understand [y', w'], the sharing of discourse referents y' and w'
in (Id)? Unfortunately, Kamp is not very specific, but he does provide some hints. He
writes that a pair of shared discourse referents of the form [x, y],
must be understood as external assessments of subjects and their states,
which involve not only the individual psychologies of those subjects, but
also certain causal relations between them (having to do with their present
and past communications and more generally with their interactions within
the larger information exchanging community of which they are part). 1 73
Though Kamp does not provide explicit satisfaction conditions for [y', w'], the just
quoted passage suggests that [y\ w'] is satisfied if certain causal relations hold between
Hob and Nob. What kind of causal relations? Causal relations having to do with
communication and information exchange. In fact, Kamp envisions DR theory as an
l^Kamp, "Prolegomena 80-81.
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idealized theory of communication. The general model is that an utterer of a particular
discourse converts his or her thoughts (which have the structure of DRSs) into a public
language and the recipient transforms the public language utterance back into a DRS. 174
Kamp s emphasis on communication and information exchange could motivate a
transmission style analysis of intentional identity. Unfortunately, since Kamp fails to
provide any more substantial details, the question whether or not Kamp should be
considered an advocate of TA is moot. Zeevat and Asher do provide more details, so 1
shall focus on their discussions. I begin with Zeevat.
Henk Zeevat distinguishes between external or real objects and internal or private
objects. 175 Zeevat suggests that reference markers inside DRSs representing cognitive
states be taken as representing private objects. 176 Zeevat, like Edelberg, leaves the exact
nature of private objects unexplained, though private objects, at the very least are
"constituents of thoughts." 1 77 The private objects of a subject are of two kinds--those the
subject assumes to correspond with something in reality and those the subject does not
assume correspond with something in reality. 178 In many cases, private objects the
l^Kamp, "Context, ...," 255-56; "Prolegomena ...," 67.
^ 75Zeevat, 191-92.
^Zeevat, 1 96.
^Zeevat, 197.
^Zeevat, 199.
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subject assumes to correspond with something in reality actually do so correspond.
According to Zeevat, when the "subject is affected through one or more of his
senses. ..[and] understands this as being affected by one object and accordingly forms a
new index to store the information he obtains by this experience," 179 In these cases the
private object "is a counterpart by experience of the experienced object." 180
Zeevat also recognizes that "(mjany private objects come into being by other
processes than experience.... Private objects come into being by hypothesis and by
communication as well." 181 Thus, Zeevat also introduces the notion of counterparts by
communication. For two cognitive agents a and b. private object a "is a counterpart by
communication of [private object [3] iff [a] is a's referent for the term T in an utterance by
b to a in which T refers to |(3| for b." 182 Zeevat notes that the "notion of counterpart by
1
^Zeevat, 199.
^Ozeevat, 199.
ISlzeevat, 199.
1 82zeevat, 200. Notice that Zeevat's definition implies that terms in utterances
refer, for cognitive agents, to intentional or private objects. Since terms in a public
language such as English are, for the most part, meant to refer to external objects. Zeevat
admits that "an English word cannot be a name of a private object in the normal sense, but
only in a derived sense" and goes on to provide conditions "under which a word in
English or another language can be called a name for a private object"[201]
I am not certain that his conditions will work. Unfortunately, presenting,
explaining, and providing criticisms of his conditions would take us too far afield. Thus,
I shall assume that there is a perfectly good sense, even if derived, in which a term of a
public language such as English can refer, for agents, to private objects.
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communication can lead to a notion of a chain of private objects that are linked by the
counterpart relation." 1 83 Let us call such a chain of private objects a "counterpart chain."
Finally, according to Zeevat the anchor [y', w'] is satisfied if y' and w' are either (i)
connected directly by a counterpart chain or (ii) connected by separate counterpart chains
to some third private object. 184
Zeevat is clearly endorsing a version of TA. For Zeevat the reference markers in
(Id) represent or stand for private objects. Private objects are the constituents of agents'
thoughts and so are excellent candidates for ideas. In (Id), the anchor [y', w'] guarantees
that Hob and Nob are thinking of the same witch. In (39a), a R (3 guarantees that Hob
and Nob are thinking of the same witch. Finally, just as "a R (3" is true as long as either
a and (3 are directly linked by a chain of ideas, or a and (3 are linked by two chains to a
third idea, 5. [y\ w'] is true as long as y' and w' are linked directly by a counterpart chain
or are linked by two counterpart chains to some third private object. I shall now consider
Asher's satisfaction conditions for [y'. w'].
Asher, like Zeevat, distinguishes notional or conceptual objects from real objects
and suggests that reference markers inside DRSs representing cognitive states represent
notional objects-objects that are the constituents of people's cognitive states. 185
1 8
^Zeevat, 200.
1 84Zeevat, 208-209.
185 Asher, "Belief in Discourse 129, 167; "A Typology 133, 138.
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According to Asher these objects can be causally connected such that the reference
markers representing them can be linked to each other. For example, Asher writes, "a
reference marker in one delineated DRS may be causally connected to a reference marker
in another delineated DRS by means of a communicative link or what [Charlesl Chastain
has called a referential chain" 1 86 and ”[i Individuals can even share beliefs about fictional
objects with each other, if the discourse referents that stand proxy for the individuals get
linked by chains of communication." 187 Asher also points out that reference chains need
not be based solely on communication. Of the coreference in (1) in particular, he writes
"such links only make sense if the agents' attitudes are coordinated together by means of
communication or some other mechanism
,
in such a way that the two agents can be said
to have the 'same' individual in mind." 188 What other mechanisms? Unfortunately,
Asher does not say. He merely claims that reference chains may be formed in an almost
endless variety of ways. 189
He does, however, provide two ways in the case of Hob and Nob. Hob's and
Nob's reference markers can be linked by a referential chain if (i) they "were introduced
186Asher, "a Typology 152. Asher's reference is to Charles Chastain.
"Reference and Context," in Language, Mind, and Knowledge
,
ed. Keith Gunderson,
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975), pp. 194-269.
^Nicholas Asher, "Belief, Acceptance and Belief Reports," Canadian Journal
of Philosophy 19 (1989): 343-44.
l^Asher, "a Typology ...," 127. Emphasis added.
l^Asher, "A Typology...," 152.
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by the same source in the environment" where "the character of that source
...[is] such
that Hob or Nob would conclude that there was one such witch with respect to that
source," or (ii) Hob and Nob communicate with each other about the witch. 190 As Asher
himself admits, however, the "notion of a referential chain, so important for the analysis
of belief reports involving multiple agents, still remains largely unexplored."191 For
example, we still have to determine what kinds of environmental sources have the correct
character, i.e. a character such that the agents involved would conclude they were thinking
about the same thing. Still, Asher claims that "(referential chains underlie all successful
reports involving multiple agent intentional anaphoric relations." 192
Let us assume that the two ways Asher provides for forming referential chains
exhaust the ways in which referential chains can be formed and both have been adequately
explicated. Therefore, a preliminary version of the satisfaction conditions for [y', w']
might be as follows: [y\ w'] is satisfied (with respect to model M) iff there is a referential
chain connecting /( y') (a notional object) to /( w') (another notional object). There is a
l^OAsher, "A Typology ...," 152.
Asher, "A Typology ...," 191. Charles Chastain, from whom Asher gets the
idea of referential chains, is of no help in explicating the idea of a referential chain.
Chastain spends his time determining when the first element in a chain succeeds in
referring and when its referential purport is cancelled. He does hint at one point that
communication will support referential links, [p. 229] and later suggests that "the
formation of referential chains are intelligible to most people only on a causal analysis"
though he admits that the causal aspect "is not essential to the theory. "(p. 256].
192Asher, "A Typology ...," 158.
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referential chain connecting /( y') to /(w') if (i) y' and w' are linked by communication or
( 11 ) y' and w' are introduced by an single environmental source with the appropriate
character. Clearly, Asher can also be interpreted as advocating a version of TA. Since as
we saw at the end of Section I, TA seems to provide an adequate translation of ( 1 ),
perhaps the DR theorists have also provided a solution to Geach's Puzzle. 1 shall now
present and discuss, Edelberg's alleged counterexample to TA.
Counterexample to the Transmission Analysis?
Edelberg argues that TA fails to adequately interpret intentional identity statements.
Armed with the versions of TA proposed by Edelberg, Saarinen, Devitt, Zeevat, and
Asher, we are now in a position to begin examining the merits of Edelberg's claim.
Edelberg supports his claim by appeal to a counterexample. Edelberg asks us to consider
the following situation, which I shall call "Situation I":
Two teams of astronomers have independently been investigating the peculiar
motions of the Hydra-Centaurus supercluster and of the Local Supercluster.
Both teams attempt to explain the vectors of the peculiar motions in the same
way: by postulating an "overdensity" of galaxies at roughly twice the distance
between the Hydra-Centaurus supercluster and our own supercluster that is
drawing both superclusters toward it. The American team calls the structure
"The Great Attractor", the Russian team calls it "The Overdensity" (in Russian).
Due only to certain differences in instrumentation and atmospheric conditions at
the times and locations of observations, the two teams conjecture the structure
to be at "slightly" different distances. The Americans say it is at twice the
distance to the Hydra-Centaurus supercluster: the Russians say it is at 2. 1 times
the distance. In reality, let us suppose, the Great Attractor does not exist at all:
the peculiar motions of the various superclusters are each caused by
independent factors.
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Edelberg claims that in Situation I, the sentence
(45) The American team believes the Great Attractor is at twice the distance of the
Hydra-Centaurus supercluster and the Russian team thinks it is at 2.1 times that
distance,
is true. 193 For instance, "you might assert [(45)] ifyou are trying to arguefor the Great
Attractor theory largely on the basis ofthe American team's expertise but you think the
/Russians] have more accurate instrumentation.'' 1 94 TA, however, does not account for
the truth of (45). Since no conversation has taken place between the two teams or some
third team doing the same research there is no direct "'transmission' of an idea from one
speaker to another." Thus, he concludes that "the transmission analysis fails." 195
Is Situation I really a counterexample to the transmission analysis? Since we have
five versions to consider, perhaps Edelberg has succeeded in refuting some but not all of
the versions. I shall consider each version in turn, beginning with TAD. Situation I is
clearly a counterexample to TAD. According to TAD, in order for (45) to be true, "the
Great Attractor" and "it" need to specify mechanisms of reference with the same source,
where allowable sources are acts of imagination or failed attempts to link a term with an
object. Even though, both "the Great Attractor" and "it" do specify mechanisms of
reference that arise out of failed attempts to link a term with an object, the two attempts are
193Edelberg, "Intentional Identity ...," 574-75. Situation I is a modified version
of Edelberg's Example 2.
1
^Edelberg, "Intentional Identity ...," 575.
1
^Edelberg, "Intentional Identity ...," 575.
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separated by an entire continent, and so are not connected to the same source. Thus,
according to TAD, (45) is false, when intuitively (45) is true in Situation I. Therefore.
Situation I and (45) constitute a counterexample to TAD.
What of the other four versions of TA? Whether or not Situation I and (45)
constitute a counterexample to these other versions is, regrettably, not as clear as in the
case of TAD. Let a be an object (either an idea, an object from the point of view of the
American team, a private object, or a conceptual object) such that for the American team a
represents the Great Attractor. Let (3 be an object of the same kind as a such that for the
Russian team (3 represents the Overdensity. Clearly then,
(46a) 3 a(The American team believes[a is at twice the distance of the Hydra-
Centaurus cluster]) & 3f3(The Russian team thinks [(3 is at 2.1 times that distance!)
is true in Situation I. In order for (45) to be true in Situation I, however, a R (3 must also
be true.
Given Edelberg's and Zeevat's versions of TA, TAE and TAZ respectively, a R (3
iff a and (3 are (i) directly linked by a chain of ideas (or a counterpart chain) or (ii) linked
by two such ideas to a third idea, 5. Let L be the relation that holds between two ideas
forming a link in such a chain. L will be defined in terms of some sort of communication
relation, call it B. For example, in TAE, B will be the "based on by normal mechanisms
of conversation" relation and L holds between two ideas if one is based upon the other. In
other words, aLf3 iffaB(3 v (3Ba. 196 ForZeevaton the other hand, a L(3 iffaB(3.
197
1
^Edelberg, "intentional Identity ...," 572.
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Since B is not itself symmetrical in either case, the difference between TAE and TAZ. at
least at the schematic level, is that TAE’s L relation is symmetrical whereas TAZ's is not.
Now instead of defining chains of ideas independently, let L be transitive. Thus, for
Edelberg, a R P iff aLp and for Zeevat, a R p iff {(aLp v PLa) v 35[(5La & 5Lp) v
(aL5 & PL6)1}. Do either of these conditions hold in Situation I?
Notice that Edelberg defends the truth of (45) in Situation I by providing a reason
why someone might assert (45) in Situation I. Recall also, that Discourse Representation
Theory is supposed to be a theory of communication and so is concerned with utterances
of (45). Let the utterer of (45) be Rob. Assume that 5 is the idea that represents both the
Great Attractor and the Overdensity for Rob. Why does it represent both? Because Rob
has, through some channel of communication, learnt of the American team's hypothesis
concerning the movement of the superclusters and. through some completely different
channel of communication we might suppose, learnt of the Russian team's hypothesis
concerning the movements of the same superclusters. Rob has then concluded, all on his
own, that the Russians and the Americans are postulating the existence of the same thing.
Given Rob’s acquisition of 5, 5 is linked to a through some channel of
communication, i.e., there are ideas Xj through x
n
such that (XjLa & x^Lxj & x3Lx2 &
... & x
n
L5). Since L is transitive, 5La. For similar reasons, 5LP is also true. According
to TAE, L is symmetric, so aL5. Since L is transitive and we have both aL5 and 5Lp,
l^Zeevat, 200.
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we also have ocL(3 which in turn, according to TAE, gives us a R (3. Since the channels
of communication give usbothSLa and5L(3, we also have(5La &5L(3) v (aL5 &
PL5), and by existential instantiation, 35[ (5La & 5L(3) v (aL5 & (3L5)]}, and by iterated
disjunction introductions, {(aL(3 v (3 Lot) v 35[(5La & 5Lj3) v (aL6 & (3L5)] } which,
according to TAZ, gives us a R (3. Thus, in either case a R (3 is true in Situation I on the
hypothesis that someone is asserting (45) in that situation. Thus, Situation I is not
necessarily a counterexample to either TAZ or TAE.
Why is Situation I a counterexample to TAD. but not to TAE or TAZ? The only
significant difference between TAD on the one hand and TAE and TAZ on the other is that
TAD stipulates that the chains involved be connected at the source, whereas TAE and TAZ
do not. TAE and TAZ merely stipulate that the chains involved be connected. Since the
chains can be connected if the American and Russian teams' ideas converge on a single
idea rather than have the same idea as a source. Situation 1 does not rule out the possibility
that TAE and TAZ correctly evaluate (45) as being true in Situation I. Should we
therefore accept TAE and TAZ as solutions to Geach's Puzzle? By no means.
TAE and TAZ are unsatisfactory, even if they can avoid Edelberg's alleged
counterexample. The price TAE and TAZ pay to make (45) true in Situation I is too high-
-they make the truth or falsity of sentences like (45) depend upon the beliefs of an utterer
or thinker of (45). First, if there is no utterer or thinker of (45), then according to TAE
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and TAZ, (45) is false in Situation I. But surely, the truth or falsity of (45) should not
depend upon the existence of some utterer or thinker of (45), but rather on the thoughts of
the American and Russian teams and the causes of those thoughts.. Second, as we saw in
Chapter II, proposed solutions that make the truth of intentional identity statements depend
upon the beliefs of utterers or thinkers of the statements, fail to provide adequate readings
in contexts of type III. Let Rob be attempting to report the beliefs of Hob and Nob in a
context of type m~Hob and Nob have come to their beliefs about witches in completely
unrelated ways and there is absolutely no reason to believe Hob and Nob are thinking of
the same witch. If, however, Rob mistakenly comes to believe that Hob and Nob are
talking of the same witch, then Hob's idea of the witch and Nob's idea of the witch will
be both linked to Rob's idea, in which case Hob's and Nob's ideas are counterparts and
both TAE and TAZ would claim that (1) was true in Context III, when clearly it is not.
The truth or falsity of sentences such as (1) and (45) should depend upon what beliefs
Hob, Nob, the American team and the Russian team have and not on what beliefs Rob
has. Since TAE and TAZ do make the truth or falsity of (45) and (1) depend upon the
beliefs of Rob, they are inadequate.
So far then, Situation I is a counterexample to TAD, but not to TAE or TAZ. In
order for TAE and TAZ to be true in Situation I, however, both theories must make the
truth of (45) depend upon (i) the existence of an utterer or thinker of (45) and (ii) the
beliefs of the thinker or utterer of (45). Since the truth or falsity of (45) is independent of
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these facts TAE and TAZ are inadequate. If TAE and TAZ are modified to make the truth
or falsity of (45) independent of (i) and (ii), then Situation I and (45) do constitute a
counterexample to TAE and TAZ. Thus, TAE and TAZ also fail to be solutions to
Geach's Puzzle, even if Situation I does not prove it directly.
But what of the versions of TA offered by Saarinen and Asher? The version I
attribute to Saarinen, which I shall call TAS, is not specific enough to provide a
conclusive answer one way or the other. The most we have is that a R (3 is true if and
only if there is an "appropriate causal relation" between a and (3. Saarinen's discussion
seems to suggest that an appropriate causal relation exists if there is some sort of
communication link between a and (3, in which case TAS is best construed along the same
lines as either TAE or TAZ. Since neither of these versions of TA is adequate, TAS will
not be adequate either. On the other hand, if Saarinen were to provide an account of
"appropriate causal relation" that did not depend solely on communication, then perhaps
Saarinen could avoid the difficulties plaguing TAE and TAZ. I shall not attempt to
provide Saarinen with the account he requires. Instead, I shall consider the merits of
Asher's version of TA, TAA,-an account that does not rely solely upon communication to
link ideas.
Situation I is not a counterexample to TAA. Let x be the reference marker
representing the Great Attractor for the American team and let y be the reference marker
representing the Overdensity for the Russian team. In order for (45) to be true the
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condition [x, y| must be satisfied. Recall that according to Asher. |x, y] is satisfied as
long as there is a reference chain connecting x and y. Recall also that there can be a
reference chain connecting x and y if x and y were introduced by the same source in the
environment where the character of that source is such that the respective agents would
conclude that there is a single object with respect to that source. 198 Is the condition
satisfied? Yes. There is a reference chain connecting x and y because both are introduced
as a result of a single source in the environment such that both the American and the
Russians would conclude that there is one object with respect to that source. In the
present case the source in the environment is the motions of the superclusters. Thus, even
though there is no communication between the American and Russian teams, there is,
according to TAA, a reference chain linking their ideas (via the motions of the
superclusters.) TAA, therefore provides the correct evaluation of (45) in Situation I and
therefore avoids Edelberg's alleged counterexample. At the same time, TAA does not
make the truth or falsity of (45) depend upon the existence of the beliefs of an utterer or
thinker of (45) and so does not suffer from the shortcomings of either TAE or TAZ.
Thus, perhaps TAA is a solution to Geach’s Puzzle. 1 shall examine this possibility in
more detail in the next chapter.
19
^Asher, "A Typology...," 152.
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Conclusion
In this chapter I presented several versions of the transmission analysis
interpretation of intentional identity-an analysis that attempts to explain intentional identity
by appeal to the causal connections between the propositional attitude holders in question.
In the final section I presented Edelberg's alleged counterexample, Situation I, to the
transmission analysis and showed that it was a counterexample to only one version of the
transmission analysis, Michael Devitt's TAD. I also showed that, though Edelberg's and
Zeevat’s versions, TAE and TAZ, were not refuted by Situation I, TAE and TAZ could
only make (45) true in Situation I for reasons that make both theories generally inadequate
as theories of intentional identity. Finally, I argued that Situation I is not a
counterexample to Asher's version of the transmission analysis, TAA, and that TAA does
not suffer from the shortcomings of either TAE or TAZ. Thus, I conclude that while
Edelberg's Situation I shows that most versions of TA are inadequate, Situation I fails to
show that all versions of TA fail as interpretations of intentional identity. Given that TAA
is still a viable option and given that the transmission analysis in general succeeds not only
in Situation I, but also in our problematic context from Chapter I, Context IV, perhaps
TAA is the sought after solution to Geach's Puzzle.
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CHAPTER V
THE NEW PUZZLE
Walter Edelberg argues that pronoun of laziness interpretations, possibilist and
substitutional quantifier solutions, and transmission analyses all fail as accounts of
intentional identity. The failure of these accounts motivates Edelberg to provide his own
solution to Geach's Puzzle. The primary purpose of this chapter is to present and analyze
Edelberg's motivation-his arguments against alternative accounts--for offering his own
account. I shall argue that Edelberg’s arguments fail. As a result Edelberg has failed to
sufficiently justify the need for his own account. I shall also argue, however, that there
are arguments and counterexamples that do demonstrate the inadequacy of the alternative
accounts. I shall present these arguments and counterexamples. Finally, I shall briefly
present and comment upon Edelberg's proposed solution to Geach's Puzzle.
This chapter has four main sections. In the first section, I shall present and
discuss Edelberg's primary problem with transparent interpretations of intentional identity
statements—what Edelberg calls the 'new puzzle’ of intentional identity. In the second
section, I shall consider other arguments Edelberg has against the substitutional quantifier
solution, the pronoun of laziness solution and the transmission analysis. I shall argue that
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Edelberg s arguments at most show that intentional identity statements are ambiguous
among these three types of readings. His arguments fail to show that these three solutions
are inadequate. I shall provide a context that does demonstrate the inadequacy of these
proposed solutions. In the third section, I shall consider a new proposal of Edelberg's for
solving Geach s Puzzle and I shall resume considering the viability of Nicholas Asher's
version of the transmission analysis, TAA. Edelberg claims that his 'new puzzle' is a
problem for both proposals. I shall argue that while the 'new puzzle' is clearly a problem
for Edelberg's proposal, it is not as clearly a problem for TAA. Finally, in the fourth
section, I shall present and comment upon Edelberg's final attempt to solve Geach's
Puzzle. I shall conclude that while Edelberg has provided some interesting insights into
intentional identity, he has at most presented a sketch of a solution to Geach's Puzzle. I
begin by discussing the so-called "new puzzle."
The New Puzzle
In "A New Puzzle About Intentional Identity," Edelberg writes:
of the strategies ... for interpreting intentional identity, the most promising
is to offer a quantificational analysis in which existential import is dropped
from the relevant quantifiers I'll be arguing
..., however, that a
[distinctively] new puzzle demonstrates the impossibility of a
quantificational interpretation of natural language intentional identity. 199
By 'quantificational interpretation' Edelberg just means a quantifier analysis in which
*99\yalter Edelberg, "A New Puzzle About Intentional Identity," Journal of
Philosophical Logic 15 (1986): 12. Edelberg refers to the puzzle as "distinctively new"
on page 4.
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existential import has been dropped from the relevant quantifiers. By 'quantificational
analysis' Edelberg means an analysis along the lines of
(38a) 3 a(Hob thinks fWa & Bam] & Nob wonders whether [KasJ).
If 3 a carries no existential import, then a need not range over actual physical objects.
For example, a might range over possible objects, natural language terms, guises,
aspects, or ideas. Thus, Edelberg's ’new puzzle’ applies, at the very least, to many of the
transparent readings of ( 1 ) considered in the first three chapters. Edelberg only considers
the possible objects and natural terms possibilities. He claims the "difficulty arises for
both."200
By claiming that the new puzzle "demonstrates the impossibility of a
quantificational interpretation" Edelberg means that not all natural language intentional
identity statements can be given a quantificational interpretation—a unified account of
intentional identity in terms of a quantificational interpretation is impossible. In the first
three chapters we saw several demonstrations that some intentional identity statements
cannot, in all contexts, be given a quantificational analysis. Thus, in order for Edelberg's
new puzzle to reveal something new, his puzzle must show that some intentional identity
statements we previously thought could be given a quantificational analysis cannot.
With these preliminaries aside, let us now consider Edelberg's 'new puzzle'.
Edelberg writes, "quantificational interpretation of intentional identity has the result that
2
^Edelberg, 12.
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inferences invalid in English have formal translations that are valid on any semantics in
which conjunction is symmetric (when not in the scope of propositional attitude
operators)"201 Edelberg is proposing that a formalization of ( 1 ) such as
(2b) 3 px(Wx & Hob thinks [Bxm] & Nob wonders whether |Kxs])
is not satisfactory because substituting (2b) for (1) in certain invalid arguments makes the
arguments valid. Edelberg makes his point using a sentence involving detectives and
murderers rather than townspeople and witches, but his point is fairly general. Edelberg
asks us to consider the inference from:
(47) Detective A believes someone murdered Smith and Detective B believes he
murdered Jones,
to
(48) Detective B believes someone murdered Jones and Detective A believes he
murdered Smith.
If both (47) and (48) are interpreted quantificationally, then the inference is valid, since
(48a) 3a(B believes [Maj] & A believes [Mas])
follows from
(47a) 3a(A believes [Mas] & B believes [Maj])
"by one application of the principle of the symmetry of conjunction."202 But the inference
from (47) to (48) is not generally valid. Since Edelberg doubts the problem arises from
our treatment of conjunction, he concludes that the problem arises "from the assumption
201 Edelberg, 12.
202£<jeiberg, 14.
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that the pronouns in intentional identity statements are quantificational pronouns."203
Next, I consider Edelberg's demonstration that the inference from (47) to (48) is not valid.
Edelberg claims that in the following set of circumstances, call it "Situation II,"
(47) is true and (48) is false. Edelberg writes:
Two detectives, A and B, recently investigated an apparent murder
on Chicago's south side. Smith's body had a bullet hole in it, and
Detectives A and B inferred that Smith was murdered by a single person.
They discussed the case at length, but neither has anyone in mind as a
suspect.
Yesterday the two detectives were investigating another apparent
murder, this time on Chicago's north side. Jones’ body had a bullet hole in
it, and Detectives A and B inferred that Jones was murdered by a single
person. Detective B thinks that the man who murdered Smith is the same
person as the man who murdered Jones. Detective A disagrees. He thinks
Smith and Jones were murdered by two different people, though he has no
one in mind as a suspect for either case.
...in fact neither Smith nor Jones was really murdered. Both died of
heart attacks. In each case, a stray bullet from an unrelated incident struck
the corpse in the chest.204
According to Edelberg, (47) is true since B does believe that the person who murdered
Smith murdered Jones, but (48) is false since A does not believe that the person who
murdered Jones murdered Smith. Thus, the inference from (47) to (48) is not valid.
Since the inference from (47a) to (48a) is valid, (47) and (48) ought not be interpreted
quantificationally.
So far Edelberg's 'new puzzle' is not very exciting. Situation II at most shows
that there are some readings of (47) and (48) that cannot be interpreted quantificationally.
^^Edelberg, 14.
204Edelberg, 13-14.
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Given what Edelberg claims about the truth and falsity of (47) and (48) in Situation II
these reading appear to be pronoun of laziness readings.^05 But we already knew that
pronoun of laziness readings are not equivalent to quantificational readings. At the very
least Edelberg needs to show that there is a reading that cannot be interpreted either
quantificationally or as a pronoun of laziness. In other words, one might, since in
Situation II a pronoun of laziness type solution does work, "propose that the pronouns in
de dicto intentional identity statements are ambiguous between a quantificational use and a
lazy use."206 Edelberg claims to be able to avoid this latter problem
Edelberg provides the following scenario, which I shall call "Situation III," to
demonstrate that both the quantificational and the pronoun of laziness interpretations fail.
Monday: Smith (the mayor) and Jones (the commissioner) have been shot,
at opposite ends of Chicago. Detectives A and B are investigating both
cases, but neither ... has anyone in mind as a suspect.
Tuesday. Both Smith and Jones have died of their gunshot wounds.
Detective A knows Smith died, and thus now believes that the person who
shot Smith murdered him. but doesn't know Jones is dead. Likewise, B
knows Jones died, and thus now believes that the person who shot Jones
murdered him, but doesn't know Smith is dead. Detective A now knows
that Smith was the mayor, but not that Jones was the commissioner.
Similarly, B now knows that Jones was the commissioner, but not that
Smith was the mayor. After reflecting on certain similarities between the
205The invalid inference from (47) to (48) is maintained if (47) is rewritten as
(49) Detective A believes someone murdered Smith and Detective B believes the
person who murdered Smith murdered Jones,
and (48) is rewritten as
(50) Detective B believes someone murdered Jones and Detective A believes the
person who murdered Jones murdered Smith.
2
^Edelberg, 15.
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two cases, Detective B infers that the man who shot Smith is the same
person as the man who shot Jones. He communicates this to A, saying.
"The man who shot Smith is the man who shot Jones." A disagrees, but B
persists in his opinion.207
Now consider:
(5 1 ) Detective A thinks someone murdered the mayor and Detective B thinks he
murdered the commissioner.
and
(52) Detective B thinks someone murdered the commissioner and Detective A
thinks he murdered the mayor.
A possibilist quantifier interpretation of (51) will not do because, since (53) is true, such
an interpretation would mandate that (52) be true. But (52) is false in Situation III.
Edelberg also argues that the "details of the example obviously preclude a laziness
analysis" on the grounds that "B believes neither that Smith was the mayor nor that he was
murdered."208 Clearly, the fact that B believes neither that Smith was the mayor nor that
he was murdered is enough to rule out:
(53) Detective A thinks someone murdered the mayor and Detective B thinks the
person who murdered the mayor murdered the commissioner,
as a reading of (5 1 ), but is it enough to rule out:
(54) Detective A thinks someone murdered the mayor and Detective B thinks the
person Detective A thinks murdered the mayor murdered the commissioner 209
207Edelberg, 16-17.
^O^Edelberg, 17.
^^Edelberg [see page 3] allows
(55) Hob thinks a witch blighted Bob's mare and Nob wonders whether the witch
Hob thinks blighted Bob's mare killed Cob's sow,
as a pronoun of laziness reading of ( 1 ), so he must allow (54) as a reading of (5 1 ).
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as a reading of (51) in Situation III? No. Situation HI does not provide enough
information to rule out (54). B may believe neither that Smith was the mayor nor that
Smith was murdered while believing that A thinks Smith was both the mayor and
murdered. B just thinks A is wrong that Smith is the mayor and was murdered. Thus,
Edelberg has not quite managed to provide a situation in which it is clear that a pronoun of
laziness type solution will not work.
Fortunately for Edelberg, Situation III can be easily modified to insure that neither
(53) nor (54) will be true even though (5 1) is true. I shall present two separate ways of
modifying Situation III that produce the desired results.
Modification I: Stipulate that no one, including A, has suggested to B that A
thinks Smith is the mayor and was murdered.
Thus, B does not think there is a person A thinks murdered the mayor, though B does
think there is a person that A thinks shot Smith. Since B has no one in particular in mind
as the murderer we cannot give the definite description "the person A thinks murdered the
mayor" wide scope. Thus, (53) and (54) are both false.
Modification H: Stipulate that A and B are in fact independently investigating the
shootings and neither has heard of the other.
Modification II would produce a situation similar to Contexts II and IV in Chapter I.
Since B has never heard of A and B does not think Smith is the mayor or was murdered,
neither (53) nor (54) is true. Either way a pronoun of laziness solutio;i is inadequate.
Notice, however, that Situation III, even with Modification I or II, does not
preclude an analysis of (5 1) such as:
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(56) Detective A thinks the person who shot Smith murdered the mayor and
Detective B thinks the person who shot Smith murdered the commissioner.
If in Situations II and III, "someone" and "he" are interpreted as "the person who shot
Smith Edelberg fails to make his point-there is a wide-scope quantifier interpretation that
succeeds in Situation III. Edelberg, however, claims to have reasons to reject
substitutional interpretations such as (56). I turn to these reasons now.
Edelberg and the Substitutional Quantifier Interpretation
Though Edelberg does claim that the 'new puzzle' is a problem for any
quantificational interpretation, including the substitutional quantifier interpretation,
Edelberg never demonstrates that the 'new puzzle' applies to the substitutional quantifier
interpretation. Edelberg focuses on the possibilist quantifier interpretation because, he
claims, "[the substitutional quantifier interpretation] offers no real advantage over [the
possibilist quantifier interpretation]"210 Besides, he has other reasons for thinking that the
substitutional quantifier interpretation is inadequate. Given the apparent success of (56), a
substitutional interpretation, in Situation III we need to examine Edelberg's reasons.
In "A Perspectivalist Semantics for Propositional Attitudes", Edelberg claims that:
another way of trying to interpret [(51)] emerges when we notice that
although [(53)] and [(54)] are false in [Situation III], [(56)] seems
intuitively true, on a de dicto reading in which the descriptions take narrow
scope with respect to the verbs of belief. ... This observation suggests that
we might analyze [(51)] as
[ (51a) 3a[ A thinks M(a, ixYx) & B thinks M(a, ixCx)] ],
2
^Edelberg, 8
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where the quantifier 3 a is given a substitutional interpretation.
... The
substituends for a would be restricted to English definite descriptions
which would then take narro[w] scope in the resulting substitution
instances. Sentence [(56)] would then be a substitution instance of
([51a)].211
(5 1 a) is true as long as some term can be substituted for a and the resulting sentence is
true. Since there is a term, viz. "the person who shot Smith." that, when substituted for
a, generates a true sentence, viz (56), (51), so interpreted, is true in Situation III.
Edelberg, however, objects to the substitutional quantifier interpretation on the
grounds that it "assigns truth conditions that are both too strong and too weak."212
Edelberg, who restricts himself to showing that the truth conditions are too weak.
provides the following situation, which I shall call Situation IV.
A wrote to her friend, B. saying that she (A) recently donated to the
Chicago Museum of Natural History a priceless wooden Aztec sculpture,
and that this is the first and only wooden artifact that the Museum
possesses. The whole thing is a baldfaced lie, but B, who has never visited
the Museum, is completely taken in.
C and D know' nothing at all of A or B. Unlike B, D has visited the
Museum many times, and knows perfectly well that the Museum contains
countless wooden artifacts. D's favorite exhibit is a forty foot wooden boat
taken from and Egyptian tomb, which he sees on every visit to the Museum.
Recently, however, C told D that all the wooden artifacts in the museum
have been stolen. All but one, that is -- the exception being D's beloved
Egyptian wooden vessel. Of course C's story is a lie, but D's surprise does
2 1
1 Walter Edelberg, "A Perspectivalist Semantics for Propositional Attitudes,"
Unpublished manuscript, 13. See also, "Intentional Identity and the Attitudes,"
Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (1992): 587, n. 24.
212Edelberg, "A Perspectivalist ...," 13. Tyler Burge makes a similar claim in
"Russell's Problem and Intentional Identity," in Agent, Language, and the Structure of
the World
,
ed. James E. Tomberlin, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.), p. 95.
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not stop him from believing it. He is relieved, at least, that the thieves did
not make off with the boat.213
According to Edelberg it is absolutely clear that in Situation IV,
(57) B thinks A gave something to the Chicago Museum of Natural History, and D
thinks it s a large wooden boat taken from an Egyptian pyramid,
is false. Yet, according to the substitutional quantifier interpretation of intentional identity,
(57) ought to be true because there is a true substitution instance of
(57a) 3a(B thinks [A gave a to the Chicago Museum of Natural History! & D
thinks [a is a large wooden boat taken from an Egyptian pyramid.]),
viz.,
(58) B thinks that A gave the only wooden artifact presently in the Chicago
Museum ofNatural History to the Chicago Museum of Natural History, and D
thinks the only wooden artifact presently in the Chicago Museum ofNatural
History is a large wooden boat taken from an Egyptian pyramid.214
Since (57) is false in Situation IV, but (57a) and (58) are true, (57a) cannot be the desired
logical form of (57). Hence, the substitutional quantifier interpretation is inadequate.
What exactly does Edelberg's example show? Since Situation IV is completely
new and not a modification of Situation III, the most Edelberg has done is show that there
are some circumstances in which the substitutional analysis does not work. Also, since,
in Situation IV the most natural pronoun of laziness reading of (57), viz.
(59) B thinks A gave something to the Chicago Museum of Natural History, and
D thinks the thing A gave to the Chicago Museum of Natural History is a large
wooden boat taken from an Egyptian pyramid,
21
-^Edelberg, "A Perspectivalist ...," 13-14. See also "A New Puzzle ...," 8-10
and "Intentional Identity and the Attitudes," 587, n. 24 for other, slightly less
perspicuous, examples which Edelberg puts to the same purpose.
21
^Edelberg, "A Perspectivalist ..., " 14.
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is false, Situation IV is not a situation that cannot be accommodated by at least one of the
proposed analyses. Thus, Edelberg fails to provide a situation in which an intentional
identity statement cannot be accommodated either by the pronoun of laziness solution or
the substitutional quantifier solution. Edelberg has failed to refute the claim that
intentional identity statements are ambiguous between a quantificational and a pronoun of
laziness interpretation.
Can Situation III or IV be modified even further such that no quantificational or
pronoun of laziness solution analyzes (51) as being true? Not clearly. What is needed is
some situation in which A and B share absolutely no way of describing the perpetrator.
But (51) is true, in part, because B supposes both crimes have been committed by one and
the same person. B supposes both crimes have been committed by one person because of
certain similarities between the two crimes. Let the relevant similarities be S. S is some
subset of the characteristics of A's crime scene with which B is familiar. Call these
characteristics C. Could a situation be developed in which A is unfamiliar with most if not
all the characteristics in C such that A and B share no description of the perpetrator? If
not, which seems plausible, then making the substitutional interpretation of (51) false,
while maintaining the truth of (51) is extremely difficult, if not impossible.215
2 15jf one argues that the substitutional interpretation is still generally inadequate
because if provides truth conditions that are too weak as demonstrated in Situation IV,
then one might reply as follows. Though Situation IV shows that a substitutional
quantifier interpretation is not universally adequate, it fails to demonstrate that a
description analysis is universally inadequate. Recall from Chapter I that a description
analysis of intentional identity takes (5 1), for some suitable description F, to be:
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Let me summarize the progress we have made so far in the first two sections.
Edelberg argues that Situations III and IV show that
,
"neither the laziness nor the
quantificational interpretations of intentional identity are acceptable. The anaphoric
relation in (at least some) intentional identity statements must be construed in some
alternative fashion."216 I showed, however, that in Situations III and IV, either a
substitutional quantifier interpretation or a pronoun of laziness interpretation is successful.
Thus, Edelberg has failed to show that an alternative account of intentional identity is
(60) Detective A thinks F murdered the mayor and Detective B thinks F murdered
the commissioner.
[Note first that even though Edelberg and Burge conflate the description analysis and the
substitutional quantifier interpretation (restricted to definite descriptions) they are not
necessarily the same. The substitutional quantifier interpretation takes (5 1 ) to be
(51a) 3a[ A thinks M(a, ixYx) & B thinks M(a, txCx)].
I grant that (51a) and (60) are superficially similar. There is however a crucial difference.
The difference is that (51a) contains a quantifier, whereas (60) does not. In other words,
one might suggest that the description analysis takes 'someone' and 'he' to be standing in
for some one particular contextually determined definite description rather than as a
quantifier ranging over definite descriptions.]
One might argue that the definite description that "something" stands for in (57) is
"the priceless wooden Aztec statue" because that is what B believes A gave to the
Museum. Since "it" is to be replaced with whatever replaces "something" we could, on a
description analysis, interpret (57) as
(61) B thinks A gave the priceless wooden Aztec statue to the Chicago Museum of
Natural History, and D thinks the priceless wooden Aztec statue is a large wooden
boat taken from an Egyptian pyramid
(61) is false and so if "something" and "it" do stand for "the priceless wooden statue" then
the description analysis provides the correct analysis in Situation IV, even though the
substitutional quantifier interpretation does not One might therefore argue that, based on
Edelberg's examples at least, the description analysis may in fact be the proper analysis of
intentional identity since it succeeds in Situations II, III, and IV.
^
^Edelberg, "A New Puzzle ....," 17.
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required. Regardless, let us now go on to consider the first of the alternative accounts that
Edelberg suggests, keeping in mind that Edelberg has not shown that an alternative
account is needed.
The first alternative account that Edelberg considers is the transmission analysis of
intentional identity (TA). As we saw in Chapter IV, Edelberg believes that TA fails. He
offers Situation I as a counterexample to TA. We also saw in Chapter IV, that Situation
failed to refute all the versions of TA we considered. Let us, for the moment ignore this
fact and assume that Situation I does refute all versions of TA. Is Edelberg therefore
justified in considering yet another solution to the problem of intentional identity?
Edelberg thinks he is. I shall argue that he is not.
First, let me provide a brief synopsis of Situation I. Two astronomy teams infer
from the motions of certain superclusters that an object is influencing these superclusters.
The American team calls the purported object the "Great Attractor" and the Russian team
call it "the Overdensity." Because of slight differences in the accuracy of each team’s
equipment, the teams believe the object to be at slightly different distances from Earth.
There is no communication between the teams. In fact, there is no object causing the
observed motions.^^ Edelberg argues that (45)—The American team believes the Great
Attractor is at twice the distance of the Hydra-Centaurus supercluster and the Soviet team
thinks it is at 2.1 times that distance-is true in this situation.
2 17F0r a more detailed description of Situation I, see Chapter IV.
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Let us assume that no version ofTA correctly analyzes (45) in Situation I.
Edelberg also points out that a pronoun of laziness solution will not work in this case
since the Russians do not refer to the overdensity of galaxies as "the Great Attractor."218
What about some kind of quantificational interpretation? One might argue that both teams
in fact do have a particular possible object in mind—a hypothetical overdensity of galaxies.
One might also argue that in Situation I (45) be interpreted as:
(62) The American team believes the object responsible for the peculiar motions of
Hydra-Centaurus and Local superclusters is at twice the distance of the Hydra-
Centaurus supercluster and the Soviet team thinks the object responsible for the
peculiar motions of the Hydra-Centaurus supercluster is at 2.1 times that distance.
(62) is a true instance of a substitutional quantifier interpretation of (45). Thus, it appears
that either a substitutional quantifier or a possibilist quantifier interpretation of (45) will
provide an adequate rendition of (45) in Situation I. In other words, given Situation I, the
most Edelberg can argue, assuming that the transmission analysis is required at all. is that
intentional identity statements may be trebly ambiguous between a transmission analysis
interpretation, a quantificational interpretation, and a pronoun of laziness interpretation.
Edelberg cannot yet claim that an alternative account to these three is required.
Can Edelberg or someone else provide sufficient reason to reject a quantificational
interpretation of (45) in Situation I? Against the substitutional quantifier interpretation one
might argue that analyzing the surface structure name "the Great Attractor" as "the object
responsible for the peculiar motions of the Hydra-Centaurus and Local superclusters" is
2 1
^Actually i do not think that the issue is quite so clear cut, but I shall grant
Edelberg his point for now. I shall return to this issue again in Chapter VI.
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(id hoc because such an analysis appears to be motivated only to account for intentional
identity statements. When we analyze:
(63) The American team thinks the Great Attractor is at twice the distance of the
Hydra-Centaurus cluster,
there seems to be no motivation for analyzing "the Great Attractor" as "the object
responsible for the peculiar motions of the Hydra-Centaurus and Local superclusters." If
there is no independent reason to analyze "the Great Attractor" as the longer description,
then perhaps the substitutional quantifier analysis of (45) is inadequate in Situation I.
In reply, one might argue that there is an independent motivation for analyzing "the
Great Attractor" as "the object responsible for the peculiar motions of the Hydra-
Centaurus and Local superclusters." One might, following perhaps Frege or Russell,
argue that names in general are to be analyzed away in terms of definite descriptions.
"The Great Attractor" really is just an abbreviation for "the object responsible for the
peculiar motions of the Hydra-Centaurs and Local superclusters." Unfortunately, Saul
Kripke has demonstrated the inadequacy of a general analysis of names as
descriptions.219 Not to be daunted, however, one might argue that in the cases that
Edelberg presents to refute TA the names involved can be analyzed as definite
descriptions. In all the cases that Edelberg presents as counterexamples to TA, Edelberg
claims that "the concept we apply in assessing intentional identity seems to be rough
219Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1980). See Lecture I, especially pages 30-32.
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similarity ofexplanatory role In Situation I, the names "the Great Attractor" and
"the Overdensity" are introduced as names for the object responsible for the peculiar
motions of certain superclusters. Since the names are not introduced independently of the
role, one might argue that in this case the name really is just shorthand for a description of
the form "the object filling such and such a role."
If names introduced solely on the basis of explanatory role can be analyzed away
as descriptions, (62) would be a true instance of a substitutional quantifier interpretation of
(45). Since a substitutional quantifier interpretation seems viable in Situation I, regardless
of whether a possibilist quantifier interpretation is also viable, even ifTA fails in Situation
I, Edelberg has not provided a context in which Geach's problem of intentional identity
cannot be solved by either a version of the transmission analysis, a pronoun of laziness
interpretation or a quantificational interpretation.
Even if Edelberg has failed to provide a context in which all three possible
solutions fails, is there a context that will simultaneously refute the transmission analysis,
the quantificational interpretation and the pronoun of laziness interpretation? If we
continue to ignore Nicholas Asher's version of TA, I think the answer is yes. I provide
such a context for an utterance of ( 1 ).
Context V: X, wandering in Blackwood Forest, comes across an old hut with a
large bubbling cauldron in it He assumes the hut is the home of some witch. A
few minutes later Y comes across the same hut with the bubbling cauldron and
also assumes it is the home of a witch. X tells Hob there is a witch living in
Blackwood Forest, but does not tell Hob about the hut or the bubbling cauldron.
^OEdeibei-g^ "Intentional Identity ...," 576.
158
Hob, hearing there is a witch living in Blackwood, thinks that explains the sudden
sickness of Bob's mare. Y tells Nob there is a witch living nearby, though Y is
the only person who thinks Blackwood Forest is nearby. Y does not tell Nob
about the hut, the bubbling cauldron, or that the witch lives in Blackwood Forest.
Nob, hearing there is a witch nearby, wonders whether she is responsible for the
mysterious death of Cob's sow. Nob has never heard of X or Hob or Bob. Hob
has never heard of Y or Nob or Cob. In fact there is no witch. The hut is the
hideaway of a trapper and the bubbling cauldron contains his lunch-rabbit stew.
In Context V, (1)—Hob thinks a witch blighted Bob's mare and Nob wonders
whether she killed Cob's sow— is true. The pronoun of laziness analysis fails because
Nob has never heard of Hob or Bob. Both substitutional quantifier interpretations and
description analyses fail, since Hob and Nob share no singular term or definite description
of the purported witch. Hob and Nob have no particular object, actual or possible, in
mind as the witch. At the same time, there is no reason to suppose that Hob and Nob
share any guise, aspect, perspectival object, or intentional object such that any of the
possibilist quantifier solutions we have considered so far succeed. Thus, both actualist
and possibilist quantifier interpretations fail. Finally, most versions of TA fail because
Hob's and Nob's ideas are not connected to each other by communication-Hob's and
Nob's ideas are in completely unconnected chains of ideas. Thus, if we continue to
ignore Asher's version of TA, Context V is the sort of context Edelberg is looking for-
Context V simultaneously refutes most versions of TA and the pronoun of laziness and
quantificational interpretations.
Unfortunately, neither Situation I nor Context V is a counterexample to Asher's
version of TA, TAA. According to TAA, Hob's and Nob's ideas are anchored to each
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other (counterparts) as long as there is a reference chain connecting them. There will be a
reference chain connecting the ideas as long as (i) Hob communicated his idea to Nob or
vice versa, or (ii) both ideas ultimately arise from a single source in the environment with
the appropriate character such that Hob and Nob would think there was a single object
with respect to that source. For example, environmental sources could be a single
individual, a newspaper article, or even a boiling cauldron. In both Context V and
Situation I, there is a source in the environment with the appropriate character to make the
propositional attitude holders believe there is one object with respect to that source. Thus,
even if we help Edelberg by providing Context V, Edelberg still is not justified in
considering alternative accounts. There is a version of TA that is still a viable option in
both Situation I and in Context V. I shall consider the viability ofTAA in more detail in
the next section.
The 'New Puzzle’ Again
In order to facilitate our analysis of TAA, I shall briefly describe Edelberg's next
alternative account of intentional identity statements after TA. Even though Edelberg
rejects TA, Edelberg does not reject (39a)—3a(Hob thinks fWa & Bam] & 3P(Nob
wonders whether fKPs] & a R (3))-as an interpretation of (1). Edelberg just rejects a
certain analysis of the intentional counterpart relation, R. According to Edelberg, TA, or
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more specifically Edelberg’s own version of TA, TAE. does not capture all the cases in
which two ideas can be counterparts. Edelberg suggests adding that "li]f two ideas are
introduced to explain roughly the same (or better counterpart) data in roughly the same
way, they are counterparts." He admits that the "concept of counterpart data, and the
concept of similarity of explanatory role, are both in need of explication," and that for
other kinds of cases, such as beliefs about mathematical entities, our practice is to invoke
other kinds of similarity relations."221 Regardless, Edelberg's strategy is to define the
intentional counterpart relation not just in terms of the based on by normal routes of
conversation relation, but by the similarity ofexplanatory role relation as well. I shall
call this interpretation of intentional identity that involves the modified intentional
counterpart relation, "El".
Like TA, El and TAA, account for the truth of (1) in Contexts I, II, and IV. Both
El and TAA, however, have the added advantage that they can account for the truth of ( 1)
in Context V, whereas no other solution we have considered so far can. Unfortunately,
both El and TAA are incomplete. As we saw in Chapter IV, Asher leaves the notion of
'environmental source with appropriate character' unexplained. As we saw above,
Edelberg leaves the notions of 'normal routes of conversation' and 'rough similarity of
explanatory role' unexplained. Let us assume for the moment that either the intentional
counterpart relation or the notion of a referential chain has been fully explicated. In other
221 Edelberg, "Intentional Identity ...," 576.
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words notions such as 'normal routes of conversation', 'rough similarity of explanatory
role', or 'environmental source with appropriate character' have been fully explicated.
Given this assumption, perhaps El or TAA is the solution to Geach’s Puzzle that we seek.
Edelberg is not convinced. He argues that even if El and TAA are fully
explicated, both accounts fail to be adequate solutions. Why? Because Edelberg's 'new
puzzle arises for both accounts. Recall that the 'new puzzle' is the problem of accounting
for what Edelberg calls the 'asymmetry of intentional identity statements'. For example.
(47)-Detective A believes someone murdered Smith and Detective B believes he murdered
Jones-can be true even though (48)—Detective B believes someone murdered Jones and
Detective A believes he murdered Smith- is false. An account of intentional identity is
inadequate if it cannot account for this asymmetry. Edelberg claims that El and TAA
cannot account for the asymmetry. In the rest of this section I shall evaluate Edelberg's
claim.
Consider again Situation II. In Situation II, Detective A believes one person shot
Smith and a different person shot Jones. B believes the same person shot both Smith and
Jones. Thus,
(64) A believes someone shot Smith and B believes he shot Jones
is true, whereas,
(65) B believes someone shot Jones and A believes he shot Smith
is not. Let a be A's idea representing the person who shot Smith. Let b be B's idea
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representing the person who shot Jones. El interprets (64) as:
(64a) 3a3P(A believes [a shot Smith] & B believes [f3 shot Jones] & cxR(3)
and interprets (65) as:
(65a) 3ot3(3(B believes [(3 shot Jones] & A believes [a shot Smith] & (3Ra).
Given that (65a) follows from (64a) both (64a) and (65a) are satisfied in the same
conditions. Thus, if a and b are counterparts both (64) and (65) are true and if they are
not, both (64) and (65) are false. Either way El makes an incorrect prediction of truth
value. Thus, El cannot be a completely adequate analysis of intentional identity.
One might think that there is an easy fix for El. If the intentional counterpart
relation were not symmetric, then perhaps one could explain why (64) is true and (65) is
false. If the counterpart relation were not symmetric, then a could be a counterpart of b,
but b could fail to be a counterpart of cl In such a circumstance (64) would be true and
(65) false. But then Edelberg asks, how do we account for the truth of
(66) B believes someone shot Smith and A believes he did not shoot Jones.222
According to El, (66) is interpreted as:
(66a) 3a3(3(B believes [(3 shot Smith] & A believes [~(a shot Jones)) & (3Ra).
In Situation II, (65) is false and (66) is true. But in order for (66) to be true b must be an
intentional counterpart of a, in which case (65) is also true. In order to make (65) false b
cannot be an intentional counterpart of a, in which case (66) is also false. Either way,
222£de i5erg i "intentional Identity ...," 578-79.
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making the counterpart relation non-symmetric will not help El account for the asymmetry
of intentional identity statements. Thus, El does not provide a satisfactory account of
intentional identity.
So far, I agree with Edelberg. El is not satisfactory. It cannot simultaneously
account for the truth of (64) and (66) and the falsity of (65). But what of TAA? Edelberg
claims that TAA in effect takes the intentional counterpart relation to be non-symmetric 223
In terms of DR theory, taking the counterpart relation to be non-symmetric amounts to the
condition [x, y] being satisfied even though the condition [y, x] is not. Indeed. Asher
responds to a version ol Edelberg's problem by admitting that "while we may introduce a
quasi-external anchor |x, y] for x, we might not be able to introduce the quasi-external
anchor [y, x] for y, had y been introduced first."
224 Asher seems to be claiming that
there can be a referential chain connecting x to y, but not connecting y to x. But, as
Edelberg has demonstrated, making satisfaction of (x, y] non-symmetric only creates new
problems. Does Asher propose a version of TAA that makes satisfaction of [x. y]
different from the satisfaction of |y, x]? If he does, did he need to? I shall devote the rest
of this section to answering these questions.
Let b be a reference marker in Detective B’s delineated DRS standing for the
conceptual object that represents for B the person who shot both Smith and Jones. Let a
^^Edelberg, "a Perspectivalist ...," 26.
224Nicholas Asher, "A Typology For Attitude Verbs and their Anaphoric
Properties," Linguistics and Philosophy 10 (1987): 155.
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and a ' be reference markers in Detective A’s delineated DRS standing for conceptual
objects that represent for A the person who shot Smith and the person who shot Jones
respectively. For simplicity I shall talk as if b, a and a
'
were the conceptual objects
themselves, a and b were introduced to account for the fact that Smith has been shot.
Upon encountering the shot Jones, B adds the belief that b also shot Jones. A on the
other hand introduces a new conceptual object, a' to represent the person who shot
Jones. A does not believe that a and a
'
stand for the same person. Given this
background let us consider how TAA might handle (64) and (65).
Let us consider (64) first. The DRS that DR theory might generate for (64) is:
<x, A>
<u, B>
<z, Smith>
<w, Jones>
{y, a}
{v, b}
[Ml
In producing (64b) from (64) the construction algorithm linked y with a and v with b.
Since a represents for A the person who shot Smith and b represents for B not only the
person who shot Smith but also the person who shot Jones, both the p: and q: conditions
will be satisfied. But what about [a, b]? Since a and b were originally introduced to
represent the person who shot Smith, Asher could claim that [a, b] is satisfied--^ and b
(64b)
x, p
Detective A(x)
Believes(x, p)
P y,2
Smith(z)
Shot(y, z)
u, q
Detective B(u)
Believesfu, q)
q:
V, V
Jones(v)
Shot(v, v)
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are connected by a referential chain since a and b were introduced by the same source in
the environment. Thus, (64b) is true.
<u, B>
<x, A>
<V , Jones>
<z'
,
Smith>
{y\?}
[b,?]
(65b) is a partial DRS because it is not immediately obvious what internal links the
construction algorithm will generate from (65) in the given situation. While it seems fairly
obvious that v' should be linked tob (and since B believes/? shot Jones, q': is satisfied),
it is not obvious what y', and therefore /?, should be linked to. Hence the question
marks. There are two options, a and a '. I shall consider each option in turn.
Asher links y' with a and then argues that while [a, b] is satisfied, [b, a] is not.
Asher argues that in order for (65) to be true there would have to a reference chain linking
b to cl He claims there is no such chain because A believes that whoever the person
who shot Smith is, he or she is not the person B has in mind as the person who shot
Jones.225 Asher offers no further justification to his claim that the condition [b, a] does
not hold. Thus, Asher leaves unexplained how A's believing that whoever shot Smith is
225Asher, "A Typology ...," 158.
Let us now consider (65). A partial DRS for (65) might be:
(65b)
Detective B(u)
Believes(u, q')
q V',¥'
Jones(w')
Shc^v'
,
v 1 )
x,P'
Detective A(x)
Believes(x, p
1
)
P':
Smiths')
ShotCyLz 1 )
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not the person B has in mind as the person who shot Jones has any bearing on whether b
is linked to a by a reference chain. Since b and a were introduced as a result of the a
single source in the environment, viz. Smith’s dead body, according to Asher's,
admittedly sketchy, explanation of reference chains, b and a ought to be linked by a
reference chain.
Perhaps Asher is suggesting that not only must a and h be introduced as a result
of a single source in the environment, but A must intend a to stand for the same thing that
B intends b to stand for. In Situation II, a and b have the same source in the
environment. In addition, B intends b to stand for the same thing A intends a to stand
for. Thus, a is linked to b or a is an anchor for b. On the other hand, since A does not
intend a to stand for the same thing that B intends b to stand for, b is not linked to a.
The asymmetry of [a, b] and [b, a] is explained in terms of the asymmetry of A’s and B’s
intentions. Unfortunately, if Asher includes the caveat that A and B must intend their
respective ideas to stand for the same thing, even more serious problems arise.
First, in contexts in which A and B have never heard of each other neither A nor B
can intend their respective ideas to stand for the same thing the other's idea stands for.
Thus, a and b are not linked at all and so neither (64) nor (65) is true, contrary to our
intuitions that (64) at least is true. Second, there is still the problem of accounting for the
truth of (66)-B believes someone shot Smith and A believes he did not shoot Jones. If
(66) is true then condition [b, a] must hold in Situation II. But if [b, a] holds then (65) is
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true, contrary to our intuition that (65) is false. Thus. Asher's attempt to make the
satisfaction of conditions such as [a, b] independent of the satisfaction of (b, aj is
seriously flawed. Ashers modifications would make TAA incapable of accounting for
both the falsity of (65) and the truth of (66). Given that Asher links y' to a, but argues
that [b, a] is not satisfied we can see that Edelberg is correct-Asher does offer an analysis
that in effect takes the counterpart relation to be non-symmetric and is therefore
inadequate.
But does Asher need to offer such an analysis? I think not. Asher’s motivation
for supposing a condition like [x, y] to be non-symmetric is misguided. Recall that Asher
claims that even if [x, y] is satisfied, if y had been introduced first, then perhaps [y, x]
would not be satisfied. But what does the order of introduction of reference markers have
to do with whether or not the ideas the reference markers stand for are connected by a
referential chain? a and b are reference markers in A's and B's delineated DRSs. The
ideas they stand for were introduced by the two detectives to explain one aspect of the
environment-the fact that Smith has been shot. The ideas are connected by a referential
chain because of the single environmental source. Surely the order in which the ideas
were introduced is completely irrelevant. In other words the ideas a and b stand for are
connected by a referential chain independently of whether the reference markers a and b
are introduced at all.
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Perhaps Asher does not really mean the order in which a and b
,
or the ideas for
which they stand, are introduced, but rather the order in which the construction algorithm
generates internal links involving a and bl Since the construction algorithm works left to
right, in (64) a link will be made between y and a before a link is made between v and b
and in (65) a link will be made between v' and b before y is linked to a or a '. Perhaps
Asher really wants to claim that even if a and b are connected by a reference chain and in
(64) y gets linked to a and then v gets linked to b, in the case of (65), the construction
algorithm, by linking v' to b first might not dictate that y' be linked to a but to a ’
instead. If y' gets linked to a' instead of a, then the truth of (65), unlike (64) or (66)
depends upon there being a reference chain linking bio a' rather than b to a
Assume that in (65b) y' is linked to a' (A's idea of the person who shot Jones).
Thus, the relevant anchor is |b, a']. Is (65b) true or false? False. Though whether or not
[b, a' | is satisfied is unclear (after all they both are ideas of the person who shot Jones),
condition p': is not satisfied-A does not believe that a' shot Smith. There is no DRS in
A's delineated DRS representing the fact that a' shot Smith. Thus, condition p': is not
satisfied and (65b) is false. If the construction algorithm links y' to a\ TAA will provide
the correct answer and so avoid Edelberg's 'new problem'. Is linking y' to a' a viable
option? I do not know. The fact that Asher adopts a different tactic is not auspicious, but
Asher provides no details on how the construction algorithm links reference markers-he
merely informs us that the links exist
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I conclude that Edelberg's 'new puzzle' does pose a problem for El and TAA. If
the counterpart relation is symmetric then seemingly neither can account for the truth of
(64) and falsity of (65) in Situation II. If the counterpart relation is not symmetric then
neither can account for the truth of (66) and the falsity of (65). The only way for TAA to
avoid this dilemma is to alter which reference markers are getting linked so that the truth of
(64) depends upon |a, b] and [b, a], but the falsity of (65) does not. In other words,
Asher might argue that given (64) and (66) the construction algorithm generates DRSs in
which a and b are linked, whereas given (65) the construction algorithm generates a
DRS in which a ' and h are linked. If Asher were to make this argument, then not only
would he have to explain the essential notion of a "reference chain," he would also need to
explain how the construction algorithm makes internal links of the form {x, y}. So far in
his discussion of DR theory, he has only suggested that such links are made, but has not
indicated how a reference marker gets linked with one reference marker in a subject's
delineated DRS rather than another. Clearly providing an adequate theory of intentional
identity places significant constraints on which reference markers get linked by the
construction algorithm. If an adequate construction algorithm can be provided and
explained and once satisfaction of [x, y] is fully explained, perhaps TAA will provide an
adequate explanation of intentional identity. I shall not pursue making these explanations
here. Instead 1 shall move on to Edelberg's final suggestion for solving Geach's Puzzle.
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Edelberg's Solution
In the previous sections we examined numerous arguments that Walter Edelberg
has against attempts to solve Geach's Puzzle such as pronoun of laziness interpretations,
quantificational interpretations, and transmission analyses. Though Edelberg’s arguments
are often unsuccessful his conclusion that these purported solutions fail is correct.
Contexts such as Context V and logical problems such as Edelberg's 'new puzzle' clearly
demonstrate that, with the possible exception of TAA, an alternative account of intentional
identity is required. In order to overcome the shortcomings of the proposed solutions,
Edelberg provides his own analysis of intentional identity. I shall call Edelberg's
analysis, "E2".
E2 is a more complex version of El (which is a more complex version of TA).
Thus, E2 includes (i) quantification over ideas and (ii) ideas being counterparts.
According to E2, like El
,
ideas are counterparts if they are connected by a chain of ideas
or if they play a similar explanatory role. In addition to keeping the machinery of El,
Edelberg also distinguishes two uses of (singular indefinite) noun phrases, such as
"someone." He writes
a singular indefinite NP like "someone" can be used by a speaker in two
ways: either to refer to a specific object the speaker has in mind, or without
any such specific reference. In the former case we will say that the speaker
evokes the object in question, and that the anaphoric initiator is used
evocatively. When no such object is evoked, we shall say the anaphoric
initiator has a wildcard use.226
226Edelberg, "Intentional Identity ...," 582.
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Given that Edelberg’s universe also contains ideas, he adds that "(singular indefinite)
anaphoric initiators in certain syntactic positions can be used either evocatively to refer
(to] a specific idea
; or as a wildcard initiator that behaves roughly like an existential
quantifier ranging over ideas. "227 One such syntactic position is within the scope of
propositional attitude verbs such as believes. In such cases,
the initiator can be used to evoke ideas belonging only to the subject of the
belief clause. When such a evocation occurs, an anaphorically linked
pronoun in a second belief context then semantically refers to the evoked
idea -- or rather, to its counterpart, if it has one, in the beliefs of the subject
of the second belief clause (otherwise the pronoun fails to refer). Wildcard
uses of an anaphoric initiator occurring in the scope of a belief predicate
behave like widescope existential quantifiers, ranging over ideas belonging
to the subject of the belief clause.228
Both (64a)--3a3(3(A believes [a shot Smith] & B believes [(3 shot Jones] & aR(3)--and
(65a)--3a3(3(B believes 1(3 shot Jones] & A believes [a shot Smith] & (3Ra)--capture the
wildcard use of "someone" in (64) and (65). Since (65a) follows from (64a), given the
wildcard use of "someone", (65) does follow from (64).
What of the evocative use of "someone" in (64) and (65)? Evocative renditions of
(64) and (65) might be:
(64c) 3 ca3(3(A believes [a shot Smith] & B believes ](3 shot Jones] & aR(3)
and
^Edelberg, "intentional Identity ...," 582.
228£delberg, "Intentional Identity 582.
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(65c) 3 ea3 (3(B believes [a shot Jonesl & A believes 1(3 shot Smith 1 & aR(3)
,
where "3 ca" is an evocative quantifier. In (64c), for example, "3 ea" picks out a
particular idea of A's-the idea of A's that the speaker of (64) wishes to evoke. In (65c),
on the other hand, "3 ea" picks out a particular idea of B’s-the idea of B’s that the speaker
of (65) wishes to evoke. Unlike, (65a) and (64a), (65c) need not follow from (64c). To
show this, Edelberg asks us to assume the following. A has two relevant ideas: [S1A , the
person who shot Smith, and [J]A, the person who shot Jones. For A the ideas represent
different people. B has three relevant ideas (S]B , [J]B , and [SJ]B , the person who shot
Smith and Jones. For B all three ideas represent the same person.229 Assume |S]A R
I
S
(
B and I J
1
A R |J]B . [SJ]B has no counterparts.
230 According to Edelberg, in (64) the
speaker uses "someone" to evoke (SjA . (64c) holds because there is a counterpart of [S]A
that B believes shot Jones, viz. [S1B . In (65), however, the speaker evokes |J] B or (SJ JB .
Either way (65) is false. If (J]B is evoked, then either there is a counterpart, viz. [J]A, but
A does not believe |J]A shot Smith or A does believe that [S)A shot Smith, but (S]A
is not
a counterpart of [J] B . If [SJ] B is evoked, then no
counterpart exists. Either way (65c) is
not satisfied and (65) is false. Finally, in (66) the speaker uses "someone" to evoke (S] B .
229Ede iberg, "Intentional Identity ...," 583. This is a very shortened version
of
Edelberg’s account. He also introduces a "part of relation between intentional objects.
For example [S]B and [Jfe are both part of [SJ]B . The part
of relation is generally doing
the same work as Castaneda's conflation relation.[See Chapter II] He stipulates
that
intentional objects related by the "part of relation have the same I-properties. Thus, B
believes [S]B,[J]B , and [SJ]B murdered both
Smith and Jones.[See 580-581]
230Edeiberg. "Intentional Identity ...," 580.
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(66) will be true because there is a counterpart of [S]B that A believes did not shoot Jones,
viz. [S]A .
Thus, by introducing evocative quantifiers, E2 avoids Edelberg’s 'new puzzle.’
At the same time, since E2 contains all the machinery of El and El adequately accounts
for intentional identity statements in such problematic contexts as Context V, E2 also
provides a satisfactory account in these contexts. Perhaps E2 is the desired solution to
Geach’s Puzzle. I shall not examine this possibility more closely here. Instead. I shall
conclude this chapter by reiterating the shortcomings that E2 inherits from its predecessors
such as El and TAE.
Conclusion
Even though Edelberg's attempts to show that solutions such as the pronoun of
laziness interpretation or the quantification interpretation or the transmission analysis are
inadequate fail, Edelberg is still correct to argue that an alternative account is required.
Edelberg's alternative account, E2, and perhaps TAA, avoid the problems, such as
Context V, and the 'new puzzle', that face the other proposed solutions. Still, there are,
as Edelberg acknowledges, many questions Edelberg has left unanswered. For example,
what are ideas/intentional objects? When are they counterparts? How do we tell which
object a speaker is trying to evoke? Notice that TAA has similar questions to answer.
Just as E2 has to explain what ideas/intentional objects are, TAA has to explain what
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conceptual objects are. Just as E2 has to explain the concepts 'based on by normal routes
of conversation' and 'rough similarity of explanatory role' in order to explain when
intentional objects are counterparts, TAA has to explain 'environmental sources with
appropriate character' and 'referential chains' in order to explain when two reference
markers are linked. Just as E2 has to explain how the context provides the recipient with
the information to pick out the object the speaker intends to evoke, TAA has to explain
how the context generates certain internal links rather than others. Until these questions
are answered it is hard to determine whether E2, or TAA, in fact offers an adequate
solution to Geach's Puzzle.
I conclude, therefore, that both Edelberg and Asher have provided intriguing and
promising proposals for analyzing intentional identity. Both theories, however, have key
concepts that need explaining. Instead of trying to explain these concepts and perhaps
advocating one of these theories, I shall in Chapter VI attempt to at least sketch out a
theory that can do all the work that Asher's and Edelberg's proposals, with a little help,
can do, but without as much theoretical machinery. If I succeed, then my theory should
be preferable on simplicity grounds at least.
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CHAPTER VI
THE PROBLEM OF INTENTIONAL IDENTITY II
In the previous chapters I focused on presenting and evaluating numerous
proposals put forward as solutions to Geach's Puzzle. In this chapter I shall provide a
brief recounting of our progress in those chapters and then, based on the results, I shall
provide my own attempt to solve Geach's Puzzle. My proposed solution will bring us full
circle, since I shall be defending a solution that even Geach considered and rejected in his
original presentation of the problem. I shall defend a modified version of the pronoun of
laziness solution.
This chapter has five major sections. In the first section I shall briefly restate
Geach's Puzzle and the various attempts to solve it that we considered in previous
chapters. I shall show that, given the analyses performed on the various solutions
considered in the previous chapters, the solutions proposed by Walter Edelberg and the
Discourse Representation theorists, especially Nicholas Asher, appear to offer the best
hope of successfully solving Geach's Puzzle. Unfortunately, Edelberg's and Asher's
solutions make explicit use of mysterious and unexplained entities, viz. ideas or notional
objects. In the second section, I shall examine in more detail the objections given to the
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pronoun of laziness solution. I shall argue that the objections fail to demonstrate the
inadequacy of the pronoun of laziness solution. In the third section. I shall present a
modified version of the pronoun of laziness solution that is able to successfully account
for the truth of ( 1) in problematic contexts such as Contexts II, IV and V. In the fourth
section I shall consider some possible objections to my pronoun of laziness solution. I
shall argue that the objections fail. In the final section, I shall conclude this chapter and
this dissertation by briefly comparing my pronoun of laziness solution with Edelberg's
and Asher's proposed solutions.
Preliminaries
Consider again the sentence we are trying to formalize, viz.
(1) Hob thinks a witch blighted Bob's mare and Nob wonders whether she killed
Cob's sow.
Like many propositional attitude sentences, (1) is ambiguous. On certain readings, (1) is
true only if there is some particular object Hob and Nob have in mind as the witch. On
other readings (1) can be true even if there is no particular object Hob and Nob have in
mind as the witch. In the cases in which Hob and Nob have a particular object in mind
there is no problem representing the fact that Hob and Nob are thinking about the same
object Depending upon the exact circumstances, either
(2a) 3x(Wx & Hob thinks [Bxm] & Nob wonders whether [Kxs])
or
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(3a) 3x(Hob thinks [Wx & Bxm] & Nob wonders whether [Kxs])
will do. But what of the latter cases-the cases in which Hob and Nob have no particular
object in mind?
Traditionally, the distinction between having a particular object in mind and not
having a particular object in mind has been represented via a scope distinction.231 Giving
the existential quantifier wide scope relative to "Hob thinks," as in (2a) and (3a), implies
that Hob and Nob have a particular object in mind. On the other hand, giving the
quantifier narrow scope relative to "Hob thinks" does not imply that a particular object is
had in mind. If we give the existential quantifier narrow scope relative to "Hob thinks"
the result is:
(12a) Hob thinks =3x|Wx & Bxm| & Nob wonders whether [KxsJ.
Unfortunately, (12a) is not well formed. The variable, "x", in "Kxs" is free and yet needs
to be bound to "3x" inside "Hob thinks." At the same time, since the existential quantifier
is within the scope of "Hob thinks," but "Nob wonders whether she killed Cob's sow" in
( 1) is not, the variable cannot be bound by "3x." Thus, giving "3x" narrow scope relative
231 For example, Geach discusses the distinction at length in "A Medieval
Discussion of Intentionally," in P. Geach, Logic Matters, (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1972), pp. 129-138. Geach also appeals to the scope distinction in both
"Intentional Identity," Journal ofPhilosophy 64 (1967): 629-630 and "The Perils of
Pauline," Review ofMetaphysics 23, reprinted in P. Geach, Logic Matters , (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1972), pp. 153-165. Seepages 160-161. See also W.V.
Quine, "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes," Journal ofPhilosophy 53 (1956): 177-
187, reprinted in The Philosophy ofLanguage, 2nd ed., A.P. Martinich, ed. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 353-359. See pages 353-354.
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10 "Hob thinks" fails to provide either a well formed formalization or a solution to Geach's
Puzzle.
Given the failure of (12a), we can see that the wide scope quantifier in (2a) and
(3a) performs two functions. First, it implies that Hob and Nob have a particular object in
mind and second, by binding the variables within the scope of both "Hob thinks" and
"Nob wonders whether." the quantifier captures the fact that Hob and Nob have
propositional attitudes about the same object. If we give the existential quantifier narrow
scope in order not to imply that Hob and Nob have a particular object in mind, we fail to
capture, via the quantifier binding variables in the scope of both "Hob thinks" and "Nob
wonders whether," that Hob and Nob have propositional attitudes about the same
thing.232 Thus, representing readings of (1) in cases in which Hob and Nob have no
particular object in mind and yet Hob and Nob have propositional attitudes about the same
thing poses a dilemma. If we give the existential quantifier w'ide scope, we capture the
fact that Hob and Nob have propositional attitudes about the same thing, but imply that
Hob and Nob have a particular object in mind when they may not. If we give the
existential quantifier narrow scope, we do not imply Hob and Nob have a particular object
in mind, but fail to capture the fact that Hob and Nob have propositional attitudes about
the same thing.
232fiy "about the same thing" I do not mean to imply that there is something, x,
that Hob's and Nob's attitudes are about. Instead, I mean that Hob and Nob can have
attitudes about the same (non-existent) witch in the same sense in which children share
beliefs about Santa Claus, mystery aficionados share attitudes about Sherlock Holmes,
and ancient Greeks share attitudes about Zeus.
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How might we avoid this dilemma? There are two general strategies one might
adopt. First, continue to give the existential quantifier wide scope in order to capture the
fact that Hob and Nob have propositional attitudes about the same thing, but then modify
the quantifier in some way such that there is no implication that Hob and Nob have a
particular object in mind as the witch. In other words, represent (1 ) along the lines of
(38a) 3 a(Hob thinks [Wa & Barn] & Nob wonders whether [Kas]),
where 3 a carries no implication that Hob and Nob have a particular physical object in
mind as the witch. In Chapters II and III we examined versions of (38a) in which a
ranges over non-physical objects such as aspects, guises, terms, or ideas.233
As we saw in Chapters II and III, proposals along the lines of (38a) successfully
avoid the dilemma above. (38a) captures the fact that Hob and Nob have propositional
attitudes about the same thing, but does not imply that Hob and Nob have a particular
object in mind as the witch. Unfortunately, we also saw that (38a) implies that Hob and
Nob share some aspect, guise, term, or idea of the witch, i.e. both think a proposition in
which the same aspect, guise, term, or idea occurs, and yet the intended reading of (1) can
be true even if Hob and Nob share no aspect, guise, term, or idea of the witch. Thus, in
233Again, (38a) is not to be read as "There is an idea Hob thinks is a witch
since Hob does not think that ideas are witches or that they blight anything. Instead, we
might say that us (38a) is true if there is an idea, a, such that in all of the worlds
consistent with what Hob thinks, a represents an object that is both a witch and blighted
Bob's mare, etc. The exact nature of the "represents" relation will, of course, depend
upon whatever ideas turn out to be. [See also Chapter II and Chapter IV.]
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cases in which Hob and Nob have no particular object in mind and share some aspect,
guise, term, or idea of the witch. (38a) is satisfactory, but in cases in which Hob and Nob
do not share some aspect, guise, term, or idea of the witch (38a) is not satisfactory.
Perhaps the problem facing (38a) can be overcome if, instead of having Hob and
Nob share ideas,234 we let Hob and Nob have separate ideas related in some way. Thus,
instead of analyzing the problematic reading of (1) as some version of (38a), analyze it as
some version of
(39a) 3a(Hob thinks [Wa & Bam] & 3(3(Nob wonders whether [K(3s] &
a R (3)).
(39a) does not imply that Hob and Nob have the same idea of the witch and or that Hob
and Nob have a particular object in mind as the witch. At the same time, the relationship
that holds between Hob's and Nob’s ideas is supposed to guarantee that Hob's and Nob's
propositional attitudes are about the same witch.
The primary tasks of those advocating some form of (39a) is to explain (i) the
nature of ideas and (ii) the nature of the relation, R. In Chapters IV and V we saw that
some explanations ofR were clearly inadequate. These explanations of R entailed that
(39a) was false in situations in w'hich Geach’s reading of ( 1 ) was true. In other words,
the ideas were not related in the specified way and yet Geach's reading of (1) was still
true. Other explanations, such as those offered by Walter Edelberg and Nicholas Asher,
say "ideas" rather than "aspects, guises, terms, or ideas" for two reasons.
First, for the sake of brevity. Second, the suggestion I am about to reiterate was
originally expressed in terms of ideas. At the same time, I see nothing preventing a
similar type of suggestion being adopted for aspects, guises, or terms.
181
did not sufficiently define the R relation and so were incomplete. They did not provide
enough information to tell whether or not (39a) adequately represents ( 1) in cases in which
Hob and Nob have no particular object in mind as the witch.
What, then, is the status of the first general strategy to avoid the dilemma posed by
formalizing ( 1 ) in such a way that there is no implication that Hob and Nob have a
particular object in mind? Incomplete, but with no obvious problems that would prohibit
successful completion. Given that (39a) is the first strategy's best proposal and that (39a)
makes explicit appeal to ideas and a special relation between them, viz. R. what is
required is an explanation ot ideas and an explanation of R such that when R holds
between two ideas had by separate people, these people have propositional attitudes about
the same thing. Without such an explanation the first strategy for formalizing the
problematic reading of (1) and so solving Geach's Puzzle remains incomplete.
What of the second general strategy to avoid the dilemma? The second general
strategy accepts that to avoid implying that Hob and Nob have a particular object in mind,
the formalization of the phrases "a witch" and "she" should be given narrow scope relative
to "Hob thinks" and "Nob wonders whether." What is required is some way of analyzing
these phrases such that Hob's and Nob's propositional attitudes turn out to be about the
same thing. Two examples of this general strategy were examined in Chapter I. The first,
the pronoun of laziness or anaphora interpretation, suggests analyzing Geach's reading of
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( 1) as either
( 13b) Hob thinks [3x(Wx & Bxm)] & Nob wonders whether [K(ix(Wx &
Bxm), s)J
or
(55a) Hob thinks [3x(Wx Sc Bxm)] & Nob wonders whether [K(ix(Wx &
Hob thinks [Bxm]), s)].
The second, the description analysis, suggests analyzing Geach's reading of (1) as
(21a) Hob thinks [B(tx(Wx & Fx), m)] & Nob wonders whether [K(ix(Wx &
Fx), s],
for some suitable interpretation of "F." (13b), (55a). and (21a) all give narrow scope
interpretations of ’a witch” and "she" in order to allow that Hob and Nob may have no
particular object in mind. All three depend upon some repetition of predicates in order to
represent the fact that Hob's and Nob's propositional attitudes are about the same witch.
For example, in (13b) "Bxm" gets repeated inside the scope of "Nob wonders whether"
and in (21a) "tx(Wx & Fx)" appears inside the scope of both "Hob thinks" and "Nob
wonders whether." Unfortunately, though (13b), (55a), and (21a) all allow that Hob and
Nob may have no particular object in mind and yet have propositional attitudes about the
same thing, both the description analysis and the pronoun of laziness interpretation
encounter other difficulties.
The description analysis' proposal, (21a), faces two problems. First, (21a). like
(38a), requires that Hob and Nob share some witch-description. But there are contexts in
which Hob and Nob share no witch-description and yet their propositional attitudes are
about the same thing. Second, (21a) gives the first conjunct of (1), viz.
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(^-5) Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare
an interpretation that differs from the interpretation of (25) when not a part of ( 1 ). viz.
(25a) Hob thinks [3x(Wx & Bxm)].
But if Hob really has no object in mind as the witch, then what someone expresses with
(25) alone is the same as what one expresses with the first conjunct of (1). Surely the
addition of the second conjunct of (1) does not thereby change what was expressed in the
first conjunct of ( 1 ). Thus, the first conjunct of ( 1 ) and (25) alone should be given the
same interpretation. Since (21a) does not give the first conjunct of (1) and (25) alone the
same interpretation, (21a), is, at the very least, inadequate compared to an analysis that
does give the first conjunct of (1) and (25) alone the same interpretation.
Neither pronoun of laziness proposal, (13b) nor (55a), suffers from the defects
facing the description analysis. Both analyze the first conjunct of (1) in the exact same
manner as (25) alone. Neither entail that Hob and Nob share some description of the
witch. Both proposals, however, appear to suffer from other defects. Though (13b) and
(55a) allow that Hob and Nob may have no particular object in mind and capture the fact
that Hob’s and Nob's propositional attitudes are about the same thing, they seem to get
Nob's propositional attitude wrong. Since there are contexts in which the intended
reading of ( 1) is true and yet Nob has never heard of Hob or Bob's mare. Nob is not
wondering about the witch who blighted Bob's mare or the witch Hob thinks blighted
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Bob's mare. Thus, the pronoun of laziness solution appears inadequate in contexts in
which Nob has never heard of Hob or Bob's mare and yet Geach's reading of ( 1 ) is often
true in such contexts.
Since, given narrow scope interpretations of "a witch" and "she," I can see no
other way of insuring that Hob's and Nob's attitudes are about the same object other than
by sufficient overlap of predicates within the scope of "Hob thinks" and "Nob wonders
whether," unless the difficulties facing either the description analysis or the pronoun of
laziness interpretation can be overcome, the second general strategy fails. Is there no
choice, then, but to adopt the first strategy and so accept ideas or conceptual objects or
whatever one wishes to call them? Is the best avenue for progress to be had by attempting
to explain the R relationship? If the difficulties facing the description analysis and the
pronoun of laziness interpretation cannot be overcome, then the answer to both questions
appears to be "yes." I see no hope for salvaging the description analysis. The prospects
for a pronoun of laziness type interpretation, on the other hand, are, I think, unclear. In
the next section I shall examine the objections to the pronoun of laziness solution in more
detail in order to determine whether or not we are forced to adopt the first strategy.
The Pronoun of Laziness Solution Reconsidered
If we want to translate the first conjunct of (1) in the same manner as we translate
(25)--Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare-alone and if we want to allow that Hob
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may have no particular object in mind by giving the translation of "a witch" narrow scope
relative to "Hob thinks," then we can easily represent (25) and the first conjunct of ( 1 ) as
(25a) Hob thinks [3x(Wx & Bxm)).
The second conjunct of ( 1), viz.
(67) Nob wonders whether she killed Cob's sow
is not so easily formalized. First, let us assume, for the sake of consistency, that in order
to allow that Nob may have no particular object in mind we need to give the translation of
"she" narrow scope relative to "Nob wonders whether." Second, if we also assume that
the "she" in (67) is a pronoun of laziness, then, depending upon context, "she" can stand
proxy for, at the very least, either of the following definite descriptions—"the witch who
blighted Bob's mare" or "the witch Hob thinks blighted Bob’s mare." The two definite
descriptions, which are to be given narrow scope relative to "Nob wonders whether,"
provide the following readings of (67):
(68) Nob wonders whether the witch who blighted Bob's mare killed Cob's sow,
and
(69) Nob wonders whether the witch who Hob thinks blighted Bob's killed
Cob's sow.
(68) and (69). however, are generally rejected as adequate analyses of (67), given (1).
The pronoun of laziness analysis is rejected because (67) can be true, given (1),
even if "Nob thought or said nothing about Bob's mare or about Hob"- 35 or even if "Nob
235peter Geach. "Intentional Identity," Journal ofPhilosophy 64 (1967): 630.
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does not have anything to do with Bob, |and so does] not have any ideas or beliefs about
the witch who blighted Bob's mare,”236 or even if "Nob knows nothing about Hob or
about Bob's mare."237 According to Tyler Burge, (68) "implies that Nob has heard of
Bob's mare and its troubles."238 For example, in contexts such as Contexts II, IV, or V.
Nob has never heard of Hob or Bob or Bob's mare. Since Geach's reading of (1), and so
(67), is true in these contexts, if the objections voiced above are cogent, (68) and (69) are
inadequate.
For ease of exposition, let us take (69) as the pronoun of laziness reading of (67).
Clearly, the objections just given apply to the following formalization of (69):
(69a) Nob wonders whether [K(tx(Wx & Hob thinks) Bxm]), s)].
(69a) is true, let us assume, if in each possible world consistent with the sum total of what
Nob is wondering there is an object that satisfies K(ixfWx & Hob thinks|Bxm]), s). In
Context IV, for example, in which Nob has no knowledge of Hob or Bob's mare, it is
consistent with all that Nob wonders that both Hob and Bob’s mare do not exist. Thus, in
236]^ Saarinen, "Intentional Identity Interpreted, " Linguistics and Philosophy 2
(1978): 156. [Saarinen's emphasis.]
237\yalter Edelberg. "A New Puzzle About Intentional Identity," Journal of
Philosophical Logic 15 (1986): 4.
238Tyier Burge, "Russell's Problem and Intentional Identity," in Agent,
Language, and the Structure ofthe World, ed. James E. Tomberlin, (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Co.), p. 95. See also page 96, on which Burge claims that in order
for (68) or (69) to be true, "Nob must know about the blighting of Bob's mare or about
Hob's belief."
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some of the worlds consistent with what Nob wonders, there is no Hob and no Bob's
mare and so no object that satisfies tx(Wx & Hob thinks[Bxm]) or, therefore, K(tx(Wx &
Hob thinks[Bxm]), s). Thus, given Context IV. (69a) is false.
Perhaps we should continue to treat "she" as a pronoun of laziness standing proxy
for "the witch Hob thinks blighted Bob's mare." but give the translation of the description
wide-scope such as in
(69b) 3x(x = tx(Wx & Hob thinks(BxmJ) & Nob wonders whether |Kxs]).
The problems cited by Burge, Edelberg. Geach, and Saarinen do not apply to (69b). Of
course, (69b) is not adequate in Context IV either, since (69b) implies that there are
witches and that Nob has a particular witch in mind, neither of which are true. If we make
the quantifier in (69b) a possibilist quantifier as in
(69c) 3 px(x = ix(Wx & Hob thinks|BxmJ) & Nob wonders whether |Kxs])
we have a formalization that may fail to imply that Nob has a particular object in mind.
But, since (69c) is true only if there is some possible object that, in the actual world, is a
witch Hob thinks blighted Bob's mare, (69c) still implies that there are witches. Thus,
neither (69b) nor (69c) will do in Context IV.239
239\Ve might try to make the quantifier in the formalization of (69) range over
ideas as in
(69d) 3a(a = ix(W'x & Hob thinks'[Bxmj) & Nob wonders whether [K'as]).
(69d) does not imply that Nob has a particular object in mind. Does (69d) imply that there
are witches? I think it depends upon how we understand ideas. For example, if ideas are
taken to be perspectival world lines such that the manifestation of the world line in any
particular possible world is the object the idea represents in that world, then (69d) has the
same shortcoming as (69c). It implies that there is some object in the actual world that is a
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Given the failure of (69a), (69b). and (69c) in Context IV one might argue that we
should give up the possibility of treating the "she" in (67) as a pronoun of laziness and so
give up interpreting (67) as (69) in Context IV. I am not immediately convinced. There
seem to be sentences like (69) in which use of a term seems appropriate and yet
formalizing the sentence containing this term is problematic. Let me provide examples.
Example 1 : A has beliefs about Sinter Klaas that A, speaking only Dutch, reports
speaking Dutch. S, who speaks both English and Dutch, reports A's beliefs to C, who
speaks only English, using
(70) A believes Santa Claus wears a red suit,
even though A would not use "Santa Claus" (or for that matter, "wears," "a," "red," and
"suit") when reporting his own beliefs. If S could not report one of A’s belief about
Sinter Klaas using (70), then presumably S could never accurately report any of A's
beliefs to C. But surely S can accurately report A's beliefs to C.
Example 2: A, having learnt only the Greek names of the classical gods, believes
that Zeus was quite the philanderer. S wants to report A's belief to C, but S knows that C
witch Hob thinks blighted Bob's mare. If on the other hand ideas are themselves taken to
be world bound objects of some sort, which may or may not represent any other entity in
the same world, then I do not think (69d) implies there are witches.
Is (69d), with ideas as world bound objects that themselves can be cross-identified
with ideas in other worlds, viable? For (69d) to be true there has to be a witch Hob think
blighted Bob's mare idea in the actual world that is cross-identified with an idea in each
of Nob's wonder worlds and the idea in each of Nob's wonder worlds has to represent an
object that killed Cob's sow. Now for this proposal to have a chance of being viable one
would need to further elaborate and explain the nature of these world bound ideas and
explain how ideas are cross-identified.
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knows of only a few of the classical Gods and that C knows of those few by their Roman
names. Thus. S reports A's belief to C using
(71
)
A thinks the father of Mercury is quite the philanderer,
even though A has never heard of Mercury. Surely, S’s use of (71) is acceptable-
otherwise S could not convey A's belief to C.
(69) in Context IV, (70) in Example 1, and (71) in Example 2 share the following
traits. First, "the witch Hob thinks blighted Bob’s mare", "Santa Claus," and "the father
of Mercury" are all terms that the agent having the attitude would not use to report that
very attitude. Second, all three terms are terms for a non-existent object. The
combination of these two features is what is causing the formalization problem in all three
instances. We cannot give the term in question narrow scope because the agent would not
use the term. We cannot give the term wide scope because that would imply that there
actually was something satisfying the term. Yet, despite these difficulties, (70) and (71)
still seem to be true in Examples 1 and 2. Perhaps then (69) is true in Context IV. despite
the failure of (69a), (69b), and (69c).
If we assume that (69) is true in Contexts II, IV, and V, then there seems to be no
obvious way of formalizing (69) in these contexts. Since the witch Hob thinks blighted
Bob's mare does not exist, the translation of "the witch Hob thinks blighted Bob's mare"
must, apparently, be given narrow scope relative to "Nob wonders whether." But, since
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Nob would not use the term "the witch who blighted Bob's mare," the translation must,
apparently, be given wide scope relative to "Nob wonders whether." However, if (69) is
true in Context IV, then there must be a reading of (69) other than the ones captured by
(69a), (69b), (69c) that somehow overcomes the apparently conflicting requirements of
giving the translation of "the witch Hob thinks blighted Bob’s mare," both wide and
narrow scope relative to "Nob wonders whether."
Given the conflicting requirements on the alleged third reading of (69), one might
deny that there is a third reading of (69) such that (69) is true in Contexts n, IV and V.
One might then argue that the only alternative is to allow quantification over ideas, in
which case we can formalize Geach's reading of (1) as (39a)-3oc(Hob thinks [Wa &
Baml & 3(3(Nob wonders whether [K(3s] & a R (3)). On the other hand, one might
continue to hold that, since we can accurately report the attitudes others have about non-
existent objects using terms the attitude holders would not use, there is a reading of (69)
such that (69) is true in Context IV. The problem is to provide adequate formalizations of
(69) in Context IV, (70) in Example 1 and (71) in Example 2. In the next section, I shall
attempt to provide formalizations of the problematic readings of these sentences.
C each's Puzzle Solved?
Recall from Chapter I that Geach's Puzzle is solved if logical structures can be
found for all readings of (1). The readings of (1) can be divided into two groups-those
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which imply Hob and Nob have a particular object in mind as the witch and those which
do not imply they have a particular object in mind.240 If Hob and Nob have a particular
object in mind as the witch, then
( 1 ) Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's and Nob wonders whether she killed
Cob's sow
is best interpreted as either
(2) As regards some witch, Hob thinks she blighted Bob’s mare and Nob
wonders whether she killed Cob's sow
or
(3) As regards somebody. Hob thinks she is a witch and has blighted Bob's mare
and Nob wonders whether she killed Cob's sow.
(2) and (3) are easily formalizable as
(2a) 3x(Wx & Hob thinks [Bxm] & Nob wonders whether [Kxs])
and
(3a) 3x(Hob thinks [Wx & Bxm] & Nob wonders whether [Kxs])
respectively.
If Hob and Nob do not have any object in mind as the witch, then formalizing (1)
is not straightforward. So far. the only viable option seems to be something like
(39a) 3a(Hob thinks [Wa & Bam] & 3 (3(Nob wonders whether [K(3s] &
aR (3)).
Unfortunately, the advocates of (39a) leave the entities over which 'a' and 'p' range
unexplained and leave the R relation unanalyzed. With these explanations and analyses
24(>rhere may also be cases in which Hob has a particular object in mind, but Nob
does not and vice versa. If the solution I am about to propose is successful, then these
cases can be accommodated by a suitable combination of the solutions for neither having
an object in mind with both having an object in mind.
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left undone, we cannot be sure that (39a) adequately formalizes Geach’s intended reading
of ( 1 ) in all cases in which Hob and Nob have no particular object in mind.
As an alternative to (39a), we began re-exploring the possibility that the "she” in
( 1 ) is a pronoun of laziness, i.e. (1) is to be interpreted as either
(13) Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob’s mare, and Nob wonders whether the
witch who blighted Bob's mare killed Cob’s sow
or
( 55 ) Hob thinks a witch blighted Bob's mare and Nob wonders whether the witch
Hob thinks blighted Bob's mare killed Cob's sow.
As long as Nob is aware of Hob’s belief about a witch and Bob’s mare and its troubles.
then (13) and (55) can easily be translated as
(13b)—Hob thinks [3x(Wx & Bxm)] & Nob wonders whether [K(tx(Wx &
Bxm), s)j
and
(55a)—Hob thinks |3x(Wx & Bxm)j & Nob wonders whether |K(ix(Wx & Hob
thinks [Bxm]), s)|
respectively. But how are we to translate (13) or (55) in cases in which Nob has no
knowledge of Hob or his belief about a witch or of Bob's mare or its troubles? Since
(13b) and (55a) apparently imply that Nob has some such awareness, they will be
inadequate in contexts such as II, IV, and V in which Nob has no such awareness. In
order for ( 1 3) and (55) to be adequate, we must find another way of formalizing them.
Let us continue to assume that (13) and (55) are in fact true in contexts such as
Context II, IV, and V and attempt to find an adequate formalization of these sentences.
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In Context II, both Hob and Nob read about the witch supposedly roaming Gotham in the
Gotham Tribune. In Context IV, Hob learns of the witch from X who heard about the
witch from Z and Nob learns of the witch from Y who also heard from Z. In Context V
Hob learns of the witch from X who surmises that a witch is about based on seeing a
boiling cauldron in a lonely glade in the woods. Nob learns of the witch from Y who also
supposes that a witch is about based on seeing the same cauldron in the same glade though
at a different time from X. In all three contexts, Nob is completely unaware of Hob.
Hob’s thoughts, Bob, and Bob's mare. Let us also suppose that in all three contexts there
is a reporter, R. who is aware of the facts of the matter and so utters (1) to report Hob's
and Nob's attitudes.241
We are supposing that in Contexts II, IV and V, R’s utterance of (1) be interpreted
along the lines of ( 1 3) or (55). Let us, for the moment, suppose that instead of uttering
( 1 ) R uttered (55). Since in Contexts II, IV, and V, Nob has no knowledge of Hob or
Bob's mare and since (55a) implies Nob has such knowledge, we cannot formalize (55)
241 Geach, when he originally proposed his Puzzle, had the reader suppose a
reporter was using (1) to describe an outbreak of witch mania in Gotham village.
["Intentional Identity," 627. | For the most part the fact that a reporter is reporting Hob's
and Nob's attitudes via ( 1) has been irrelevant. In order to provide a formalization in our
problematic contexts, however, I believe the fact is relevant. Recall that the two other
viable options for a solution. Edelberg's theory and Discourse Representation Theory,
explicitly involve the speaker of (1). For example, Edelberg introduces the evocative
existential quantifier. Such a quantifier, according to Edelberg, captures the fact that the
speaker, by using "a witch," may wish to evoke a particular thought object of Hob's in the
speaker's audience.[See Chapter V.) DR theory, as the name implies, is explicitly
concerned with representing discourses such as the reporter's particular use of (1) in our
problematic contexts. [See Chapter IV.]
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as (55a) in these contexts. If R uses (55) in Contexts II, IV. or V to report Hob's and
Nob's attitudes, R uses a term. viz. "the witch Hob thinks blighted Bob's mare" that Nob
would not use to report his own attitude. As we saw in the previous section there are
numerous instances in which a speaker reports the propositional attitudes of others using
terms, even terms the speaker takes to be non-referring, that the propositional attitude
holder would not use to report the attitude in question. Let us call terms that (i) the
speaker uses in reporting a particular attitude and (ii) the holder of the attitude would not
use to report that attitude, "speaker terms." Call terms that the holder of the attitude would
use "agent terms."242
In contexts such as Context I in which Nob hears about the witch from Hob we
can suppose that Nob, being a competent language user, could now generate the term "the
witch Hob thinks blighted Bob's mare" and take it to refer to some object or other. Nob.
in other words, is familiar with the term, "the witch Hob thinks blighted Bob's mare."
Since Nob is familiar with the term and thinks that the term may refer to whatever killed
Cob's sow, Nob would report Nob's wonderings using the term. Thus, in Context I,
regardless of who uses the term to report Nob's wonderings, the term, "the witch Hob
thinks blighted Bob's mare" is an agent term. In contexts such as Context II, IV, and V,
242x}ie distinction that I am currently restricting to terms presumably applies to all
words (especially in the case of reporting the attitudes of someone speaking a completely
different language.) Regardless, I shall continue to distinguish only terms as either
speaker- or agent- .
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however, in which Nob has never heard of Hob or of Bob's mare Nob is unfamiliar with
the term "the witch Hob thinks blighted Bob's mare" and so would not use it to report his
own wondenngs. Thus, in Contexts II. IV and V. if R uses the term to report Nob's
won derings, then the term is a speaker term.
In Context I, when R uses (55) to report Hob’s and Nob’s attitudes, R uses only
agent terms. In Contexts II, IV, and V, when R uses (55) to report Hob's and Nob's
attitudes R uses at least one speaker term. Since (55a)~Hob thinks [3x(Wx & Bxm)] &
Nob wonders whether [K(ix(Wx & Hob thinks [Bxm]), s)]~implies that Nob is aware of
Hob and Bob’s mare and so, presumably, is familiar with the term "the witch Hob thinks
blighted Bob s mare, (55a) adequately formalizes (55) in contexts in which "the witch
Hob thinks blighted Bob's mare" is an agent term. But what of contexts in which the term
is not an agent term? On the assumption that (55) is true in Contexts II, IV, and V, how
are we to understand and formalize (55)?
Before answering these questions, let us re-examine Example 2 from the previous
section. According to Example 2, A, having learnt of the Greek gods comes to believe
that Zeus is quite the philanderer. Thus,
(72) A thinks Zeus is quite the philanderer
is true. A tells S that he thinks Zeus is quite the philanderer. S takes A's statement to
express one of A’s beliefs. If S were to report A's attitude using (72), then S would
report A's attitude using only agent terms-terms that A would use to report A's attitude
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concerning Zeus affairs. Instead of using (72), however, S reports A's attitude to C.
who knows only of certain Roman gods, using (71)-A thinks that the father of Mercury
is quite the philanderer. A, who does not know the Roman names, would not report A's
attitude using (71)-"the father of Mercury” is, in this case, a speaker term.
Regardless of the fact that A would not necessarily assent to (71) or report A's
attitude using (71), (71) still seems an accurate report of A's attitude. In fact, S has no
other way, meaningful to C at least, by which S can report A's attitude to C.243 Why
does (71 ) appear to be true in Example 2? Because Zeus is the father of Mercury in the
sense that, given the actual myths and legends out of which "Zeus" and "the father of
Mercury arose, if the terms were to refer, then the terms would refer to the same object.
Thus, in a world in which the actual myths were true, "Zeus" and "the father of Mercury"
refer to the same thing and "Zeus is quite the philanderer" and "the father of Mercury is
quite the philanderer" pick out the same state of affairs. In this sense, (71) and (72) report
the same belief and so (71 ) will also be true in Example 2.
Even though we have reasons to think (71) is true, we still have the problem of
formalizing (71). Let us begin with (72). (72) contains only agent terms and so is
straightforwardly formalizable as
243()ne might argue that S could report as follows, "A thinks that Zeus is quite the
philanderer, where 'Zeus' is the Greek name for the father of Mercury." But, C upon
hearing S's report seems quite justified in confirming S's report by asking, "So, A thinks
the father of Mercury is quite the philanderer?" The most intuitive and natural reply is
"Yes," in which case we still have to formalize (71) in such a way that the formalization is
true in Example 2.
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(72a) A thinks [Pz].
(72a) can also be straightforwardly evaluated according to one's preferred analysis of the
attitudes. For example, on one analysis (72a) is true if and only if, in every world
compatible with everything A thinks, z is in the extension of P. (7 1 ), on the other hand,
contains a speaker term, and so cannot be formalized as
(71a) A thinks [Pix(Fxm)|
since (71a) implies A has knowledge of Mercury and this is not necessarily the case. But
(71) is true because (71), in some suitable way. reports the same attitude as (72). In other
words, (71 )'s truth is being established indirectly by appeal to the truth of (72). What we
need, then, is some way of indicating, in the formalization of (71), that an indirect
evaluation is required. I propose that when formalizing speaker terms inside the scope of
some attitude verb we indicate the term is a speaker term, and so requires indirect
evaluation, by appending a subscript "s" after the standard formalization of the term.
Thus, (71) gets formalized as:
(71b) A thinks |Pix(Fxm)J
.
Like (71), (71b) will be true as long as (71b) reports the same attitude as some attitude
report containing only agent terms, such as (72a). I shall now provide a first rendition of
how we are to evaluate sentences such as (71b).
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Let A believes [PtJ be the general form ot an attitude report containing a speaker
term with narrow syntactic scope. Let Con be the context in which "A believes [PtJ" is
uttered. Let an agent term be any term that A would use to report any of A's attitudes.
TCI : A believes [PtJ" is true iff there is some agent term ’a' such that (i) in the
closest possible world in which (a) Con holds, (b) both 'f and 'a' refer and (c) V
and ’a' have the same meaning as at the actual world, t = a and (ii) "A believes
I
Pa is true.
Thus, "A believes [PtJ" is true as long as "A believes [PtJ" expresses the same state of
affairs as an attitude report containing no speaker terms such as "A believes [Pa]." "A
believes [PI*]" expresses the same state of affairs as "A believes [Pa[" as long as in the
closest possible world in which Con holds and 't* and ’a’ both have the same meaning as
the actual world and refer, t = a, i.e. Y and ’a’ refer to one and the same object. In other
words, to say that if two terms were to refer, they would co-refer is to say that, in the
closest possible world in which certain facts about the terms are kept constant and both
terms refer, they refer to the same thing.244
In Example 2, "the father of Mercury" is used as a speaker term when S uses (71).
The context, Con, in which S utters (71) just are the details of Example 2, viz. that A
knows ot the classical gods under their Greek names; that C knows of some of the
classical gods, but only under their Roman names; and that S knows these facts and that
the Roman myths arise from the Greek myths. Thus, according to the truth conditions
244Since no world is closer to the actual world than the actual world itself, if both
terms refer in the actual world, then that is the world in which we must check whether or
not the terms co-refer. Thus, the mechanism of evaluation given above works regardless
of whether the speaker and agent terms refer in the actual world or not.
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from the previous paragraph, (71b)~A thinks [Pix(Fxm)
s
]-is true as long as there is
some agent term, 'a', such that (i) in the closest possible world, given Con. in which
both 'a' and "ix(Fxm)" refer, a = ix(Fxm) and (ii) "A believes [Pa]" is true. An agent
term of A s is just any term that A would use in reporting any of his attitudes. "Zeus" is
such a term since A would use it to report one of his attitudes. In fact, in Example 2. A
uses Zeus to express one of his beliefs to S, viz. that Zeus is quite the philanderer.
Formalize Zeus" as "z" and let "a" be "z." What is the closest possible world, given
Con, in which both "z" and "tx(Fxm)" refer? Given Con, A has learnt of Zeus by reading
the Greek myths and C has learnt of the Roman gods by reading some of the Roman
myths. Also the Roman myths are descendents of the Greek myths. Thus, the closest
world, given Con. in which "z" and "tx(Fxm)" both refer is a world just like the one in
which A learns of Zeus and C of the father of Mercury by reading the Greek and Roman
legends except that the legends of A's and C's world concerning the classical gods are true
descriptions of the exploits of the classical gods. In the closest possible world A and C. do
not read legends, but rather historical accounts of the classical gods.
If A and C are reading true exploits of the classical gods, then since the Roman
legends are re-tellings of the Greek ones, if Zeus exists, then since Zeus is the father of
Hermes and Hermes just is Mercury, Zeus is the father of Mercury. In the closest world
in which "z" and "tx(Fxm)" both refer, Zeus is the father of Mercury, i.e. z = tx(Fxm).
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Clause ( 1 ) is satisfied. At the same time, since A reports one of his beliefs to S using
Zeus is quite the philanderer,” "A believes Zeus is quite the philanderer" is true and so
clause ( 11 ) is satisfied. Thus, given Example 2, S’s utterance of (71) is true.
What of R's use of (55) in Contexts II, IV, and V? Consider Context II first.
Nob has read of a witch terrorizing Gotham and wonders whether the witch he read about
in the Tribune killed Cob’s sow. Hob has also read the Tribune and thinks that whoever
is the witch he (Hob) read about in the Tribune blighted Bob's mare. Neither Hob nor
Nob has any particular entity in mind as the witch and neither Hob nor Nob knows of the
other. R knows the facts and so knows that
(73) Hob thinks the witch he (Hob) read about in the Tribune blighted Bob's
mare,
(25) Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare,
and
(74) Nob wonders whether the witch he (Nob) read about in the Tribune killed
Cob’s sow.
Now suppose, given R’s knowledge of the facts, R reports Hob's and Nob's attitudes
using:
(55) Hob thinks a witch blighted Bob's mare and Nob wonders whether the witch
Hob thinks blighted Bob's mare killed Cob's sow.
The first conjunct of (55) is just (25) and so is true. What of the second conjunct, viz.
(69) Nob wonders whether the witch Hob thinks blighted Bob's mare killed
Cob's sow?
R does not think that there are witches, but does think that if there were a witch Hob read
about in the Tribune and a witch Hob thinks blighted Bob's mare and a witch Nob read
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about in the Tribune
,
they would all be the same witch. Why? Because keeping constant
the fact that Hob and Nob learn of the witch by reading the Gotham Tribune
,
the closest
possible world in which "the witch Hob thinks blighted Bob's mare" refers is one in
which there actually is a witch Hob read about in the Tribune. In other words, the
Tribune is reporting about an actual entity. But if the Tribune is reporting about an
actual entity, then the witch Nob read about in the Tribune is the same entity. Thus, in
the closest possible world in which "the witch Hob thinks blighted Bob’s mare" and "the
witch Nob read about in the Tribune" both refer, the witch Hob thinks blighted Bob’s
mare is the witch Nob read about in the Tribune. Thus, (69) expresses the same state of
affairs as (74), which is true. Thus, (69) is true. Since (25) and (69) are true, so is (55).
Formally we have, as facts:
(25a) Hob thinks [3x(Wx & Bxm)],
and
(74a) Nob wonders whether |K(ix(Wx & Rnxt), s)].
R reports Hob’s and Nob’s attitudes using (55). Since (55) contains the speaker term,
"the witch Hob thinks blighted Bob’s mare," (55) gets formalized as:
(55b) Hob thinks [3x(Wx & Bxm)) & Nob wonders whether [K(tx(Wx & Hob
thinks [Bxm))
s ,
s)]
The first conjunct of (55b) is just (25a) and so is true. The second conjunct of (55b) is
(69e) Nob wonders whether [K(ix(Wx & Hob thinks[Bxm])
s
,
s)].
If (69e) is true, then so is (55b). (69e) is true as long as there is some agent term, "a"
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such that given Context II, (i) in the closest possible world in which "a" and "ix(Wx &
Hob thinks[Bxm])" refer, a = tx(Wx & Hob thinks[Bxml) and (ii) "Nob wonders
whether |Kas]" is true. Given Context II, a term that Nob would use if Nob were to
report his own wondering is, "the witch I (Nob ) read about in the Tribune" which is
formalized as "ix(Wx & Rnxt)." Let "a" be "ix(Wx & Rnxt)." Given Context II, the
closest possible world in which "ix(Wx & Rnxt)" and "tx(Wx & Hob thinks[Bxm])" both
refer is one in which the Tribune is reporting about an actual witch and so the witch Hob
thinks blighted Bob's mare is the witch Nob read about in the Tribune. ix(Wx & Rnxt) =
ix(Wx & Hob thinksf Bxm]) and so clause (i) is satisfied. Since, according to Context II.
(74a) holds, clause (ii) is satisfied. Thus, (69e), and so (55b), is true in Context II.
Now consider Context IV. In Context IV Hob hears about the witch from X and
Nob hears about the witch from Y. Both X and Y hear about the witch from Z. Given the
context, R knows
(75) Nob wonders whether the witch he (Nob) heard about from Y killed Cob’s
sow.
R also knows that
(76) Hob thinks the witch he (Hob) heard about from X blighted Bob's mare.
and so
(25) Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare.
Again, R does not think that there are witches, but does think that if there were a witch
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Hob thinks blighted Bob’s mare it would be the witch Hob heard about from X and the
witch Nob heard about from Y. In the closest possible world in which Context IV holds
and "the witch Hob thinks blighted Bob's mare” and "the witch Nob heard about from Y"
both refer, if there is a witch Hob thinks blighted Bob’s mare, then it is the witch Hob
heard about from X. If there is a witch Hob heard about from X, then, given Context IV.
it is the witch X heard about from Z. Now Z did not just tell X about the witch, but Y as
well. Thus, the witch Y heard about from Z is the witch X heard about from Z. Since Y
told Nob about the witch, the witch Nob heard about from Y is also the witch Y heard
about from Z and the witch X heard about from Z and the witch Hob heard about from X
and finally the witch Hob thinks blighted Bob’s mare. Thus, given that (i) in the closest
possible world in which Context IV holds and "the witch Hob thinks blighted Bob’s
mare" and "the witch Nob heard about from Y" both refer, the witch Hob thinks blighted
Bob’s mare is the witch Nob heard about from Y and (ii) (75) is true, (69)-Nob wonders
whether the witch Hob thinks blighted Bob’s mare killed Cob’s sow-is true in Context
IV. Since both (25) and (69) are true, (55) and (55b) are true in Context IV.
Finally, consider Context V. Context V is just like Context IV except that X and Y
infer the existence of a single witch by encountering a boiling cauldron in a secluded glen
in the woods near Gotham. Thus, once again, R knows (75), (76), and (25) to be true.
On the basis of (75), (76), (25), and the facts of Context V, R reports Hob’s and Nob’s
attitudes using (55). The first conjunct of (55) is (25) which is true. The second conjunct
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of (55) is (69). (69) involves the use of a term that Nob would not use to report his own
wondenngs, viz. "the witch Hob thinks blighted Bob's mare." Thus, (69) is true as long
as there is some agent term, "a", a term Nob would use to report his wonderings, such
that (i) in the closest possible world in which Context V is true and "a" and "the witch
Hob thinks blighted Bob's mare" both refer, a = the witch Hob thinks blighted Bob's
mare and (ii) "Nob wonders whether a killed Cob’s sow" is true. If we keep the facts of
Context V constant except that there is actually a witch whose boiling cauldron both X and
Y stumble across, then the closest possible world in which "the witch Hob thinks blighted
Bob s mare and "the witch Nob heard about from Y" both refer is one in which they refer
to the same thing. They refer to the same thing because the witch Hob thinks blighted
Bob's mare just is whoever is the witch X told Hob about and the witch X told Hob about
is the witch X inferred to exist from seeing her boiling cauldron. But this witch is the
same witch Y infers to exist from seeing the same boiling cauldron, which is the same
witch Y tell Nob about and so the same witch Nob wonders about. Since, "Nob wonders
whether the witch he heard about from Y killed Cob’s sow" is true, (69) is true in Context
V. Since both (25) and (69) are true in Context V, (55) and (55b) are true in Context V.
In Contexts II, IV, and V. Nob is not familiar with the term, "the witch Hob
thinks blighted Bob’s mare." Thus, if R uses (55) to report Hob's and Nob's attitudes in
these contexts, "the witch Hob thinks blighted Bob's mare." is a speaker term. Since the
term is a speaker term, in Contexts II, IV, and V, (55) is formalized, not as (55a), but as
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(55b). (55b), unlike (55a), does not imply that Nob knows of Hob or of Bob or of Bob's
mare and its troubles. (55b) is true as long as there is some term that Nob would use to
report his own wondenngs such that if, given the context. Nob's term and "the witch Hob
thinks blighted Bob's mare were to refer they would refer to the same thing. In all three
contexts there is such a term and so (55b) is true.
So far I have been assuming that R uses (55) in our problematic contexts. I have
shown how we can formalize a use of (55) that is true in these contexts. But our
problematic sentence is not (55), but rather (1). What happens if R uses (1) in Contexts
II, IV and V? If R uses (1), then (1) is to be interpreted as (55) where (55) is formalized
as (55b)-Hob thinks [3x(Wx & Bxm)] & Nob wonders whether [K(ix(Wx & Hob thinks
[Bxm])
s
,
s)]. In other words, the "she" in (1) is a pronoun of laziness standing proxy for
the witch Hob thinks blighted Bob's mare" used as a speaker term. Thus, in all contexts
in which neither Hob nor Nob have a particular object in mind and so the formalizations of
a witch and she have narrow scope, a pronoun of laziness solution is adequate. Either
the pronoun "she" stands proxy for an agent term, in which case we translate (55) as (55a)
or "she" stands for a speaker term, in which case we translate (55) as (55b).
Objections and Replies
Let us assume that in Contexts II, IV and V, (1) is to be given a pronoun of
laziness interpretation, where the pronoun "she" is standing proxy for a speaker term. For
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example, in Contexts II, IV, and V, "she" might stand proxy for the speaker term, "the
witch Hob thinks blighted Bob's mare," in which case ( 1) is to be interpreted as (55) and
formalized as (55b). Given our current procedure for evaluating sentences containing
speaker terms, TCI, (55b) is true in Contexts II, IV, and V. Unfortunately, even though
TCI generates the desired evaluation of (55b) in Contexts II, IV. and V, as a general
procedure for evaluating sentences containing speaker terms, TCI faces several
objections. I shall consider these objections next.
Objection 1 : TCI fails to provide sufficient conditions for the truth of "A believes
[PtJ" as the following counterexamples show.
Counterexample 1: Since an agent. A, can be familiar with a term, but mistakenly
think that the term does not refer to the object to which it in fact refers, the current theory
allows that in certain circumstances both
(77) A thinks Karl Watson murdered Smith
and
(78) A thinks Karl Watson did not murder Smith
can be true simultaneously. But surely one is false. Assume A thinks John Holmes,
whoever that is, murdered Smith. S knows A's belief about whoever is John Holmes and
S knows that whoever is John Holmes is also Karl Watson. Now suppose A mistakenly
thinks John Holmes and Karl Watson are in fact two different people, but correctly thinks
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only one person killed Smith. Thus, A also thinks Karl Watson, whoever that is, did no,
murder Smith. But given what S knows, S can truthfully report A's first belief to C by
using (77). Now assume A informs another person. D. of A's second belief and D.
having no idea who Karl Watson is, dutifully reports A's belief to C using (78). Since C
takes A to be a rational person. C naturally presumes that either D or S must be wrong.
According to the current theory, however, C's natural presumption is wrong—both (77)
and (78) are in fact true.
Counterexample 2: Assume that the tallest man is in fact the oldest man. A
believes that his father is over 100. At the same time, A thinks the tallest man is younger
than 100, but that the oldest man is over 100. S, however, mistakenly believes that A's
father is the tallest man. Thus, S might report A’s belief using
(79) A thinks the tallest man is over 100.
Given A’s opinion concerning the tallest man. (79) is false. But there is an agent term,
viz. "the oldest man" such that in the closest possible world in which "the oldest man" and
"the tallest man" co-refer (the actual world) the tallest man is the oldest man and A thinks
the oldest man is over 100 is true. Thus, TCI fails to provide sufficient conditions for the
truth of sentences containing speaker terms.
Reply: Given Counterexample 1. there is a strong inclination to think that either
(77) or (78), most likely (77), must be false. This inclination is to be resisted. (77) and
(78) are not contradictory, but rather, as Quine calls them 'near contraries.' Quine points
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out that any theory that countenances quantification into propositional attitude contexts
must "pay the price of accepting near contraries."245 If Quine is right, then, since I accept
quantification into propositional attitude contexts, I must pay the price of accepting near
contraries. Thus, the fact that I am also committed to accepting near contraries even in
cases in which there is no quantification into a propositional attitude context is harmless.
Since (77) and (78) are not contradictory they can both be true.
Still, one might want an explanation of C's very natural inclination to think that
either S or D must be wrong. I can think of two reasons why C might be strongly
inclined to think either S or D must be wrong. First, there is the inclination to think that
(80) It is not the case that A thinks Karl Watson murdered Smith
follows from (78).246 Since (80) and (77) appear contradictory, if (80) follows from
(78), then perhaps C is correct to think that (78) and (77) cannot be true simultaneously.
Second, there is an inclination to think that if both (78) and (77) are true, then
(81) A thinks Karl Watson murdered Smith and Karl Watson did not murder
Smith.
245W.V. Quine, "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes," in The Philosophy of
Language, 2nd ed., A.P. Martinich, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p.
356.
24fyaakko Hintikka, in Knowledge and Belief, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1962), 15, notes that "a does not believe that p" is often used as if it were equivalent to "a
believes that not p." Perhaps Hintikka is correct that English often does treat the two as
equivalent, but I wish to claim something weaker, viz. that at the very least in English we
are strongly inclined to think that if "a believes that not p" is true, then so must be "a does
not believe that p."
209
is true. But (81) attributes to A gross irrationality and C may be quite sure that A is not
irrational. Thus, C has two reasons to think (77) and (78). cannot be true simultaneously.
Let us examine each of the reasons in turn.
According to the first reason there is a strong inclination to infer (80) from (78)
and (77) and (80) appear to be contradictory. There are two choices for resisting this
inclination—either reject that (80) follows from (78) or reject that (80) and (77) are
contradictory. I shall reject the latter. Given Counterexample 1, the logical structures of
(77) and (80) are
(77a) A thinks [Mk
s
s]
and
(80a) ~(A thinks [Mks J).
(77a) is true as long as there is some agent term (in this case "John Holmes" such that (i)
in the closest possible world in which both terms refer (in this case the actual world). Karl
Watson is John Holmes and (ii) "A thinks [Mjs]" is true. Thus, in order for (77a) and
(80a) to be consistent all that is required is that it be possible that "A thinks |Mjs]" and
"~(A thinks [Mks])" be true simultaneously. Given that A also thinks that Karl Watson is
not John Holmes the two sentences can be true simultaneously. Thus, given the context
of Counterexample 1
, (77) and (80) are not contradictory.247
247()ne might think that the truth of (72) and (79) combined with the fact that A
thinks Karl Watson is not John Holmes rules out the possibility of analyzing A's beliefs in
terms of the set of possible worlds consistent with everything that A believes, since there
are no worlds in which (72), (79), and "A thinks Karl Watson is not John Holmes" are all
true. One would be mistaken. The three sentences are incompatible, only if both "Karl
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According to the second reason there is a strong inclination to infer (81)—A thinks
Karl Watson murdered Smith and Karl Watson did not murder Smith-from (77) and (78).
Why? C might assume that in order for propositional attitude reports such as (77) and
(78) to be accurate the term "Karl Watson" must not only identify the object of A’s
attitudes, but also indicate how A would pick out the object of A's attitudes.-48 If C's
assumption is accurate, then if both (77) and (78) are true, then so is (81). But since (81)
attributes gross irrationality to A and A is not irrational, at least one of (77) or (78) must
be false.
We have already seen the consequences of adopting C's assumption. If accurate
belief reports express not only what the believer believes, but also the manner in which he
or she believes it, then we must reject all English reports of the beliefs of speakers of other
languages. But surely this something that we are unwilling to do. When S and D use a
particular term to report A's beliefs, in most cases C may presuppose that A would use
the term in reporting A’s own beliefs, but S and D do not. by using (77) and (78),
necessarily report or assert that A would use the term. In other words (77) and (78) may
Watson" and "John Holmes" are rigid designators. Drop the assumption that both terms
are rigid designators in this context and there will be worlds in which all three sentences
are true simultaneously.
248()thers who have suggested that terms may be doing double duty include Tyler
Burge, "Belief De Re," Journal ofPhilosophy 1
A
(1977): 338-62; Hector-Neri
Castaneda, "Indicators and Quasi-Indicators," American Philosophical Quarterly 4
(1967): 85-100; and Brian Loar, "Reference and Propositional Attitudes," Philosophical
Review SO (1972): 43-62.
conversationally imply that A would use the term "Karl Watson" to report A's beliefs and
so conversationally imply that A has inconsistent beliefs. Regardless, (77) and (78) need
not actually imply that A has inconsistent beliefs. If S's report using (77) does
conversationally imply that A would use the term "Karl Watson," then S's report may be
misleading, but is still true.249 Thus, C would be mistaken to assume that accurate
attitude reports involve only terms which the agent would use to report the attitude is too
strong. C may be able to assume that attitude reports generally conversationally imply that
the agent would report that attitude in the same way, but such conversational implicature
does not support the falsity of either (77) or (78).
According to Counterexample 2, (79)-A thinks the tallest man is over 100 is false
and yet, according to TCI, (79) ought to be true. Unfortunately, (79) is not clearly false
in Counterexample 2. Ignore A's beliefs about his father. A does believe that the oldest
man is over 100 and the oldest man is the tallest man. Thus, given TCI. S would be quite
justified in reporting A's belief that the oldest man is over 100 by using (79). If one
argues that (79) is false since A clearly believes that the tallest man is not over 100. then
249sjnce conversational implicatures can generally be cancelled, either explicitly
or by context, if propositional attitude reports generally conversationally imply that that
agent would report the attitude in the same way, then we should expect that the
conversational implicature of sentences such as (77) should be capable of being cancelled.
S could have presumably cancelled the conversational implicature by uttering (77)-A
thinks Karl Watson murdered Smith-and then adding something like "though A would
not use 'Karl Watson' to describe the murderer of Smith" or "though A is confused about
who is Karl Watson."
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we have a version of Counterexample 1 which I just showed to be inadequate. On the
other hand, even though (79) may in fact be true in Counterexample 2, the counterexample
still raises an interesting point about sentences containing speaker terms. S used (79) to
report that A thinks his father is over 100 and not that A thinks the oldest man is over 100.
In other words, S may be truthfully reporting one of A's beliefs, but not the belief that S
wanted to report. Thus, when dealing with sentences containing speaker terms, not only
are we interested in the truth of the speaker's report, but it's accuracy as well.
In addition to truth conditions for sentences containing speaker terms, we may also
need accuracy conditions. Let "A believes [Q]" be the general form of the report S wishes
to report. Let "A believes [Pt
s
]" be the general form of S's report.
AC1: "A believes [PtJ" is an accurate report of "A believes [Q]" iff there is some
agent term A would use to report A believes [Q] that makes "A believes |PtJ" true.
Since, in Counterexample 2, A would not use "the oldest man" to report his own belief
that his father is over 100, there is no satisfactory agent term tha makes (79) true. Thus,
(79) is not an accurate report of A's belief that his father is over 100.
Neither Counterexample 1 nor 2 demonstrate that TCI fails to provide sufficient
conditions for the truth of sentences containing speaker terms. Counterexample 2 does
demonstrate that we want S's report of A's attitudes to be both accurate and truthful.
Other than Counterexample 2, all of S's reports, including (1) interpreted as (55), have
been both true and accurate. Thus, even if sentences containing speaker terms need to be
checked for both truth and accuracy, there is not yet any indication that TCI is inadequate.
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Objection 2: TC 1 fails to provide necessary conditions for the truth of "A believes
fPtJ” as the following counterexamples show.
Counterexample 3: From an upper window, A. the dog, sees George, A's owner,
coming up the walk toward the front door. A runs downstairs and stands waiting by the
front door with tail wagging. S, George's houseguest sees all of this, and reports to
George's spouse that A believes George is at the front door using
(82) A believes George is at the front door.
Since A is a dog, A would not use "George" to report any of A's beliefs and so "George"
is a speaker term. But, since A is a dog, there is no agent term at all that, according to
TCI will make (82) true.
Counterexample 4:250 A sees a bunch of cows in a field and forms the belief that
all the cows in the field are smelly. At the same time, A has no term that picks out any
particular cow or particular group of cows in the field. Suppose, that S knows that one of
the cows in the field is Bessy. S knows about A's beliefs and so reports
(83) A believes Bessy is smelly.
(83) reports one of A's beliefs and yet according to TCI, (83) is false since there is no
agent term at all that will make (83) true.
Reply: In order for (82) in Counterexample 3 to be true, non-linguistic animals
must have propositional attitudes. Whether or not species other than human beings in fact
^^Counterexamples 2, 3, and 4 are based on examples proposed by Phillip
Bricker as possible difficulties for TC 1
.
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have propositional attitudes is a matter of some controversy. With no conclusive answer
to the question of whether or not non-linguistic animals have propositional attitudes, we
cannot determine whether or not Counterexample 3 is telling against TCI. Thus, one
could commit oneself to the claim that non-linguistic animals do not have propositional
attitudes and so argue that, strictly speaking, (82) is false, as TCI predicts. On the other
hand, even if one believes that (publicly) non-linguistic animals in fact have propositional
attitudes, one might argue that they do so in virtue of some thought-language, the terms of
which could serve to make (82) true according to TCI. Thus, without a resolution of the
highly controversial and complex issues of the status of non-linguistic animal attitudes and
thought-languages, Counterexample 3 need not be accepted.
Counterexample 4, on the other hand, is more problematic. At the very least
Counterexample 4 sidesteps the problem of determining the status of non-linguistic animal
attitudes. One might still argue that there are language of thought terms representing each
of the cows in the field to A and so TCI correctly predicts that (83) is true. Of course,
without a much more detailed discussion of the status of thought-languages we have no
way of determining whether the language of thought proposal is plausible. At the same
time, since I am skeptical about the existence of thought-languages I would prefer to make
do without them, if possible. Thus, I would prefer some other reason to reject
Counterexample 4.
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If (83) is true because it is being interpreted as
(84) Of Bessy, A believes she is smelly,
then Counterexample 4 does not apply to TCI, since the speaker term. "Bessy" in (84)
has wide syntactic scope relative to "A believes." If, on the other hand, "Bessy" is being
given narrow syntactic scope, then one can argue that (83) is false. At the very least, the
fact that A believes all the cows in the field are smelly is not sufficient to guarantee the
truth of (83). Consider the following example: A glances into a crowded lecture hall and
forms the opinion that everyone in the room is male. At the same time, A believes that
whoever is Sally Conner is female. Now assume Sally Conner is in fact in the lecture
hall. Should we think, on that basis, that A believes Sally Conner is male? No. Thus,
just because A thinks all the cows in the field are smelly does not mean that A thinks that
Bessy is smelly. At the same time, since Counterexample 4 stipulates that A has no way
of referring to individual cows, it is not the case that A believes Bessy is smelly for some
other reason. Thus, there is no reason to think (83) is true in Counterexample 4. But if
(83) is false in Counterexample 4, then Counterexample 4 fails to demonstrate that TCI is
inadequate.
Objection 3: The proposed theory is incomplete. What exactly is the context of
utterance or Con? Clearly Con cannot be the entire state of the world prior to the
utterance. Consider S's utterance of (72)--A thinks Zeus is quite the philanderer. Since
Zeus does not exist in the actual world, there is no world in which Con holds (Zeus does
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not exist) and "Zeus" refers to the classical Greek god. (Zeus exists). At the same time.
Con must include some facts about the actual world. For example. "Zeus” and "the father
of Mercury" are presumably meant to refer to a classical god and not some ancient Greek
dog. or to two separate storytellers who made up remarkably similar stories and used their
own names in those stories. Thus, Con must include a set of facts somewhere in
between including merely the minimal requirement that "Zeus” and "the father of Mercury"
refer to classical gods and including the entire state of the world prior to the utterance. But
in between including the entire state of the world prior to the utterance and including
minimal facts about "Zeus" and "the father of Mercury" is a vast ranges of possibilities.
So the question remains, what exactly is the context of utterance?
Reply: Let "A believes [PtJ" be a report of A's attitude by some speaker S. Let
"a" be a term that A would use if A were to report A’s own attitude. Let C be S's
audience for "A believes [PtJ." We are interested in evaluating the counterfactual "if 'a'
and 't' were to refer they would co-refer" given a set of facts true in the actual world,
namely Con. Con determines which possible worlds are relevant to the evaluation of the
counterfactual and which are not. What sorts of facts are in Con? Primarily, facts
concerning S's evidence that "A believes [PtJ" reports the same attitude as "A believes
[Pa]" What sorts of facts are these? Facts about how A came to have the belief that Pa
and facts about the terms, "a" and "t," in relation to A's belief. Let me provide some
examples to illustrate what kinds of facts may be in Con.
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Given Example 2, we are interested in determining whether or not "Zeus" and "the
father of Mercury" counterfactually co-refer. What facts should be included in Con? S's
evidence that (71) and (72) report the same attitude. What is S’s evidence? First, that A
acquired the term "Zeus" from reading a particular book of the Greek myths. Second, that
C acquired the father of Mercury" from hearing or reading of the Roman myths. Third,
that the Roman myths are merely re-tellings of the Greek ones. These three facts about the
actual world make up Con in Example 2. If these facts are sufficient, then in the closest
possible world in which the facts in Con hold and in which "Zeus" and "the father of
Mercury refer, Zeus and "the father of Mercury" will refer to the same thing.
Now consider Context IV. We are interested in determining whether the term,
the witch Hob thinks blighted Bob’s mare" and some agent term such as "the witch I
(Nob) heard about from Y" counterfactually co-refer. What is R's evidence that (69)—
Nob wonders whether the witch who Hob thinks blighted Bob’s mare killed cob’s sow-
and "Nob wonders whether the witch Nob heard about from Y killed Cob’s sow" report
the same attitude of Nob’s? First, Hob thinks one and only one witch is responsible for
the blighting of Bob’s mare. Second, Hob comes to think there was a witch about that is
responsible for the blighting of Bob’s mare through conversation with X. X and X’s
conversation with Hob explain how Hob came to think there was a witch roaming Gotham
in the first place. Third, X comes to believe there was a witch about through conversation
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with Z. Thus, in Context IV, Con contains facts about how Hob came to believe there
was a witch and how Hob's source, X, came to believe there was a witch and so on.
R s evidence also includes other facts. Fourth, Nob, through conversation with
Y, comes to believe there is a witch plaguing Gotham and wonders whether she killed
Cob’s sow. Y and Y's conversation with Nob explain how Nob came to believe there is a
witch plaguing Gotham. Fifth, Y comes to believe there was a witch plaguing Gotham
through conversation with Z. Thus, in Context IV, Con will also contain facts about how
Nob came to believe there was a witch plaguing Gotham and about Nob's source. Y, and
about Y's source, Z, and, if necessary, about Z's source, and so on. If all the facts
included in Con are sufficient, then in the closest possible world in which "the witch Hob
thinks blighted Bob's mare" and "the witch I (Nob) heard about from Y" refer, they will
co-refer.
To summarize: given some agent term, "a", and some speaker. S, who utters "A
believes [Pt
s
]" the context of utterance. Con, of "A believes [PtJ" is all the facts that S
could use as evidence that "A believes |Pt.]" reports the same attitude as "A believes [Pa]"
and so that t = a. Such facts will include facts about how A. S, and perhaps even S's
audience came to acquire certain beliefs that could be reported using the terms "a" and "t."
Facts about how A. S, and S's audience came to acquire these beliefs will include
conversations A, S, and S's audience have engaged in, various forms of media they have
interacted with, observations of the environment they have made, etc. The chain of facts
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can be earned back further to include how A's and S's and S’s audience's sources came to
acquire certain beliefs. The sources of the sources and so can in turn be evoked and
included in Con. If the evidence is sufficient, in the closest possible world in which "t"
and ex both refer, t and cx will be one and the same entity.
Conclusion
Having now considered and rejected numerous attempts to solve Geach's Puzzle,
only three viable options remain. There is Walter Edelberg's theory, E2, Nicholas
Asher s Discourse Representation Theory solution, and finally my pronoun of laziness
interpretation. As we saw in Chapters IV and V, E2 and Asher's DR theory, both involve
quantification over ideas or notional objects. Both propose to solve Geach's Puzzle by
introducing a special relationship that holds between one of Hob's ideas and one of Nob's
ideas. According to Edelberg, Hob's idea and Nob's ideas can be counterparts, i.e.
connected by a chain of ideas. According to DR theory, two notional objects can be
anchored to each other. According to Asher, Hob's and Nob's ideas are anchored to each
other if the ideas are connected by a reference chain. Unfortunately, Edelberg and Asher
leave ideas, notional objects, counterparts, chains of ideas, anchors, and reference chains
largely unexplained.
As we saw in the previous two sections of this chapter, my solution interprets the
"she" in (1) as a pronoun of laziness standing proxy for a speaker term--a term (i) used in
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a report ot a propositional attitude of some agent. A. and (ii) which A would not use. for
whatever reason, to report the propositional attitude. The speaker term is given narrow
syntactic scope relative to "Nob wonders whether" in order to capture the fact that Nob
may have no particular object in mind. At the same time, given TCI and AC 1. the
resulting sentence is a true and accurate report, even in problematic contexts such as
Contexts II, IV and V. I shall conclude this chapter, and this dissertation, by briefly
comparing my pronoun of laziness solution, call it Gl, with E2 and Asher's DR theory.
E2 and DR theory both explicitly appeal to mysterious and unexplained entities—
viz ideas or notional objects. On the surface at least, Gl does not appeal to such entities.
Unfortunately, since Edelberg and Asher do not tell us what ideas or notional objects are
we cannot be certain (i) whether appeal to such entities is unwanted and (ii) whether Gl is
making use of them or not. Recall that even though Edelberg leaves the nature of ideas
unexplained, he does think treating ideas as names is promising.251 Clearly, Gl is also
explicitly committed to names. If ideas are interpreted as world lines of some sort, then
even though Gl does not make explicit appeal to such entities, Gl will require such
entities, since Gl does compare possible worlds and the objects in them. Finally, even if
ideas are some sort of world-bound individuals Gl may still have to appeal to such entities
to account for the attitudes of non-linguistic animals. Thus, we cannot yet tell whether
E2, DR theory, and Gl differ in their ontological commitments or not.
Edelberg, "Intentional Identity and the Attitudes," 564.
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E2 and DR theory both introduce theoretical machinery solely for the purpose of
solving Geach’s Puzzle. E2 introduces the notions of ideas being counterparts and of
chains of ideas. DR theory introduces the notion of two notional objects being anchored,
and from Asher at least, the notion of referential chains. There appears to be no other
motivation for introducing these notions other than explaining intentional identity
sentences. Gl, however, introduces theoretical machinery in order to explain the general
phenomenon, of which intentional identity statements are merely a part, of reporting
people s attitudes using expressions that they would not use to report their own attitudes.
Thus, Gl has the advantages of (i) having an independent motivation for introducing the
theoretical machinery of narrow scope speaker terms and the truth conditions for sentences
containing such speaker terms and (ii) unifying certain problematic uses of intentional
identity statements with a wide range of other statements.
Regardless of the slight advantage G 1 may have over E2 and DR theory, given our
initial goal of solving Geach's Puzzle, all three options deserve more attention. Areas for
such attention might include (i) determining the nature of ideas/notional objects and the
counterpart/anchoring relation that can hold between them; (ii) given more complete
versions of E2 and TAA, providing a comparison of the the three theories to determine (a)
whether or not they are versions of the same theory and (b) if they are not, if there are
reasons to adopt one theory rather than the others; and (iii) integrating the theories into a
general theory of propositional attitude reports.
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I conclude that we have three possible solutions to Geach's Puzzle that deserve
further analysis. E2 and TAA explain intentional identity by appeal, ng to ideas and a
special relation between them. G1 explains intent,onal identity in tenns of the common
linguistic phenomenon of anaphora and reporting the attitudes of others using terms that
the holders of the attitudes would not use rather than as a completely independent
phenomenon that requires its own explanation. Once pronouns in intentional identity
statements are treated as pronouns of laziness, intentional identity statements show the
same de dicto/de re variations that attitude reports involving a single agent show. With
the introduction of the distinction between speaker terms and agent terms all the variations
can be given adequate translations regardless of the number of agents involved.
Intentional identity statements such as (1) are no exception.
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APPENDIX
SENTENCES(1)
Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether she (the same
witch) killed Cob's sow.
(la) 3 witch-term x (Hob thinks [Bxm] & Nob thinks [Kxs?]).
(lb) 3x3y3z3w3u3v[('Hob' Des x & 'a witch' Spec y & 'blighted Bob’s mare'
Spec z & x thinks <y, z>) & ('Nob' Des w & ’she’ Spec u & ’killed Cob’s sow'
Spec v & w wonders whether <u, v>) & SS (y, u)].
(lc)
x,P
Hob(x)
ThirikiX p)
P: y, z
vitch(y)
Bob's mejre(z)
blightedfo.z)
u,q
Nob(u)
Wonders vhether<u, q)
q:
v, v
Cob's 30M.V)
killed(v, v)
(Id)
X,P u, q
Hob(x) Nob(u)
Thin]fep) Wonders vhether(u, q)
p: y, z
n
’ V
,
X7
xzitch(y)
4.-
Cob's 3ow(v)
Bob's mare(z) killed(v, v)
blighted(y,z)
<x, Hob>
<m, Nob>
{y, y’}
{v, V}
[y', v'l
(2) As regards some witch, Hob thinks she has blighted Bob’s mare, and Nob wonders
whether she killed Cob’s sow,
(2a) 3x(Wx & Hob thinks [Bxm] & Nob wonders whether [Kxs]).
(2b) 3 px(Wx & Hob thinks [Bxm] & Nob wonders whether [Kxs]).
(3) As regards somebody, Hob thinks she is a witch and has blighted Bob's mare, and
Nob wonders whether she killed Cob's sow,
(3a) 3x(Hob thinks [Wx & Bxm] & Nob wonders whether [Kxs]).
(3b) 3 px(Hob believes [Wx & Bxm] & Nob wonders whether [Kxs]).
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(3c) 3 px(Hob thinks [Wx &Bxm] & Nob wonders whether [Kxs]).
(3d) 3 Dx(Hob thinks [Wx &Bxm] & Nob wonders whether [Kxs]).
(3e) 3 p
px(Hob thinks [Wx &Bxm] & Nob wonder whether [Kxs]).
(3f) 3 D
px(Hob thinks [Wx &Bxm] & Nob wonders whether [ Kxs]).
(3g) 3 P
px(Hob thinks [W(v(x)) & B(v(x),m)j & Nob wonders whether
I
K(v(x),s) ])
(4) Hob and Nob had some one person in mind as a suspected witch.
(5) As regards Jil or Lil, Hob thinks one (he knows not which) is a witch and has blighted
Bob's mare, and Nob wonder whether she (the same one) killed Cob’s sow.
(6) As regards Jil or Lil, Hob thinks one (he knows not which) is a witch.
(6a) 3x3y{(x = 1 & y = j) & (Hob thinks [Wx] v Hob thinks [Wy[)
}
(6b) 3x3y{(x = 1 & y = j) & Hob thinks [Wx v Wy]}
(7) As regards somebody, Hob thinks she is a witch.
(8) Hob has some one person in mind as a witch.
(9) Hob thinks somebody is a witch.
(10) I owe John a horse.
(10a) () [3x{Hx & G
i
j x } [
.
(11) There is a horse I owe John.
(11a) 3x[Hx & (){ Gijx } |.
(12a) Hob thinks 3xJWx & Bxm] & Nob wonders whether [Kxs].
(13) Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether the witch
who blighted Bob's mare killed Cob's sow.
(13a) Hob thinks [3x(Wx & Bxm)] & Nob wonders whether [3x(Wx & Bxm &
Kxs)]
(13b) Hob thinks [3x(Wx & Bxm)] & Nob wonders whether [K(ix(Wx &
Bxm), s)]
(13c) Hob thinks [3x(Wx & Bxm)] & Nob wonders whether [3x(Wx & Bxm &
Vy(Wy & Bym — x = y) & Kxs)]
( 14) Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare and Nob wonders whether just one witch
blighted Bob's mare, and she killed Cob’s sow.
(15) Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob’s mare and Nob assumes that just one witch
blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether she (the same witch) killed Cob's sow.
(16) Nob wonders whether just one witch blighted Bob's mare and (Nob wonders
whether) she killed Cob's sow.
(17) Nob assumes just one witch blighted Bob's mare and Nob wonders whether she
killed Cob's sow.
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(17a) Nob assumes [3x(Wx & Bxm & Vy(Wy & Bym - x = y)J & Nob
wonders whether [Kxs].
(18) Nob assumes that just one witch blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether the
witch who blighted Bob’s mare killed Cob's sow.
(18a) Nob assumes [3x(Wx & Bxm & Vy((Wy & Bym) - x = y))j & Nob
wonders whether [K(ix(Wx & Bxm), s)].
( 19) Nob assumes that just one witch blighted Bob’s mare, and Nob assumes that just one
witch is such that Nob assumes it to have blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether
she (the latter witch?) killed Cob’s sow.
(20) Nob assumes just one witch blighted Bob’s mare and Nob assumes just one witch
blighted Bob’s mare and wonders whether she killed Cob’s sow.
(2 1 ) Hob thinks that the (one and only) witch that is F has blighted Bob’s mare and Nob
wonders whether the witch that is F killed Cob’s sow.
(21a) Hob thinks [B(ix(Wx & Fx). m)] & Nob wonders whether [K(ix(Wx &
Fx), s]
) John believes that there is a man at the door, and Paul believes that he (that man) is a
burglar.
(23) John believes that there is a blue round square and Paul thinks that it is hollow.
(24) Pegasus does not exist.
(24a) 3a(a = the sense of "Pegasus” & ~3x (Aax)).
(25) Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob’s mare.
(25a) Hob thinks [3x(Wx & Bxm)].
(25b) 3 a( Witch-aspect a & Hob thinks [Bam]).
(25c) 3 a(Witch-aspect a & 3x(Wx & Aax) & Hob thinks [Bam]).
X, p
Hob(x)
Think(x, P)
p: y, 2
witch(y)
Bob’s mare(z)
blighted(y,z)
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<x, Hob>
<y f
(-6) The sense of Hecate" is a witch-aspect and is an aspect of Hecate and Hob thinks
IHecate blighted Bob's mare|.
(27) Hob thinks that Hecate blighted Bob's mare.
(28) There is a witch-guise, a. such that Hob thinks |a has blighted Bob's mare| and Nob
wonders whether [a killed Cob’s sow].
(29) There is an aspect a such that a is a witch-aspect and Hob thinks |a blighted Bob's
mare] & Nob wonders whether [a killed Cob's sow].
(30) There is some guise, a, with witchhood in its core that Hob thinks is
consubstantiated with the guise, c{ having blighted Bob’s mare}, and that Nob wonders
whether is consubstantiated with the guise, cjhaving killed Cob's sow}.
(30a) 3a (a (W) & Hob thinks(C*(a, c{having blighted Bob's mare})] & Nob
wonders whether [C*(a, c{having killed Cob's sow})]).
(30b) 3a (a(W) & C**(a, ajbeing thought by Hob to have blighted Bob's mare])
& C**(a, afbeing wondered whether by Nob to have killed Cob's sow])).
(31) Oedipus believes the previous King of Thebes is dead.
(31a) C**(c{the previous King of Thebes}, c{the previous King of Thebes, being
believed by Oedipus to be dead}).
(32) There is some guise, a, with witchhood in its core that is consociated |by Hob] with
the guise, cjhaving blighted Bob's mare} and is consociated [by Nob] with the guise,
c{having killed Cob's sow}.
(32a) 3a(a(W) & [Hob]C**(a, c{having blighted Bob's mare}) & [Nob]C**(a.
c{ having killed Cob's sow})).
(33a) 3x3y(x(W) & y(W) & Hob thinks [C*(x, c{having blighted Bob's mare})]
and Nob wonders whether ]C*(y, c{having killed Cob's sow}] & C*( x,y)).
(34a) 3x3y(x(W) & y(W) & Hob thinks |C*(x, cjhaving blighted Bob's mare})]
and Nob wonders whether |C*(y,c{ having killed Cob's sow}] & C**( x,y)).
(25e) X,P
Hob(x)
Thiiik(x, p)
p: y, 2
vitch(y)
Bob's mare(s)
blighted(y,z)
227
(35) Jimmy believes there is a lady on the stairs.
(35a) a^Jimmy believes |Lx & Sx]).
(35b) 3pX(Jimmy believes [Lx & Sx]).
(35c) Jimmy believes [3x(Lx & Sx)|.
(36a) 3pX(a believes [Px]).
(37a) 3 p
p
x(Hob thinks [Wx & Bxm] & 3 ppy(Nob wonders whether [Kys] &
x = y)).
(37b) 3 p
p
x(Hob thinks |W(v(x)) & B(v(x).m)| & 3/y(Nob wonders whether
[K(v(y), s)] & v(x) = v(y)))
(38a) 3a(Hob thinks [Wa & Bam] & Nob wonders whether [Kas])
(39a) 3a(Hob thinks [Wa & Barn) & 3(3(Nob wonders whether [K(3s] &
a R (3)).
(40)
Tom believes that Pegasus flies and Ralph believes that he eats grass.
(40a) 3x3y3z3w3u3v[(Tom' Des x & 'Pegasus' Spec y & 'flies’ Spec z & x
believes <y. z>) & ('Ralph' Des w & 'he' Spec u & 'eats grass' Spec v & w
believes <u, v>)].
(40b) 3x3y3z3w3u3v[('Tom’ Des x & 'Pegasus' Spec y & 'flies' Spec z & x
believes <y, z>) & ('Ralph' Des w & 'he' Spec u & 'eats grass' Spec v & w
believes <u, v>) & SS (y, u)|.
(41) Tom believes a horse flies and Ralph believes he eats grass.
(42) Pegasus flies.
(42a) 3x('Pegasus' Des x & x flies)
(43) Tom believes that Pegasus flies.
(44)
(43a) 3x3y3z('Tom’ Des x & 'Pegasus' Spec y & 'flies' Spec z & x believes
<y,z>)
Socrates is bald.
(44a)
x
Socrates(x)
B9Jd(x)
(45) The American team believes the Great Attractor is at twice the distance of the Hydra-
Centaurus supercluster and the Russian team thinks it is at 2.1 times that distance.
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(46a) 3 cx(The American team believesfa is at twice the distance of the Hydra-
Centaraus cluster]) & 3 (3(The Russian team thinks [(3 is at 2. 1 times that
distance]).
(47) Detective A believes someone murdered Sm.th and Detective B believes he murdered
Jones.
(47a) 3a(A believes [Mas] & B believes [Maj]).
(48) Detective B believes someone murdered Jones and Detective A believes he murdered
Smith.
(48a) 3a(B believes [Maj] & A believes [Mas]).
(49) Detective A believes someone murdered Smith and Detective B believes the person
who murdered Smith murdered Jones.
(50) Detective B believes someone murdered Jones and Detective A believes the person
who murdered Jones murdered Smith.
(51) Detective A thinks someone murdered the mayor and Detective B thinks he murdered
the commissioner.
(51a) 3a| A thinks M(a, ixYx) & B thinks M(a, ixCx)].
(52) Detective B thinks someone murdered the commissioner and Detective A thinks he
murdered the mayor.
(53) Detective A thinks someone murdered the mayor and Detective B thinks the person
who murdered the mayor murdered the commissioner,
(54) Detective A thinks someone murdered the mayor and Detective B thinks the person
Detective A thinks murdered the mayor murdered the commissioner.
(55) Hob thinks a witch blighted Bob's mare and Nob wonders whether the witch Hob
thinks blighted Bob’s mare killed Cob's sow.
(56a) Hob thinks [3x(Wx & Bxm)] & Nob wonders whether [K(ix(Wx &
Hob thinks [Bxm]), s)].
(56b) Hob thinks [3x(Wx & Bxm)] & Nob wonders whether [K(ix(Wx & Hob
thinks (Bxm])
s
,
s)].
(56) Detective A thinks the person who shot Smith murdered the mayor and Detective B
thinks the person who shot Smith murdered the commissioner.
(57) B thinks A gave something to the Chicago Museum of Natural History, and D thinks
it's a large wooden boat taken from an Egyptian pyramid.
(57a) 3a(B thinks [A gave a to the Chicago Museum of Natural History] & D
thinks ]a is a large wooden boat taken from an Egyptian pyramid.]).
(58) B thinks that A gave the only wooden artifact presently in the Chicago Museum of
Natural History to the Chicago Museum of Natural History, and D thinks the only
wooden artifact presently in the Chicago Musuem ofNatural History is a large wooden
boat taken from an Egyptian pyramid.
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(59) B thinks A gave something to the Chicago Museum of Natural History, and D thinksthe thing A gave to the Chicago Museum of Natural History is a large wooden boat taken
rrom an Egyptian pyramid.
(60) Detective A thinks F murdered the mayor and Detective B thinks F murdered the
commissioner.
(61) B thinks A gave the priceless wooden Aztec statue to the Chicago Museum of Natural
History, and D thinks the priceless wooden Aztec statue is a large wooden boat taken from
an Egyptian pyramid.
(62) The American team believes the object responsible for the peculiar motions of Hydra-
Centaurus and Local superclusters is at twice the distance of the Hydra-Centaurus
supercluster and the Soviet team thinks the object responsible for the peculiar motions of
the Hydra-Centaurus supercluster is at 2.1 times that distance.
(63) The American team thinks the Great Attractor is at twice the distance of the Hydra-
Centaurus cluster.
(64) A believes someone shot Smith and B believes he shot Jones.
(64c) 3 ca3P(A believes [a shot Smith] & B believes [P shot Jones] & aRP)
.
(65) B believes someone shot Jones and A believes he shot Smith.
(65a) 3a3p(B believes [P shot Jones] & A believes fa shot Smith] & pRa)
.
(65b)
n,q'
Detective B(u)
Believes(u, q')
q': v\ v'
Jones(V)
Shot(v\ V)
x,P'
Detective A(x)
Believes(x, p')
P': y
,
2*
SmitlI(z , )
ShoXy'.z 1 )
<u, B>
<x, A>
<V
,
Jones>
<z '
,
Smiths
{?,?>
[Ml
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D
‘“
C) 3Ca3 P(B believes l« shot Jones| & A believes [p shot Smtth| & aRR)
(66) B believes someone shot Smith and A believes he did not shoot Jones.
,,,, Jfa) 3 « 3« B believes |p shot Smith] & A believes [-(a shot Jones)] & 0R«)(67) Nob wonders whether she killed Cob's sow.
(68) Nob wonders whether the witch who blighted Bob's mare killed Cob’s sow.
(68a) Nob wonders whether fK(ix(Wx & Bxm), s)].
(69) Nob wonders whether the witch who Hob thinks blighted Bob’s mare killed Cob's
sow.
(69a) Nob wonders whether [K(ix(Wx & Hob thinks[Bxm]), s)J.
(69b) 3x(x = ix(Wx & Hob thinks(Bxmj) & Nob wonders whether [Kxs]).
(69c) 3 x(x = ix(Wx & Hob thinks! Bxm]) & Nob wonders whether [Kxs]).
(69d) 3a(a = ix(W x & Hob thinks'[Bxm]) & Nob wonders whether [K'as]).
(69e) Nob wonders whether [K(ix(Wx & Hob thinks|Bxm])
s
,
s)].
(70) A believes Santa Claus wears a red suit.
(71 ) A thinks the father of Mercury is quite a philanderer.
(71a) A thinks (Pix(Fxm)].
(71b) A thinks [Pix(Fxm)J.
(72) A thinks Zeus is quite the philanderer.
(72a) A thinks [Pz].
(73) Hob thinks the witch he (Hob) read about in the Tribune blighted Bob's mare.
(74) Nob wonder whether the witch he (Nob) read about in the Tribune killed Cob’s sow.
(74a) Nob wonders whether [K(ix(Wx & Rnxt), s)].
(75) Nob wonders whether the witch he (Nob) heard about from Y killed Cob's sow.
(76) Hob thinks that witch he (Hob) heard about from X blighted Bob’s mare.
(77) A thinks Karl Watson murdered Smith.
(77a) A thinks |Mk
s
s|.
(78) A thinks Karl Watson did not murder Smith.
(79) A thinks the tallest man is over 100.
(80) It is not the case that A thinks Karl Watson murdered Smith.
(80a) ~(A thinks [Mks]).
(81) A thinks Karl Watson murdered Smith and Karl Watson did not murder Smith.
(82) A believes George is at the front door.
(83) A believes Bessy is smelly.
(84) Of Bessy, A believes she is smelly.
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